Does the Public Hold Governors Accountable for Policy Outcomes?

• Author: Jennifer Wolak,Srinivas Parinandi
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/10659129211041044
• Published date: 01 December 2022
• Date: 01 December 2022

Article

PoliticalResearchQuarterly

2022,Vol.75(4)1051–1064

©TheAuthor(s)2021

Articlereuseguidelines:

sagepub.com/journals-permissions

DOI:10.1177/10659129211041044

journals.sagepub.com/home/prq

DoesthePublicHoldGovernors

AccountableforPolicyOutcomes?

JenniferWolak

1

andSrinivasParinandi

2

Abstract

Whataretheoriginsofgubernatorialpopularity?Paststudiesdebatewhethergovernorsaresubstantivelyevaluated

basedontheirperformanceinoffice,withsomearguingthattheoriginsofapprovalmaybeidiosyncratictoparticular

governors.Thesestudiestypicallyconsidergubernatorialapprovalinahandfulofstatesorpatternsofapprovalinthe

aggregate.Weimproveonthisresearchbydrawingonaricherdatasource:theCooperativeCongressionalElection

Study.Weconsiderbothindividual-levelandstate-levelexplanationsofgubernatorialpopularitywithasampleofover

300,000respondentsacrossthe50statesfrom2006to2018.Weexplorehowparty,policyoutcomes,andgovernment

performanceshapelevelsofgubernatorialapproval.Weshowthatpeopleevaluategovernorsbasedontheideological

directionofpolicyoutcomesinthestates.Whenstatepolicyoutcomesalignwiththeirideologicalpreferences,people

reporthigherlevelsofapprovalforthejobperformanceoftheirgovernor.Wealsoconfirmtheimportanceofpartyand

stateeconomicperformanceforgubernatorialapproval.

Keywords

governors,approval,gubernatorialapproval,policyoutcomes,publicopinion

Forgovernors,theirpopularitywiththeelectorateisa

valuedresource.Whenseekingreelection,governorswho

enjoyhighlevelsofpublicsupportarebetterabletoward

offstrongchallengersandaremorelikelytosecurethe

supportofvotersintheirstate(Bardwell2002;Kenney

andRice1983;King2001;Svoboda1995).Withinstate

government,publicapprovalservesasaninformalpower

forgovernors(BeyleandFerguson2008).Populargov-

ernorsareperceivedasmoreinfluentialbystatelegislators

(Cohen2018)andtendtoachievegreatersuccessat

implementingtheirpolicygoals(KousserandPhillips

2012).Withinstatebureaucracies,greatergubernatorial

approvalservesasusefulinformalpowerthatgrants

governorsgreaterinfluenceoverbureaucrats(Dometrius

2002;SigelmanandDometrius1988).Inthecaseofstate

judiciaries,populargovernorsaremorelikelytoseetheir

executivepowerupheldbystatesupremecourtjustices

(Johnson2015).

Giventheimportanceofgubernatorialapprovalin

politics,weareinterestedinbetterunderstandingitsor-

igins.Somewhatsurprisingly,priorstudiesofguberna-

torialapprovalhaveraiseddoubtsaboutwhether

governorsaresubstantivelyevaluatedbasedontheirjob

performance.Somefailtofindmuchleverageoverex-

plainingtheoriginsofgubernatorialapproval,suggesting

thatrootsofpopularitymaybeidiosyncratictoparticular

governors(AdamsandSquire2001;CrewandWeiher

1996).Otherstudiesdisagreeonwhetherevenfunda-

mentalslikepartisanshipandeconomicperformancein-

formgubernatorialapproval(e.g.,Cohen1983;Larimer

2015;MacDonaldandSigelman1999;Orth2001).If

governorsarenotevaluatedbasedontheoutcomesor

performanceofstategovernment,thenitraisesconcerns

aboutwhethercitizensareabletoprovideameaningful

checkontheelectedofficialsintheirstate.Tothedegree

towhichgubernatorialpopularityisusedbystateexec-

utivestoachieveinfluencewithstatelegislatorsand

bureaucrats,itmightnotbearesourcethathasbeen

sincerelyearnedbygovernors.

Usingresponsesfromthe2006to2018Cooperative

CongressionalElectionStudy,weexploreboth

1

DepartmentofPoliticalScience,MichiganStateUniversity,EastLansing,

MI,USA

2

DepartmentofPoliticalScience,UniversityofColorado,Boulder,CO,

USA

CorrespondingAuthor:

JenniferWolak,DepartmentofPoliticalScience,MichiganState

University,318SouthKedzieHall,EastLansing,MI48824,USA.

Email:wolakjen@msu.edu