Does nation building work?

• Author: Payne, James L.
• Position: REFLECTIONS

In plunging into war, hope generally triumphs over experience. The past--the quiet statistical tabulation of what happened when such plunges were taken before--tends to be ignored in the heat of angry oratory and the thump of military boots. At the outset, it is easy to believe that force will be successful in upholding virtue and that history has no relevance.

Lately, this confidence in the force of arms has centered on nation building--that is, on invading and occupying a land afflicted by dictatorship or civil war and turning it into a democracy. This objective has been a major theme of the U.S. government's recent actions in Iraq and Afghanistan, but the policy is not likely to be limited to those countries. The U.S. government now enjoys a military preeminence in the world, and the temptation to deploy its armed forces to repair or transform other regimes is likely to prove attractive again in the future.

Moreover, the idea of invading countries to "fix" them has recently gained considerable support in the academic and foreign-policy community. Among the first to advocate the assertive use of U.S. military forces around the world were William Kristol and Robert Kagan. In a 1996 article in Foreign Affairs, they urged the United States to adopt a posture of "benevolent global hegemony." This means "actively promoting American principles of governance abroad--democracy, free markets, respect for liberty" (27). To John Quincy Adams's advice that America should not go "abroad in search of monsters to destroy," they mockingly replied, "But why not?" (31). In their endorsement for foreign-policy activism, Kagan and Kristol have been joined by a number of policy wonks, journalists, and academics, a group that has come to be known as "neoconservatives."

In their enthusiasm for nation building by force of arms, neither the theorists nor the practitioners have examined the historical experience with this kind of policy. They are aware that a historical record exists, but they do not take it seriously. In a speech two weeks before the invasion of Iraq, President George W. Bush pointed to other interventions that had been successful:

 America has made and kept this kind of commitment before--in the peace that followed a world war. After defeating enemies, we did not leave behind occupying armies, we left constitutions and parliaments. We established an atmosphere of safety, in which responsible, reform-minded local leaders could build lasting institutions of freedom. In societies that once bred fascism and militarism, liberty found a permanent home. There was a time when many said that the cultures of Japan and Germany were incapable of sustaining democratic values. Well, they were wrong. (Bush 2003) 

Although this reference to Germany and Japan demonstrates an interest in the past, it is disappointingly selective. Yes, Germany and Japan would seem to be success stories for the idea that a U.S. army of occupation can leave behind an enduring democracy. But these cases are not the only pertinent ones. U.S. military forces have gone into troubled countries dozens of times through the years, but without the same results. They went into Cuba three times and tried to set up a democracy--in 1898, again in 1906, and again in 1917. Each time, after the troops left, civil war and dictatorship followed, and what has apparently found a "permanent home" in Cuba is not liberty but Fidel Castro's dictatorship.

Kristol and Kagan are equally selective in their use of the historical record. In the Foreign Affairs article in which they advocate a muscular foreign policy, they approvingly cite the case of Haiti, where, they observe, "the United States completed the withdrawal of 15,000 soldiers after restoring a semblance of democratic government" (1996, 21). Again, the method of historical comparison is used carelessly. If Kristol and Kagan wish to claim that the U.S. military invasions succeed in establishing democracy, they are obliged to review all the cases of intervention. A disinterested analyst does not point to one case that appears to support the policy and ignore the cases that do not support it. In fact, even the Haiti case contradicts their thesis. Haiti appeared to represent a success story only during the brief period in 1996, when Kristol and Kagan were writing their article. Shortly afterward, it sank back into violent anarchy, the condition in which it remains today.

In pondering the policy of nation building, then, we need an overall picture of how such efforts turn out. Before government leaders roll the dice of war, invading a country in the hope of establishing a democracy, they ought to know what their odds are.

The first step is to compile a list of cases. I focus here on the strongest, military version of nation building, illustrated by the case of Iraq: the use of ground troops to support a deliberate effort to establish a democracy. I leave aside many cases of lesser military involvements, such as episodes in which the United States sent only military aid or military advisors, funded rebel movements, or used only air power or sea power. If these lesser interventions fail, one can always say that the democratic power did not make a serious effort. The insertion of ground troops, however, manifests a high level of seriousness. It generally gives the occupier sweeping powers, including the ability to replace government officials, to establish political bodies such as legislatures, and to hold elections. My definition of nation building also requires that the invading country make "a deliberate effort to establish a democracy." Thus, I leave aside purely peacekeeping missions, punitive missions, and countries with U.S. military bases, but with no significant U.S. role in local politics. (1)

Who Are the Nation Builders?

Most discussions about spreading democracy focus on the United States as the nation builder, but other countries have also attempted this kind of project. Generations ago, many European nations, both as colonial powers and as the managers of trusteeships, were deeply involved in invading and administering foreign lands. Can the record of their accomplishments or failures be included in assessing the validity of the nation-building policy?

The problem is that colonialism, for most of the European nations, did not involve an effort to promote democracy. Countries such as Spain, Portugal, France, and Belgium were not themselves especially...