Does Local Autonomy Enhance Representation? The Influence of Home Rule on County Expenditures

AuthorJaclyn Bunch
Published date01 June 2014
DOI10.1177/0160323X14536589
Date01 June 2014
Subject MatterGeneral Interests
SLG536589 106..117 General Interest
State and Local Government Review
2014, Vol. 46(2) 106-117
Does Local Autonomy
ª The Author(s) 2014
Reprints and permission:
Enhance Representation?
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DOI: 10.1177/0160323X14536589
The Influence of Home Rule
slgr.sagepub.com
on County Expenditures
Jaclyn Bunch1
Abstract
This article examines the interactive role between institution type and ideology at the local
governmental level, demonstrating that additional degrees of autonomy allow for meaningful policy
decisions locally. With increased discretion over policy expenditures, autonomy enhances the
opportunity for ideological representation of constituents. The article explores the role of auton-
omy in county governments in Florida over a thirty-year period, questioning whether ideological
dispositions of constituents are reflected in redistributive expenditures. Findings support the claim
that local governments, with an augmented degree of autonomy provided via charter governance,
may exhibit more flexibility in policy priorities than counties without more autonomous institutions.
Keywords
autonomy, responsiveness, home rule, county governance, hierarchy, redistribution, county charter
Introduction
discretion on governmental outcomes. Specifi-
cally, the article explores whether possession
Can institutional arrangements that grant addi-
of a county charter allows local governments
tional discretion to the local governments pro-
to spend differently than those governments that
duce diverse outcomes? Whether or not local
do not possess a charter. This is important for
governments have much control over the poli-
scholars and practitioners alike, as it can both
cies and programs they produce is something
help to understand the actual power and capabil-
that has been argued for some time. Some argue
ities of local governments and highlights the
that localities and municipalities are nearly
inequity of local discretion between those that
powerless and unable to produce representative
possess a charter and those that are without.
governance due to their limited nature. How-
ever, this characterization ignores the institu-
tional diversity that exists across local units;
1 Department of Political Science and Criminal Justice,
some governments have more power and discre-
University of South Alabama, Mobile, AL, USA
tion than others. One important local govern-
mental institutional difference is degrees of
Corresponding Author:
Jaclyn Bunch, Department of Political Science and Criminal
autonomy, such as enhancement through home
Justice, 5991 USA Drive N., HUMB 226, University of
rule and charter governance. This article will
South Alabama, Mobile, AL 36688, USA.
examine the effect of local governmental
Email: jbunch@southalabama.edu; jbunch@fsu.edu

Bunch
107
It is often the case that state policies con-
governance is a form of home rule in that it
strict local governments to inaction (Frug and
grants discretion to the local government. Some
Barron 2008) and that the top-down effect of
states make charter governance available to
state regulations and policies undermine the
selected local units. While both municipalities
capabilities of local governments (Peterson
and counties may possess charters, this article
1981, 1995; Stephens and Wikstrom 2007;
will look specifically at county-level charters
Nelson 1986). Thus, some have argued that the
in Florida. The ability to adopt a charter in the
hierarchical setup, and Dillon’s rule, in the
state of Florida was granted in 1968 and is open
United States may have rendered local govern-
to all counties. As of 2009, twenty of the sixty-
ment action as limited at best. However, the
seven Florida counties had adopted a charter.
limitations are not uniform across localities.
Charters are important as they grant greater lev-
Recent studies have found that state actions do
els of discretion to the governments that adopt
not always influence local governments in the
them. Two of the major liberties of charter sta-
same fashion (Richardson 2011; Stephens and
tus in the state of Florida are the ability to pass
Wikstrom 2007). Various arrangements may
local laws and assess additional fees and/or
increase the input of local community prefer-
taxes. In addition to the ability to generate addi-
ences in policy decisions, revenue generation,
tional revenue and the power to pass local laws,
and spending (Berkman and Plutzer 2011;
charter counties in Florida may choose to allow
Benton 2002, 2003a, 2003b, 2012). In fact,
citizen initiative proposals and recall elections
adoption of more autonomous institutions such
at the county level. Charter governance can
as charter governance, which is a form of home
be adopted through a simple process in which
rule, may mediate the relationship between state
a charter is drafted and approved by popular
action and local policy (Percival, Johnson, and
vote within the county. The charter then has
Neiman 2009; Stephens and Wikstrom 2007;
legal standing so long as it does not conflict
Boschken 1998). The proposition that the legis-
with state statutes or the state constitution.
lative discretion and fiscal sovereignty granted
Charter provisions are but one way that
by charters allow for rule by local governments
home rule is provided to local governments.
to be expanded and more free needs to be exam-
Since the 1980s, the services offered by coun-
ined thoroughly as it is essential in understand-
ties have increased and therefore the counties
ing governmental behavior, especially on the
must be able to possess additional levels of
county level (Turnbull and Geon 2006).
authority (Benton and Rigos 1985). Particularly
Home rule refers to a state constitutional
important is the ability of counties to levy fees
provision or legislative action that provides a
and taxes to provide these additional services.
city or county government with a greater mea-
Studies have suggested that charter governance
sure of self-government (Richardson, Gough,
can increase both own-source revenue and
and Puentes 2003; Richardson 2011; Fix and
increase the total collections of individual
Kenyon 1990). Home rule allows for a higher
taxes, such as sales tax (Benton 2003a). How-
degree of autonomy over policy outputs for
ever, this varies from states to state. Some
local governments and may serve to combat
states, like New Jersey and Ohio, guarantee
or lessen pressures from the state, most com-
home rule within their constitution. Other
monly found in the form of state mandates
states, as is the case with Florida and states such
(Percival, Johnson, and Neiman 2009; Benton
as Oregon and South Dakota, allow counties or
and Rigos 1985, among others). It is often used
cities to adopt charters (Stephens and Wikstrom
as an indicator of autonomy due to its grants in
2007). Overall, thirty-nine states within the
powers and contrast to the determinations of
United States permit home rule in some form
Dillon’s rule (Geon and Turnbull 2004; Krane,
on the local level. In some instances, the discre-
Rigos, and Hill 2001; Weeks and Hardy 1984).
tion granted is limited to the assessment of local
In the United States, home rule status differs
taxes and fees, in others localities are granted
both within and across states. Charter
the ability to legislate locally. However, in

108
State and Local Government Review 46(2)
many instances, states grant both of these pow-
Florida counties, Sherwood notes that home
ers through home rule. The fact that Florida
rule provides a set of five benefits to chartered
charter counties may gain both fiscal and legis-
counties: accessibility (to representation), visi-
lative flexibility makes them perfect for study
bility (of officials’ actions), exclusivity over
and for broad applicability. Many states grant
revenue sources, flexibility in spending, and
home rule in various forms, but by studying a
direct authority. Of most importance here is the
form of home rule that grants both the types
flexibility in spending and direct authority over
of freedom this study may generalize to many
local ordinances. When local governments pos-
other states of interest.
sess authority and exclusivity over revenue
This article examines the impact of the spe-
sources, they also possess authority over expen-
cial rights and privileges of charter govern-
ditures and resource allocation. One of these
ments on policy outcomes. This will be done
advantages is the ability to levy additional taxes
by exploring the spending patterns of Florida
and assess certain specialized fees. As dis-
counties both prior to and after the adoption
cussed by Brian Galle (2009), certain ‘‘hidden
of a county charter. It is expected that the
fees,’’ such as the recently established Florida
higher level of discretion, granted through
charter county transit system surtax, allow for
charter governance, will produce a change in
additional revenue to be accrued by charter
the spending patterns of local officials in char-
governments. Galle defines these ‘‘fees’’ as
ter counties. Specifically, this work analyzes
hidden taxes and they are one means by which
the redistributive spending patterns of counties
charter counties gain liberty from top-down
to determine whether ideological preferences
forces and thus are able to enact policy in the
within a charter county affect spending choices.
preference of the local ideology.
While charter possession should increase all
Additional exclusive revenue sources such
areas of spending, redistributive...

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