Does Insurgent Selective Punishment Deter Collaboration? Evidence from the Drone War in Pakistan

• DOI: 10.1177/00220027211041158
• Author: Vincent Bauer,Michael Reese,Keven Ruby
• Published date: 01 February 2022
• Date: 01 February 2022
• Subject Matter: Articles

2022, Vol. 66(2) 297 –326

Does Insurgent

Selective Punishment

Deter Collaboration?

Evidence from the

Drone War in Pakistan

Vincent Bauer

1

, Michael Reese

2

, and Keven Ruby

3

Abstract

Scholars of civil wars have long argued that non-state actors can use selective punish-

ment to reduce collaboration with state adversaries. However, there is little systematic

evidence confirming this claim, nor investigation into the mechanisms at play. In this

paper, we provide such evidence from the drone war in Pakistan. Militants in Pakistan’s

tribal areas engaged in a brutal counterespionage campaign with the aim of reducing

collaboration with the United States. Our analysis combines a novel dataset of colla-

borator killings with data on drone strike outcomes. We find that strikes killed half as

many militant leaders and fighters following collaborator killings and that this suppressive

effect likely works by deterring spying in the future. Beyond providing an empirical

confirmation of the selective punishment hypothesis, our paper suggests an unac-

knowledged vulnerability of the drone program to reprisals against local allies and

collaborators that limits its effectiveness as a long-term tool of counterterrorism.

Keywords

civil wars, asymmetric conflict, counterterrorism, foreign policy

1

Data Science Division, The Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), VA, USA

2

Committee on International Relations, The University of Chicago IL, USA

3

Chicago Project on Security and Threats (CPOST), The University of Chicago, IL, USA

Corresponding Author:

Vincent Bauer, Center for Naval Analyses, 3003 Washington Blvd, Arlington, VA 22201, USA.

Email: bauerv@cna.org.

Journal of Conflict Resolution

ªThe Author(s) 2021

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DOI: 10.1177/00220027211041158

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Article

298 Journal of Conflict Resolution 66(2)

We would not be exaggerating if we said that the frontline of the Crusader’s campaign,

which is carried out by the US and its allies against the Muslims and their lands, is the

spying networks in all its types, shapes, and forms. ...The spying networks are their

eyes to see the hidden things that they cannot see and are their hands that are still

extending inside the houses, in the forests, up the mountains, into the valleys, and inside

the dark caves in order to catch a target that their developed technology was not able to

reach.

—al Qaeda Commander Abu Yahya al-Libi, Guidance on the Ruling of the Muslim

Spy, 2009

1

At a tribal meeting in late 2009, leaders of the most powerful militant groups in

Pakistan’s tribal areas crea ted a special counterintelli gence unit, the Lashkar-e-

Khorasan (LEK), to track down and kill, in the most visible and brutal ways possible,

locals accused of spying for the United States. These groups, including al Qaeda and

the Pakistani Taliban, blamed spies for the success of American drone strikes target-

ing their cadre and leadership, and have embarked on a campaign to identify and

eliminate this threat. To send their message, militants distribute video-taped con-

fessions and leave the bodies of accused spies in public places with notes identifying

their crime and warning others that the same fate awaited all those who would help

the United States.

Pakistani militants appear to have adopted a campaign of selective punishment to

reduce spying and blunt the effecti veness of the US drone campaign. The y use

confessions and notes to signal to the population that these killings are not indis-

criminate reprisals, but that only those guilty of spying will be punished. Scholars of

civil war have argued selective punishment is more likely than indiscriminate vio-

lence to elicit civilian compliance, because selectivity represents an assurance that

the compliant will be spared. But, is there any evidence that the Pakistani militants’

selective counterespionage campaign has been an effective defensive strategy

against the American drone campaign?

There are few studies on the effectiveness of selective punishment by militants to

deter local civilians from collaborating with state forces. There are three reasons for

this. First, selective punishment is largely assumed to be effective, at least relative to

indiscriminate measures such as collective punishment and random reprisals (for a

rare exception, see Lyall 2009). Second, selective violence is hard to measure, since

evidence that victims were targeted for specific activity is rare without extensive

qualitative fieldwork (e.g. Kalyvas 2006). Finally, most studies prioritize the per-

spective of the state, assessing the effectiveness of specific counterinsurgency and

counterterrorism strategies (e.g. Johnston and Sarbahi 2016; Mir and Moore 2018;

Jenna Jordan 2009) and the consequences of failing to adopt one (Cronin 2013). The

result is a literature that has largely ignored the selective violence practices of

militants. This neglect is problematic, since insurgent groups compete with states

to shape civilian behavior, including using violence to ensure compliance.

2Journal of Conflict Resolution XX(X)