Does Electoral Reform Increase (or Decrease) Political Equality?

• Author: Melanie J. Springer,Elizabeth Rigby
• Published date: 01 June 2011
• DOI: 10.1177/1065912909358582
• Date: 01 June 2011
• Subject Matter: Articles

Political Research Quarterly
64(2) 420 –434
Does Electoral Reform Increase
© 2011 University of Utah
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(or Decrease) Political Equality?
DOI: 10.1177/1065912909358582
http://prq.sagepub.com
Elizabeth Rigby1 and Melanie J. Springer2
Abstract
Over recent decades, the American states have implemented electoral reforms that make it easier for citizens to
register and vote. This article examines the “equality effects” of these reforms: the degree to which reform serves to
equalize or further skew participation rates between the rich and poor. Using the Voter Supplement to the Current
Population Survey, the authors generate state-level estimates of income bias in registration and voting for elections
from 1978 to 2008. Findings support their theory that some electoral reforms promote equality, while others further
stratify the electorate—particularly when state registration rolls are already unrepresentative in terms of income
groups.
Keywords
political participation, class bias, political inequality, state electoral reform, electoral institutions, registration laws, voting
As levels of income inequality continue to climb in the
Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). Despite the normative
United States, many question the ability of the political
importance of this goal, most evaluations of electoral
system to uphold its normative commitment to political
reforms tend to draw conclusions about their effects on
equality among citizens with vastly different resources
the representativeness of the electorate indirectly, from
(Bartels 2008; Jacobs and Skocpol 2005). Although con-
studies primarily designed to evaluate the effect of reform
cerns about income-based political inequality are long-
on overall turnout rates. Instead, in this article, we focus
standing (e.g., Schattschneider 1960), concerns have
more directly on the equality consequences of several
been reinvigorated by recent work identifying public
popular electoral reforms. The theory we develop and test
officials’ greater responsiveness to wealthier constituents
is unique in that it specifies not only the types of electoral
(Bartels 2008; Gilens 2005; Rigby and Wright 2011),
reform but also the characteristics of state electorates in
the growing role of money in the electoral process
which reforms are enacted. These distinctions allow us to
(Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder 2003), and
identify the reforms most likely to enhance equality, as
political parties’ tendency to engage in targeted mobiliza-
well as those that may serve to further skew the represen-
tion strategies by disproportionately focusing their efforts
tativeness of the electorate.
on the most advantaged and engaged members of the
This theory differentiates among three common but
electorate (Rosenstone and Hansen 2003).
distinct approaches to electoral reform, each expected to
In response, many reformers have directed their efforts
affect the balance of participation across income groups
toward equalizing the political playing field. One pri-
in different ways: reforms such as mail-in registration
mary target for reform has been state electoral institu-
that make voter registration easier, reforms like election
tions, which determine the participatory “rules of the
day registration (EDR) that reduce the barrier registra-
game” governing registration and voting in the American
tion poses to voting, and reforms such as early voting that
states (Cain, Donovan, and Tolbert 2008; Lijphart 1997;
Piven and Cloward 1988, 2000). Motivated by the clear
differences in participation rates among advantaged
1Trachtenberg School of Public Policy and Public Administration,
and disadvantaged citizens (Leighley and Nagler 1992;
George Washington University, Washinton, DC, USA
2Department of Political Science, Washington University in Saint Louis,
Rosenstone and Hansen 1993/2003; Verba, Schlozman,
MO, USA
and Brady 1995), electoral reforms aim not only to increase
overall voter turnout rates but also—and perhaps more
Corresponding Author:
importantly—to equalize political participation across dif-
Elizabeth Rigby, Trachtenberg School of Public Policy and Public
Administration, George Washington University, 805 21st Street NW,
ferent sociodemographic groups (Lijphart 1997; Mitchell
Suite 601, Washington, DC 20052, USA
and Wlezien 1995; Piven and Cloward 1988, 2000;
Email: erigby@gwu.edu

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Rigby and Springer
421
make voting more convenient. Of course, this approach is
the way institutional structures shape citizens’ political
not new; scholars commonly differentiate among different
behavior (for a recent overview, see Cain, Donovan, and
reforms (i.e., motor voter or mail-in registration). Yet they
Tolbert 2008). Of course, the central question underlying
rarely theorize different effects for distinct approaches to
most electoral law proposals is whether the reform has the
electoral reform as we do here. This is not problematic
capability of increasing turnout and, by extension, repre-
for studies of turnout since recent reforms are all presumed
sentation. Although less explicit in reform proposals, the
to be cost-decreasing, and therefore are all expected to
expectation of enhanced political equality stems from the
increase participation. However, distinguishing among
assumption that restrictive, costly electoral institutions
reforms becomes critical for understanding political
disproportionately affect low-income citizens, who bear
inequality as an effect of reform, particularly in light
higher voting costs in general. Thus, reforms that reduce
of evidence that some reform approaches risk “perverse
these costs will increase participation rates among these
consequences,” exacerbating political inequalities rather
classically disadvantaged groups at a greater rate than for
than remedying them (Berinsky 2005).
other citizens. Building on this assumption, studies find-
Also central to our theory is an expectation that the
ing increased turnout typically assume increased political
degree to which electoral reforms equalize participation
equality as well. Intuitively, turnout and representative-
rates between the rich and poor depends on the level of
ness are linked objectives; it would seem that greater par-
preexisting bias in the state’s registration rolls. This is
ticipation would be, by definition, more representative.
based on the notion that registration-based reforms can
Yet Hill and Leighley (1992) tested this assumption
only have an equalizing effect on voting if there is
directly and found only a modest relationship between
something to equalize. In addition, reforms that make it
the level of turnout and the level of class bias within the
easier for registered voters to vote will only benefit
electorate.
those who are already registered. Therefore, if the regis-
Of course, some of the turnout-focused studies have
tration rolls are particularly skewed by income, then
considered issues of inequality indirectly through the use
registration-focused reforms have a greater potential to
of subgroup analyses—examining whether voter turnout
equalize the electorate (since there is so much to equal-
rates increase more among some groups than among oth-
ize), while, in this same context, voting-focused reforms
ers. Studies, such as these, that document greater increases
could actually exacerbate income bias in political par-
in participation for one group than another can provide
ticipation by making it easier for those already engaged
important, if indirect, evidence that electoral reform may
in the system to vote.
affect the distribution of voters. Unfortunately, the magni-
To test this theory, we aggregate individual-level data
tude and direction of the “inequality effects” presented in
from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Current Population Sur-
this research vary. Many studies highlight the potential for
vey, November Voter Supplement to estimate state-level
differential effects of electoral reform across groups,
participation rates among the rich versus poor. From these
but they fail to reach consensus on the direction of the
average values, we generate a relative measure of vote
effect or to explicitly examine whether these effects are
bias (the ratio of participation among rich versus poor) for
big enough to shift the balance of participation between
each state during midterm and presidential elections from
income groups. For example, some have identified greater
1978 to 2008. Then we examine how the implementation
increases in turnout among more disadvantaged citizens
of each approach to electoral reform shifts this relative
(Avery and Peffley 2005; Highton 2004; Mitchell and
measure of participation bias. And finally, we examine the
Wlezien 1995; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980) or infre-
role of skewed registration rolls in limiting or enhancing
quent voters (Stein and Vornahme 2008), while others
the equality effects of each type of reform. The empirical
have found little or no significant difference across income
findings support our theory that electoral reforms have the
groups (Knack and White 2000; Stein 1998). Some stud-
potential to serve as equality-promoting as well as equality-
ies even warn of the potential for “perverse consequences”
inhibiting institutions and that preexisting registration
following electoral reform in which turnout...