Does Cheating Pay? The Effect of Electoral Misconduct on Party Systems

• Author: Nasos Roussias,Daniela Donno
• DOI: 10.1177/0010414011427130
• Published date: 01 May 2012
• Date: 01 May 2012
• Subject Matter: Articles

427130CPS45510.1177/0010414011427130Don
no and RoussiasComparative Political Studies
© The Author(s) 2012
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Comparative Political Studies
45(5) 575 –605
Does Cheating Pay?
© The Author(s) 2012
Reprints and permission:
The Effect of Electoral
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DOI: 10.1177/0010414011427130
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Misconduct on Party
Systems
Daniela Donno1 and Nasos Roussias2
Abstract
This article examines the effect of electoral misconduct on party systems in
new electoral regimes. The authors distinguish between different forms of
electoral misconduct and argue that preelection tools—which aim to deter
opposition parties and their supporters and create a biased information
environment—exert a “psychological” effect on parties and voters, whereas
ballot fraud exerts a direct, “mechanical” effect on vote shares. Using origi-
nal data on electoral misconduct in legislative elections in Latin America and
postcommunist countries, the authors find that preelection misconduct has
a strong reductive effect on the effective number of parties; however, ballot
fraud does not. Further investigation suggests that intimidation of opposition
parties and voters is the most important mechanism through which mis-
conduct reduces party numbers. By identifying electoral misconduct as a key
omitted variable, this article renders the conventional model of party systems
more applicable to the political contexts in new electoral regimes.
Keywords
elections, party systems, new democracies, electoral manipulation,
representation
1University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA, USA
2University of Sheffield, Sheffield, UK
Corresponding Author:
Daniela Donno, Department of Political Science, University of Pittsburgh,
4600 Posvar Hall, Pittsburgh, PA 15260
Email: donno@pitt.edu

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Comparative Political Studies 45(5)
Elections are ubiquitous in the regimes that emerged from the third wave
and the postcommunist transitions, but they are often of dubious quality.1
Attempting to hold on to power, incumbents employ a wide range of tools to
suppress free political competition, as electoral politics in Peru under Alberto
Fujimori illustrates. Prior to the 2000 presidential election, Fujimori used a
combination of bribes and intimidation to ensure the cooperation of key play-
ers in the judiciary, legislature, and the media.2 Several widely read tabloids
orchestrated smear campaigns to discredit the two leading opposition candi-
dates.3 Control of the courts also allowed Fujimori to evade accountability
for violations of electoral law, including an attempt to rig the software used
for vote tabulation.4
Such measures appear to be quite effective at ensuring electoral victory.
According to our data on legislative elections, the ruling party holds on
to power 75% of the time in manipulated elections, compared to a 56% rate
of victory in free and fair elections (Table 1a). Incumbent parties also enjoy
significantly higher margins of victory when elections are manipulated
(Table 1b).
These patterns, which have been documented and analyzed by others,5
raise questions about the deeper effects of electoral misconduct, beyond its
effect on the incumbent’s odds of winning. Is government-sponsored elec-
toral misconduct associated with fewer political parties? Are some forms of
misconduct more effective than others? Through what mechanisms does
misconduct influence party politics? The conventional model of party sys-
tems, which posits that the number of parties in a country is determined by
the interaction of political institutions and social cleavages,6 does not answer
these questions because it assumes a competitive environment in which par-
ties are free to form and campaign and in which election results accurately
reflect the votes cast. In fact, these conditions are not met in many countries
with new or fragile democratic institutions. By our estimates, 10 of 21 Latin
American and Caribbean countries and 13 of 21 postcommunist countries
held at least one manipulated election between 1990 and 2004.
Despite the frequency of electoral misconduct, there is little theoretical
agreement about its consequences and still less empirical research that inves-
tigates its effects. Some studies suggest that governments employ manipula-
tion in close races to increase their vote shares by just enough to ensure an
election win.7 In this scenario, the effect of misconduct on the number and
strength of political parties is likely to be shallow. Other studies point to the
consequential effects of government-sponsored manipulation on opposition
parties’ ability to compete in elections, suggesting that the consequences
of misconduct may be deep enough to influence key features of the party
system.8

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Donno and Roussias
577
Table 1a. Electoral Manipulation and Incumbency Reelection
Free and fair
Manipulated
Incumbents win
n
70
30

%
56
75
Incumbents lose
n
56
10

%
44
25
Total
n
126
40

%
100
100
Author’s data on legislative elections. See the third part for more details on the data set.
Pearson χ2 = 4.7928, Pr = (.029).
Table 1b. Electoral Manipulation and Margins of Victory
n
Margin (%)
SE (%)
Free and fair
126
3.0
1.8
Manipulated
40
14.9
4.8
Total
166
5.9
1.9
Difference
−11.9
4.2
Difference: mean (F&F) – mean (manipulated), t = –2.7954, Pr = .0058 (two-sided)
We provide new insights into this debate by distinguishing between the
effects of different forms of government-sponsored electoral misconduct. We
argue that tools of misconduct implemented during the preelection period
exert “psychological” effects: Opposition parties are discouraged from run-
ning, or face restrictions on their ability to campaign, and voters are intimi-
dated or discouraged from supporting the opposition. In contrast, ballot fraud,
implemented during the casting, counting, or tabulation of votes, exerts a direct,
“mechanical” effect on vote shares. We offer three specific mechanisms—
deterrence, information, and rigging—linking these two types of misconduct
with a reduction in the number of parties in a system, vis-à-vis the number of
parties predicted in a fully competitive context.
We test our theoretical assertions on an original data set of electoral mis-
conduct in 166 legislative elections in Latin American and postcommunist
countries between 1990 and 2004.9 The primary dependent variable of our
analysis is the effective number of legislative parties (ENLP), a measure that
captures the size of the party system by weighting each party by its share of
seats in the legislature. We find that preelection tools of manipulation have a

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Comparative Political Studies 45(5)
strong reductive effect on ENLP, whereas, perhaps surprisingly, ballot fraud
does not. This implies that election day rigging is relatively ineffective at
reducing party competition and may be used as a last resort by incumbents
in an already weak position. Furthermore, consistent with our argument that
misconduct intimidates and deters opposition parties’ entry, we find that pre-
election misconduct is associated with fewer parties running in the election.
These findings—which provide the first systematic evidence that miscon-
duct influences party systems—have important implications for the quality of
political competition in new electoral regimes. Free party competition is the
lifeblood of any well-functioning democracy, whereas ruling party domi-
nance is a syndrome of many “hybrid” regimes.10 A reduction in party system
size below its expected level implies a mismatch between voters’ true prefer-
ences and the ensuing—biased—electoral outcome, while the deterrence of
opposition party entry creates a de facto “representation gap.” Citizens can
choose between only a restricted set of parties that do not represent the full
spectrum that would otherwise emerge under free and fair conditions.
The article proceeds as follows. The first part outlines competing views
about the consequences of electoral misconduct. The second part presents
the theory and causal mechanisms explaining how electoral misconduct
leads to fewer political parties. The third part describes our original data set
and presents our findings. The fourth part concludes and suggests avenues
for future research.
Electoral Misconduct:
Causes and Consequences
We define government-sponsored electoral misconduct broadly as any action
intended to produce a bias favoring the electoral success of the ruling party.11
It is important to note that this definition is based on actions and their intent,
not on their effects. Whether, and to what extent, manipulation actually influ-
ences electoral outcomes is an empirical question. Existing research has found
that misconduct influences voter turnout,12 and opposition party behavior.13
But the institutional consequences of electoral misconduct remain poorly
understood. Curious about this relationship, we address an important, yet
unanswered, question: Does misconduct reduce the size of party systems?
The existing literature on electoral misconduct does not provide us with
clear answers to this question since different theories about the causes of
misconduct lead to divergent expectations about its effects. Some studies
adopt the perspective that misconduct is a tactic primarily employed to
ensure victory in close races.14 In legislative elections, this could mean

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Donno and Roussias
579
that misconduct is limited to certain districts where it is needed...