Documenting the Antitrust Revolution over Seven Editions of Kwoka and White

• Published date: 01 December 2020
• Author: Kenneth G. Elzinga,George Alan Hay
• DOI: 10.1177/0003603X20950200
• Date: 01 December 2020

Article

Documenting the Antitrust

Revolution over Seven Editions

of Kwoka and White

Kenneth G. Elzinga* and George Alan Hay**

Abstract

By a market test of longevity, seven successive editions of The Antitrust Revolution (“TAR”) is a

remarkable publishing event. John E. Kwoka and Lawrence J. White (editors) assembled a collection of

antitrust disputes written by economists who have expertise in each case. The result has been seven

books that are both textbook and treatise. The peg on which TAR hangs is the proposition that

economic analysis has “revolutionized” antitrust enforcement. This article unpacks the contents of the

editions and shows how the multiple editions reveal the evolution of antitrust law in response to

structural changes in the economy as well as advances in economic analysis. We also discuss the one

industry found in every edition (telecommunications) and assess external indicators of the book’s

influence. The Appendix lists all of the case studies and the authors over all editions.

Keywords

antitrust, mergers, collusion, exclusionary conduct

I. Introduction

Over three decades ago (the year was 1989), Scott Foresman published the first edition of The Antitrust

Revolution (hereafter, TAR) edited by John E. Kwoka and Lawrence J. White. In 2019, Oxford

University Press released the Seventh Edition.

1

Any textbook or treatise in the field of economics

that has such a long run warrants an evaluation. Such an assessment might take several tangents. What

is the book all about? What accounts for its durability in the marketplace? What has been its contri-

bution to economic scholarship? Has there actually been a “revolution” in antitrust, as the title claims?

If so, how does TAR account for it?

This article unpacks the contents of TAR over the course of its multiple editions to answer these

questions. But first, a word about the editors. When TAR was first published, both editors held

* University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA, USA

** Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, USA

Corresponding Author:

Kenneth G. Elzinga, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA 22904, USA.

Email: kenelzinga@yahoo.com

1. The third through seventh editions were published by Oxford University Press.

The Antitrust Bulletin

2020, Vol. 65(4) 523–546

ªThe Author(s) 2020

Article reuse guidelines:

sagepub.com/journals-permissions

DOI: 10.1177/0003603X20950200

journals.sagepub.com/home/abx

academic posts: Kwoka was on the economics faculty at George Washington University, and White

was a faculty member at the New York University (NYU) Stern School of Business. Later, Kwoka

joined the faculty at Northe astern University, a positio n he holds today. White, by con trast, has

remained at NYU over the entirety of TAR’s editions. Both editors took leaves from the academy

and served in the federal antitrust agencies: Kwoka served at the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and

the Antitrust Division, and White served in the Antitrust Division as a Chief Economist. Kwoka also

worked at the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), and White served on the Council of

Economic Advisors.

In addition to coediting all seven editions of TAR (there have been no other editors), each of the

editors has made notable contributions to the scholarly literature. Kwoka has over eighty articles (not

including book reviews) and three books on his CV; White has over 300 articles and 23 books (edited

or authored). In addition, Kwoka has been the president of the Industrial Organization Society, and

White is the editor of the Review of Industrial Organization. Both Kwoka and White have reputations

distinct from the seven editions of TAR they have shepherded.

The idea behind TAR is simple: assemble a collection of case studiesbased on prominent, real-world

antitrustdisputes and have the case studies authoredby economists who have expertiseabout those cases.

The expertise of the authors may be based on their research and publications; it is also likely that they

served as economic experts in the cases that are the basis for the chapters they contributed (and as a

result, they have an insider’s knowledge about the topic or question that was litigated).

In the preface to the First Edition, Kwoka and White explain that two phenomena provoked the

book: (1) the increasing application of economics to antitrust litigation and (2) the absence of readable

and accessible resource material that looked at recent antitrust cases through the lens of economic

analysis. The initial publication of TAR came after a decade of growing influence of economic

analysis in antitrust cases. The book’s ongoing analysis of real-world case studies reflects the ongoing

importance of economic analysis in antitrust since the mid-1970s: what the editors call “The Antitrust

Revolution.”

Over the last thirty years, Kwoka and White have endeavored to use these case studies to show how

TAR has persisted and evolved, with each successive edition containing new case studies that display

the growing role of economics in antitrust cases. The seven editions not only provide numerous case

studies showing how antitrust economics has evolved (the “revolution”); a publication track record

spanning seven editions also reveals TAR’s popularity among students and professors as a way to learn

about competition economics.

While TAR’s intention is to explain the growing importance of economic analysis in antitrust

enforcement, an unintended consequence of the multiple editions is revealing the evolution of antitrust

law in response to structural changes caused by shocks to the economy from forces like the Internet and

globalization.

Section II of this article is taxonomic: It identifies the case studies and the authors who appear in

multiple editions; in the process, it identifies what is new in antitrust. This section indicates what kind

of cases have become important enough to warrant inclusion in TAR (and what cases have lost their

luster and been dropped accordingly). Sections III to V of this article examine three themes of antitrust

enforcement: collusion, mergers , and unilateral market power, as see n through the lens of TAR.

Section VI addresses a fourth theme: vertical practices, particularly with regard to price and nonprice

agreements.

Section VII discusses the one industry found in every edition: telecommunications. The question of

whether a revolution in antitrust has taken place can be answered, at least in part, through the lens of

this industry. As a bonus, the telecommunications industry reflects the effect of structural changes in

the U.S. economy on antitrust enforcement. Section VIII assesses external indicators of the book’s

influence, apart from TAR’s history of seven editions. The final section contains concluding remarks

about the revolution the book purports to document and describe.

524 The Antitrust Bulletin 65(4)