Do We Want a New, Tough Antimerger Law?

Published date01 December 1979
Date01 December 1979
DOI10.1177/0003603X7902400405
Subject MatterArticle
The Antitrust Bulletin/Winter 1979
DO
WE
WANT
ANEW,
TOUGH
ANTI MERGER
LAW?
by
DENNIS C. MUELLER*
Congress has on three occasions tried to deter the growth
of corporate size and power: in 1890 with the passage of the
Sherman Act, in 1914 with the passage of the Clayton Act,
and in 1950 with the Celler-Kefauver Amendment to Section
7 of the Clayton Act. Today it finds itself once again confront-
ed with the issue of whether new legislation is needed to
retard corporate growth.
The Sherman Act was passed in the midst of what is prob-
ably still today the greatest merger wave in this country's his-
tory. Although not directed solely at mergers, one of the goals
of Section 2 was to stop the creation of monopolies via mer-
ger, as was occurring in numerous industries
at
the time. In
this objective it was successful as Northern Securities (1904)
and other cases were soon to prove, but the Act could not
prevent mergers bringing together companies of less than
monopolistic dimensions. Recognition of this contributed to
the impetus behind the second major effort to curtail corpor-
ate power in 1914.
The Clayton Act differs from its predecessor by trying to
halt and constrain monopoly power "in its incipiency" rather
than dealing with it in its fully developed state as the Sher-
man Act does. Section 7 directly prohibits mergers
that
would
"substantially lessen competition" or "tend to create" a monop-
oly.
A cavernous loophole in the antimerger section of the
1914 statute and restrictive judicial interpretations made it an
ineffective constraint on corporate mergers. A second great
merger wave took place in the 1920's in spite of the apparent
attempt by Congress in 1914 to put an end to such waves.
*Professor of Economics, University of Maryland, College Park,
Md.
@1980 by Federal Legal Publications, Inc.
807
808 THE ANTITRUST BULLETIN
In the late 1940's, the Federal Trade Commission pre-
sented evidence suggesting
that
a new merger wave was in
process. This and other events of the day led to the Celler-
Kefauver Amendment to Section 7 of the Clayton Act closing
the Act's loophole. Subsequent enforcement and judicial inter-
pretations have produced a dramatic reduction in the number
and significance of horizontal and vertical acquisitions.1
Nevertheless, starting in the 1950's and cresting in the late
1960's, the United States experienced its third great merger
wave. Although large horizontal and vertical acquisitions
could be and were successfully challenged under the Celler-
Kefauver Amendment, most conglomerate mergers appear to
be beyond this statute's reach, and it was these
that
made up
the bulk of the third great wave.
Chart 1presents data on
the
number of acquisitions and
volume of assets acquired by year since 1950. The precipitous
drop in merger activity following 1968 coincides with the col-
lapse of the 1960's bull market and the onset of the recession
induced by the first Nixon administration. This procyclical
pattern has characterized all three major merger waves.
In recent years merger activity has again started upward.
This is even more apparent in chart 2, which includes data for
1978. (Data in charts 1 and 2 are from different sources and
are not directly comparable.) In 1978, the total value of all
major corporate mergers was $34.2 billion, up 64 percent from
1977's $22 billion.
It
is this recent surge of merger activity
that
has ignited interest in new antimerger legislation.
There is little doubt
that
the
first two large merger waves
led to increases in both overall and industry concentration lev-
els. Since the 1950 amendment horizontal merger activity has
been inconsequential, and industry concentration levels have
exhibited no pattern of change
that
seems to be merger relat-
ed."
1For a review of merger legislation see, F.M. Scherer, Industrial
Market Structure and Economic Performance, Rand McNally:
Chicago, 1971, pp. 473-490.
2W.F. Mueller and
L.G.
Hamm, "Trends in Industrial Market
Concentration, 1947 to 1970," Review
of
Economics and Statistics,
56, Nov. 1974, pp. 511-520.

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