Do "tough on Crime" Politicians Win More Elections? an Empirical Analysis of California State Legislators from 1992 to 2000

• Publication year: 2022

45 Creighton L. Rev. 131. DO "TOUGH ON CRIME" POLITICIANS WIN MORE ELECTIONS? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF CALIFORNIA STATE LEGISLATORS FROM 1992 TO 2000

DO "TOUGH ON CRIME" POLITICIANS WIN MORE ELECTIONS? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF CALIFORNIA STATE LEGISLATORS FROM 1992 TO 2000

Steven A. KRIEGER (fn*)

TABLE OF contents

I. INTRODUCTION................................... 133

II. hypothesis...................................... 137

III. METHODOLOGY................................... 139

A. Overview....................................... 139

B. Testing Ground: Why Use California?......... 142

C. Data: Legislators' Criminal Justice Scores, Legislators' Vote Shares, and Criminal Justice Ballot Initiatives .....................143

1. Legislators' Criminal Justice Scores..........143

2. Legislators' Vote Shares (Election Results)........................................................................145

3. Criminal Justice Ballot Initiatives....................................................................................146

a. Proposition 184..........................149

b. Proposition 189..........................152

c. Proposition 213..........................153

d. Proposition 36...........................155

D. California and National Trends in Crime, Politics, and Party from 1992 to 2000.........157

1. 1992 and 1994 Legislative Cycles in Review ..158

2. 1996 Legislative Cycle in Review.............160

3. 1998 Legislative Cycle in Review.............161

4. 2000 Legislative Cycle in Review.............162

E. Methodology Summarized......................163

IV. analysis of results...........................164

A. Overview.......................................164

B. Regression Analysis 1: Direct Effect from Voter Reaction................................165

C. Regression Analysis 2: Feedback Loop of Legislator Reaction...........................167

D. The Importance of Party Affiliation from 1994 to 2000....................................168

v. conclusion .....................................169

table 1..................................................145

table 2..................................................149

table 3..................................................162

figure 1.................................................163

table 4..................................................166

table 5..................................................167

appendix 1: bill CLASSIFICATIONS...................172

ABSTRACT

Do "tough on crime" politicians win more elections? Conventional wisdom suggests that they do. After all, who was the last public official to win an election based on a "soft on crime" platform? Correspondingly, this unjustified and widespread belief among legislators (and their strategists) makes it extremely difficult for progressive criminal justice bills to become law. There is no empirical literature, however, to support or deny this conventional political wisdom.

a regression analysis was used to answer (1) whether legislators' election results were impacted by their voting records (based on an assigned crime score) or constituent support for a ballot initiative; and (2) whether legislators adjusted future votes (and corresponding crime scores) based on election results or constituent support for crime-related propositions. Although conventional wisdom suggests that "tough on crime" politicians win more elections, I found no evidence to support this assumption in four California state elections from 1992 to 2000, a period of time when crime was an important issue in California and nationally. In addition, I found no evidence that election results influenced legislators' future positions on criminal justice issues. Therefore, legislators (especially in California) who currently support criminal justice bills should feel comfortable continuing to do so, as it did not hamper legislators in California from 1992 to 2000. Additionally, legislators (especially in California) who would like to support more criminal justice bills but fear negative consequences on election night, should feel comfortable increasing their support for these bills.

I. INTRODUCTION

Democracy is founded on the principle that the public elects a handful of legislators to represent its personal views about the way a country should operate. Although a handful of voters may have extreme or irrational views, the majority is quite moderate. As V.O. Key, Jr. explained, "[M]any individual voters act in odd ways indeed; yet in the large the electorate behaves about as rationally and responsibly as we should expect, given the clarity of the alternatives presented to it and the character of the information available to it."(fn1)

To maintain constituent support, legislators research, write, introduce, debate, and ultimately vote on bills based on the electorate they represent. if legislators continuously support bills that conflict with the views of their electorate, those legislators are less likely to get reelected. Legislators, therefore, regularly consider their constituents' views prior to making a decision to support or oppose a particular bill.(fn2)

Few individual constituents regularly follow their legislators' every vote.(fn3) However, national interest groups supporting a variety of issues like abortion,(fn4) agriculture,(fn5) budget,(fn6) business,(fn7) civil rights,(fn8) drugs and alcohol,(fn9) education,(fn10) environment and conservation,(fn11) foreign aid, policy and national security,(fn12) guns,(fn13) health,(fn14) labor,(fn15) military,(fn16) seniors,(fn17) and welfare and poverty(fn18)-just to name a few(fn19)- are closely monitoring legislators' votes on such group's particular issue. By monitoring legislators' votes, these interest groups often assign legislators individualized scores to help constituents hold legislators accountable. Additionally, there are a variety of state interest groups tracking and scoring state legislators' votes on similar issues, especially in heavily populated states like California,(fn20) to ensure legislative accountability. During election periods, interest groups often endorse the legislators with the highest scores and vehemently oppose reelection efforts of candidates with the lowest scores by sharing the legislators' scores with their constituents. For example, when environmental interest groups target constituents during election periods, they typically make some form of the following two arguments: (1) "Your legislator voted to support conservation efforts and clean energy on nine out of ten bills, so if you support conservation and clean energy you should vote to reelect your legislator"; or (2) "Your legislator voted against conservation efforts and clean energy on nine out of ten bills, so if you support conservation and clean energy you should vote for CandidateX to defeat your legislator."(fn21)

While interest groups need only track legislators' votes relating to such group's specific issue,(fn22) constituents often consider a variety of issues before deciding to support a particular candidate.(fn23) Ultimately, legislators are responsible for representing the potentially conflicting views between individual constituents.(fn24) For example, a legislator's constituents could be evenly split on the merits of a particular bill. Further, a bill could cut across two issues that conflict with the constituents' views (perhaps a newly proposed bill limits hunting in a state park, which appeals to the conservation-minded constituents but is unappealing to the hunting-minded constituents). Finally, a legislator may inaccurately believe an issue is important to his constituents when it is not, or a legislator may inaccurately believe an issue is not important to his constituents when it is.(fn25) Understandably, this process of representation is not always clear to legislators and can be exacerbated when individual constituents possess internally conflicting views themselves.(fn26)

II. HYPOTHESIS

The majority of this Article will focus on the common political belief(fn27) and the frequent, and unproven, campaign strategy(fn28) that legislators who are viewed as "soft on crime" are less fit to serve in public office and less desirable to the public. By extension, the "softer" a legislator is on crime, the worse the candidate should fair on election night, and the "tougher" a legislator is on crime, the better the candidate should fair on election night (assuming voters' priorities remain constant).

In essence, this Article will empirically analyze the conventional political wisdom suggesting that it is more difficult for a "soft on crime" legislator to get reelected than a "tough on crime" legislator.(fn29) While a wide variety of scorecards from specific issues and corresponding interest groups was mentioned above, the issue of public safety or criminal justice(fn30) has not produced a single federal legislative score-card. The lack of a national criminal justice scorecard could be justified if interest groups believe they will get more "bang for their buck" working on a state scorecard. State-based criminal justice scorecards, however, are not prevalent either. Only a few state criminal justice scorecards exist, and they are significantly less comprehensive than the state (or national) scorecards for other issues.(fn31) This is particularly odd because of an existing belief that...