Do reputational threats influence the rigidity of US agencies? A dynamic panel data approach
Published date | 01 November 2023 |
Author | Jan Boon,Jan Wynen,Koen Verhoest |
Date | 01 November 2023 |
DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/puar.13732 |
RESEARCH ARTICLE
Do reputational threats influence the rigidity of US agencies?
A dynamic panel data approach
Jan Boon
1,2
| Jan Wynen
2,3
| Koen Verhoest
2
1
School of Social Sciences, University of Hasselt,
Hasselt, Belgium
2
Politics and Public Governance, University of
Antwerp, Antwerp, Belgium
3
Department of Management, University of
Antwerp, Antwerp, Belgium
Correspondence
Jan Boon, School of Social Sciences, University
of Hasselt, Prinsstraat 13, Antwerp 2000,
Belgium.
Email: jan.boon@uhasselt.be
Abstract
What happens to organizational rigidity when public organizations faced reputa-
tional threats over time? Do they take external criticism as incentives to become
less rigid and more innovative and flexible through employee involvement and
empowerment? Or do reputational threats paradoxically contribute to the very
rigidity that is often stereotyped as inherent parts of government? Building on
threat-rigidity theory, we test the temporal relation between reputational threats
(both in terms of the direction of reputation and its turbulence) and organizational
rigidity. We apply a dynamic panel data approach combining different data
sources on 34 US agencies over a period of 13 years. The results show that organi-
zational rigidity increased, both when reputations evolved negatively over time
and when reputations evolved more turbulently. No combined effect of negative
reputations and reputational turbulence was observed. Both sources of reputa-
tional threats independently precluded organizations from creating a climate of
employee empowerment, involvement, flexibility, and innovation.
Evidence for practice
•Public organizations demonstrate higher degrees of organizational rigidity when
their reputations were evolving negatively or more turbulently.
•Negatively evolving reputations generate more organizational rigidity, even
under conditions of rather stable (nonturbulent) evolution.
•Turbulently evolving reputations generate more organizational rigidity, even
when these reputations evolved in a neutral or positive direction.
•The climate of reputational negativity that many public organizations face leads
to an organizational climate that is more rigid. Managers have a clear role to play
in these tendencies, by avoiding the urge in situations of uncertainty to centralize
control, formalize procedures, and apply pressure on employees to conform to
their directions.
INTRODUCTION
Organizational rigidity in government refers to the inflexi-
bility of bureaucratic systems and processes, which can
hinder the ability of public organizations to adapt to
changing circumstances and effectively serve the needs
of citizens (Deverell, 2010; Staw et al., 1981). Over the past
decades, reforms have sought to address rigidity in
government, by decreasing hierarchical, formalized, and cen-
tralized decision-making, while promoting employee flexibil-
ity, experimentation, and innovation (Mergel et al., 2021).
In discussions on how governments can harness the capacity
of their workforce to flexibly adapt to environmental needs,
empowering and including employees in organizational pro-
cesses, has been a recurring recommendation (OECD, 2021;
Steen & Schott, 2019).
In sharp contrast to this idealized image stands the
reality in which many public sector employees are work-
ing. Studies consistently report the comparatively high
rate of unnecessary and burdensome rules and proce-
dures in public organizations (Pandey & Kingsley, 2000;
Wright & Davis, 2003). Rigidity continues to be a stereo-
type that is often attached to public organizations as
sources of general underperformance vis-à-vis private
The authors share first authorship.
Received: 13 January 2023 Revised: 4 September 2023 Accepted: 26 September 2023
DOI: 10.1111/puar.13732
1798 © 2023 American Society for Public Administration. Public Admin Rev. 2023;83:1798–1812.wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/puar
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