Do progressive prosecutors increase crime? A quasi‐experimental analysis of crime rates in the 100 largest counties, 2000–2020

• Published date: 01 May 2024
• Author: Nick Petersen,Ojmarrh Mitchell,Shi Yan
• Date: 01 May 2024
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/1745-9133.12666

DOI: ./- .

ORIGINAL ARTICLE

Do progressive prosecutors increase crime? A

quasi-experimental analysis of crime rates in

the 100 largest counties, 2000–2020

Nick Petersen1Ojmarrh Mitchell2Shi Yan3

Department of Sociology & Criminology,

University of Miami, Coral Gables,

Florida, USA

Department of Criminology, Lawand

Society, University of California, Irvine,

California, USA

School of Criminology and Criminal

Justice, Arizona State University,

Phoenix, Arizona, USA

Correspondence

Nick Petersen, Department of Sociology &

Criminology, University of Miami, 

University Dr., Coral Gables, FL ,

USA.

Email: npetersen@miami.edu

Funding information

University of Miami Provost Research

Award, Grant/AwardNumber: -

Abstract

Research summary: In recent years, there has been

a rise in so-called “progressive prosecutors” focused

on criminal justice reforms. Although there has been

considerable debate about the relationship between pro-

gressive prosecution policies and crime rates, there has

been surprisingly little empirical research on the topic.

Building on the limited extant research, we examined

whether the inauguration of progressive prosecutors

in the nation’s  most populous counties impacted

crime rates during a -year period ( to ). After

developing an original database of progressive prose-

cutors in the  largest counties, we used heteroge-

neous difference-in-differences regressions to examine

the influence of progressive prosecutors on crime rates.

Results show that the inauguration of progressive pros-

ecutors led to statistically higher index property (∼%)

and total crime rates (driven by rising property crimes),

and these effects were strongest since —a period

with an increasing number of progressive prosecutors.

However, violent crime rates generally were not higher

after a progressive prosecutor assumed control.

This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License, which permits

use and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non-commercial and no modifications or

adaptations are made.

©  The Authors. Criminology & Public Policypublished by Wiley Periodicals LLC on behalf of American Society of Criminology.

Criminology & Public Policy. ;:–. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/capp 459

460 PETERSEN  .

Policy implications: Despite concerns that the elec-

tion of progressive prosecutors leads to “surging” levels

of violence, these findings suggest that progressive-

oriented prosecutorial reforms led to relatively higher

rates of property crime but had limited impact on ratesof

violent crime. In fact, in absolute terms, crime rates fell

in jurisdictions with traditional and progressive prosecu-

tors. Yet, relative propertycrime rates were greater after

the inauguration of progressive prosecutors. Given that

prior research shows progressive prosecutors reduce

mass incarceration and racial inequalities, our findings

indicate that higher property crime rates may be the

price for these advancements.

KEYWORDS

courts, crime, criminal justice reform, progressive prosecutors,

reformist prosecutors

In response to growing concerns about mass incarceration in recent decades, a cadre of so-called

“progressive prosecutors”have been elected on a platform emphasizing reducing incarcer-

ation rates (i.e., decarceration). These progressive prosecutors differ from more traditional

“law-and-order” prosecutors, focusing on harsh punishments to combat crime by emphasizing

decarceration policies such as diversion from prison/jail, decriminalization of low-level drug

crimes like marijuana possession, and decreased use of mandatory minimum sentences. One

notable example is Philadelphia District AttorneyLarry Krasner, who sought to “end our addiction

to mass incarceration”by expanding alternatives to prosecution, ending overly punitive sentences,

and abolishing money bail, among other policies (Krasner, ). On the other hand, conserva-

tives haveheavily criticized progressive prosecutors for their “soft-on-crime” policies that promote

“lawlessness” and fuel rising levels of crime and violence (Smith & Stimson, ). Criticism of

progressive prosecutors reached new heights with the recall of San Francisco’s elected District

Attorney Chesa Boudin (Holland & Zeidman, ), impeachment proceedings of Larry Kras-

ner by Pennsylvania’slegislature (MacDonald, ), and the removal of State Attorneys Andrew

Warren and Monique Worrell by Governor DeSantis in Florida (Sachs, ).

Despite the ongoing debate concerning progressive prosecutors and crime, surprisingly little

scholarship exists on the topic. The limited extant research focuses on crime data from a sin-

gle city within a progressive prosecutor’s jurisdiction, employs narrow timeframes, and relies

on theoretically and empirically imprecise definitions of progressive prosecutors. Since pros-

ecutors are typically elected at the county level (Bazelon, ), analyses of crime data from

a single city within a progressive prosecutor’s jurisdiction may offer a limited view of how

their policies impact crime across their entire jurisdiction (Kaplan et al., ). The shorter and

more recent time periods used in existing analyses may obscure important trends and disregard

early waves of progressive prosecutors and their potential impact on crime in recent decades

(Kajeepeta, ; Kaplan et al., ). Moreover, some studies may lack ecological validity by

PETERSEN  . 461

relying on unspecified, vague, or imprecise definitions of who constitutes a progressive prosecutor

(Kajeepeta, ).

Building on important insights from the extant scholarship, we sought to understand whether

and to what extent the installment of progressive prosecutors in the nation’s  most popu-

lous counties shaped crime rates during a -year period ( to ). We began by coding the

progressiveness of prosecutors elected between  and  in the  largest counties. After

developing this novel database, we used the inauguration date of progressive prosecutors as a

“shock” to measure changes in local crime rates. Todo so, we estimated heterogenous difference-

in-differences regressions for violent, property,and overall Part I index crimes in each county. Our

results show that relative to jurisdictions that had maintained traditional chief prosecutors, juris-

dictions that changed to progressive prosecutors had % higher total index crime rates (driven by

higher property crime rates), and these effects are strongest from  to . In contrast, vio-

lent crime rates were not statistically higher in jurisdictions switching to progressive prosecutors

over the entire study period but did experience statistically higher violent crime rates from 

to .

1 WHO ARE PROGRESSIVE PROSECUTORS?: DEFINING THE

ISSUE

Though an adversarial system, decades of court research have documented the dominating power

of prosecutors (Davis, ;Sklansky,). At the case level, prosecutors heavily influence sen-

tencing outcomes by determining the charges and plea offers (Gershman, ; M. Lynch, ,

;Wright&Engen,). Empirical studies have found that the charging decisions (includ-

ing charge reductions or bargaining) would heavily affect final sentencing outcomes (and any

extralegal disparities therein) in both presumptive and voluntary guideline jurisdictions (Johnson

& Larroulet, ; O. Johnson et al., ; Starr & Rehavi, ). More broadly, chief prosecutors

often set policy priorities in their jurisdiction, heavily influencing how the criminal justice sys-

tem operates (Henry et al., ; Wright, ). Researchers havenamed prosecutors as either the

driving force (Pfaff, ) or the most promising solution (Bazelon, ) to mass incarceration

and other challenges the criminal justice system faces.

Despite debate about how to define progressive prosecutors, there is a fairly broad consensus

that “progressive” prosecutors differ from more “traditional” prosecutorsin their focus on reduc-

ing mass incarceration and increasing fairness (Bazelon, ; Davis, ;FJP,; Hessick

& Morse, ; Hogan, ; Levin, ; Mitchell et al., ). A  report on “ Principles

for the st Century Prosecutor,” led by Fair and Just Prosecution, has outlined concrete ways

for achieving these goals. To reduce the footprint of mass incarceration, they argue, progres-

sive prosecutors can increase diversion usage, de-felonize selected property crimes by increasing

the dollar threshold for felony offenses, decriminalize low-level drug possession, and rely less

on prison/jail sanctions for technical parole/probation violations. Beyond these recommenda-

tions, progressive prosecutors frequently minimize the invocation of harsh sentencing laws,

such as enhanced penalties for drug offenses, three-strikes laws, and mandatory minimums

(Travis et al., ). Many progressive prosecutors also funnel youth and adults suffering from

mental illness/addiction out of the correctional systems by emphasizing treatment, civil citations,

and decreased detention among these groups. Progressive prosecutors often strive to increase

fairness within the system by reducing racial/ethnic disparities, removing poverty traps (e.g.,

reducing court fines or cash bail), and bolstering system integrity by establishing conviction