Do People Trust the Government More? Unpacking the Distinct Impacts of Anticorruption Policies on Political Trust

• Published date: 01 June 2021
• Author: Jiangnan Zhu,Siqin Kang
• Date: 01 June 2021
• DOI: 10.1177/1065912920912016
• Subject Matter: Articles

https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912920912016

Political Research Quarterly

2021, Vol. 74(2) 434 –449

© 2020 University of Utah

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DOI: 10.1177/1065912920912016

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Article

Introduction

Corruption erodes the quality of government (Rothstein

and Teorell 2008). It reduces the efficiency and effec-

tiveness of public services (Rose-Ackerman 1999),

inflates government spending (C. Liu, Moldogaziev, and

Mikesell 2017), undermines the rule of law (Tanzi 1998),

undercuts political equality (Warren 2004), and reveals

officials’ “ethical deficit” (Villoria et al. 2013, 86). Thus,

corruption has the broader sociopolitical consequence of

decreasing trust in government, an increasingly common

concern. Declining trust ultimately undermines the legit-

imacy of the ruling regimes (Anderson and Tverdova

2003; Seligson 2002). Accordingly, governments go to

great lengths to regain trust and increase public support

through intensive anticorruption endeavors. In contrast

to routine institutional measures to prevent and contain

corruption (Klitgaard 1988; Perry and Hondeghem

2008), these kinds of anticorruption initiatives generally

feature temporary escalations of enforcement, driven by

a strong political will and resulting in a high number of

officials arrested or otherwise held accountable for a

brief period of time (Wedeman 2005). This pattern is

common in countries where corruption is rampant. For

example, in Brazil, incumbent presidents often initiate

anticorruption policies to boost their public support in

forthcoming elections (Avis, Ferraz, and Finan 2018).

The Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) in Mexico

regularly vows to fight corruption to maintain its ruling

status (Morris and Klesner 2010). In China, the Chinese

Communist Party (CCP) periodically investigates cor-

ruption intensively to showcase its commitment to rule

of law and win public support (Manion 2004).

912016PRQXXX10.1177/1065912920912016Political Research QuarterlyKang and Zhu

research-article2020

1The University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam, Hong Kong

Corresponding Author:

Jiangnan Zhu, Department of Politics and Public Administration,

Faculty of Social Sciences, The University of Hong Kong, Room 933,

9/F, Centennial Campus, Pokfulam, Hong Kong.

Emails: zhujn@hku.hk; zhujiangnan@hotmail.com

Do People Trust the Government

More? Unpacking the Distinct

Impacts of Anticorruption

Policies on Political Trust

Siqin Kang1 and Jiangnan Zhu1

Abstract

Governments at times combat corruption intensively in an attempt to (re)gain political trust. While corruption

crackdowns may demonstrate government resolve to fight corruption, the high-profile corruption uncovered may

also shock the public. Therefore, how effective can anticorruption policies help boost political trust? We argue

that anticorruption policies influence political trust through two channels: direct experience, that is, interactions

with governmental bodies, and the media, that is, second-hand information culled from reporting on anticorruption.

Differentiating between these two channels illustrates that anticorruption policies may have distinct effects on political

trust for different social groups. We contextualize our theoretical framework with the latest anticorruption drive

in China, combining longitudinal data from a national survey and field interviews and using difference-in-differences

(DID) models. Our findings support our predictions. For state-system insiders (e.g., civil servants), increase of political

trust is less pronounced than for outsiders because the former directly experience radical implementation processes

and ineffective anticorruption outcomes. Similarly, political trust increases at a lower rate for groups with higher

levels of education and greater access to information outside governmental propaganda than for their less-informed

counterparts. Intensive anticorruption efforts are therefore more likely to increase political trust for the grassroots

than for elites in China.

Keywords

corruption, anticorruption enforcement, political trust, China, local government

Kang and Zhu 435

However, the effect of these intensive anticorruption

efforts on political trust is not well understood.

Enforcement initiatives may demonstrate a govern-

ment’s resolve to combat corruption, but the high levels

of corruption uncovered by a crackdown may also shock

the public. Therefore, how effective is temporary inten-

sive anticorruption enforcement at restoring political

trust? To answer this question, we propose an analytical

framework connecting macro-level policies with politi-

cal trust at the individual level. We argue that anticorrup-

tion policies mainly influence political trust through two

channels: direct experience, which refers to first-hand

encounters with policy implementation or interactions

with government agencies or officials; and the media, in

which people rely on second-hand reports from different

sources on anticorruption enforcement, such as its poli-

cies and outcomes. Accounting for these two channels

highlights how governmental anticorruption efforts

affect distinct social groups differently, depending on the

prominence of each channel in mediating each social

groups’ relationship to government agencies, officials, or

policies.

We tested our theory in the context of the latest anti-

corruption drive in China. We adopted a mixed-methods

approach, combining field interviews and quantitative

strategies, using longitudinal public opinion data from

the Chinese Family Panel Survey, conducted in 2012

and 2014 across Chinese cities, together with a self-

compiled data set of local anticorruption endeavors

measured by the number of mid-level officials arrested

in each city annually. To test the impact of intensive

anticorruption efforts on political trust in a municipal

government, we used a difference-in-differences (DID)

model. Overall, our results showed that anticorruption

efforts have a positive effect on political trust. However,

more importantly, we found that the positive effects

vary by social group and that this variation depends on

the main channel by which each group perceives anti-

corruption policies, through direct experience or the

media. Trust was less likely to increase for state-system

insiders, such as civil servants, or for individuals who

interact often with government insiders (e.g., business-

men), than for state-system outsiders. Insiders’ direct

experiences with radical implementation processes and

sometimes ineffective anticorruption outcomes generate

mixed opinions about the policies. Furthermore, those

who learn about anticorruption efforts from official

reports are more likely to increase their political trust

because their information is filtered through govern-

ment propaganda (Shirk 2011). However, this positive

effect was limited for more-informed citizens, such as

those with higher education levels or who used the

Internet frequently. By 2014, anticorruption enforce-

ment in China had a less significant effect on political

trust for elites (i.e., state-system insiders and the better-

informed) than for the grassroots (i.e., state-system out-

siders and the less informed).

Our findings advance the literature on policies’

impact on political trust. By introducing an analytical

framework, we show how policies at the macro-level

can influence political trust at the individual level. We

identify distinct channels by which public policy influ-

ences political trust and disaggregate society into social

groups based on their exposure to different channels.

By focusing our analysis on local government, we also

contribute to the emerging literature on anticorruption

efforts’ effects on political trust, which tends to primar-

ily lodge trust at the national government (e.g., Ji and

Meng 2017; Y. Wang and Dickson 2017; Zhu, Huang,

and Zhang 2019). Political trust at the local level is also

important to study because citizens are more likely to

interact with local officials than at the national level.

Furthermore, research has found that Chinese people

who distrust local government tend to have lower over-

all levels of support for the regime, despite generally

high levels of trust in the central government (Chen

2017). Finally, we alert decision-makers to the impor-

tance of proper policy implementation for maintaining

political trust.

Anticorruption Enforcement and

Political Trust

Political trust is a basic, evaluative orientation toward the

government based on “how well the government is oper-

ating according to people’s normative expectations” (K.

Hetherington 1998, 791). It is crucial for legal compli-

ance and political stability (Chanley, Rudolph, and Rahn

2000). Low political trust reflects dissatisfaction with the

government and may lead to social unrest (Paige 1971).

Even in authoritarian states, higher political trust is

important to regimes because they help governments

achieve political tasks (Lianjiang Li 2013). Scholars also

find that higher political trust often coexists with more

government support (Dickson 2016; Tang 2016). People’s

specific support to government is especially a cumulative

outcome of a government’s performance, delivered by

politicians and more easily influenced by government

policies (Tang 2016). To gain specific support and trust,

politicians have an incentive to use beneficial social poli-

cies that show good performance (De Mesquita et al.

2005).

Therefore, governments, especially those in countries

with high levels of corruption, sometimes use intensive

anticorruption enforcement to improve their perfor-

mance and boost political trust. Rather than simply rely-

ing on popular institutional measures, such as reforming

civil servants’ salary levels, improving government