Do Partisans Always Like Their Inparty and Dislike Their Outparty? An Analysis of Partisans Across the Affective Spectrum

• Author: John K. Wagner,Adi Wiezel
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X221139475
• Published date: 01 May 2023
• Date: 01 May 2023

Article

American Politics Research

2023, Vol. 51(3) 373–380

© The Author(s) 2022

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DOI: 10.1177/1532673X221139475

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Do Partisans Always Like Their Inparty and

Dislike Their Outparty? An Analysis of

Partisans Across the Affective Spectrum

John K. Wagner

1

and Adi Wiezel

2



Abstract

What can American partisan affect groups tell us about different models of partisan affect over a recent snapshot in time?

Moreover, what implications do these groups have for political trust over that same snapshot in time? Results from the 2020 and

2016 American National Election Studies suggest that most partisans feel positively toward their inparty and negatively toward

their outparty (Classically-Polarized)—consistent with classical approaches to affective polarization. However, some feel

negatively toward their inparty and outparty (Double-Dislikers)—more consistent with negative partisanship models. Finally,

some feel positively toward their inparty and outparty (Double-Likers). Despite recent work suggesting increasing outparty and

inparty animosity, which implies growth in Double-Dislikers and the Classically-Polarized, only the Classically-Polarized grew

between 2016 and 2020. Regarding political trust, compared to the Classically-Polarized, Double-Dislikers are associated with

less political trust, whereas Double-Likers are associated with increasingly more political trust, suggesting substantive reasons

for focusing on each group.

Keywords

partisan affect, affective polarization, political trust, regression analysis

Two major theories of partisan affect—classical affective po-

larization and negative partisanship—vary in the extent to

which they apply to different partisan affect groups, even if they

were not designed to explain those groups wholly. “Classical”

approaches to affective polarization, for instance, are best at

accounting for partisans who “view opposing partisans nega-

tively and co-partisans positively”(Iyengar & Westwood, 2015,

p. 691; Iyengar & Krupenkin, 2018;M´

ar 2020;Iyengar et al.,

2012). We refer to this group as the “Classically-Polarized.”By

contrast, “negative partisanship”approaches focus on negative

outparty affect (Abramowitz & McCoy, 2019;Abramowitz &

Webster, 2016;2019), thus allowing for inparty disdain and

better explaining partisans who feel negatively toward both

parties (“Double-Dislikers”) than classical approaches to af-

fective polarization. However, neither theory does a good job

accounting for partisans who feel positively toward both parties

(“Double-Likers”). This poses two key questions. First, how

prevalent are these three different partisan affect groups in the

United States over a recent snapshot in time, specifically be-

tween 2016 and 2020? Second, what implications does affective

group membership have for essential outcome variables, such as

political trust over that same snapshot time?

Given widespread affective polarization in the American

public (Iyengar & Westwood, 2015;Iyengar & Krupenkin,

2018;M´

ar, 2020;Iyengar et al., 2012), we expect partisans

who like their inparty and dislike their outparty (the “Classically-

Polarized”) may be most common. However, recent work finds

that negative feelings toward one’s outparty and inparty are

rising in the U.S. (Groenendyk, 2018), suggesting Double-

Dislikers’increased prevalence. This may suggest the growing

appropriateness of classical approaches to affective polarization

and negative partisanship approaches to partisan affect.

Different combinations of inparty and outparty affect may

also have distinct ramifications for other important affective

variables, such as political trust. Political trust is vital to de-

mocracy for a variety of reasons, including its association with

support for government officials and institutions (Hetherington,

1998), lawful compliance (Marien & Hooghe, 2011), and a

government’s legitimacy and longevity (Easton, 1965). We

expect the three affective groups will show differing levels of

1

University of New Mexico College of Arts and Sciences, Albuquerque,NM,

USA

2

Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, USA

Corresponding Author:

John K. Wagner, University of New Mexico College of Arts and Sciences,

MSC 05-3070, 1 University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM 87131-0001,

USA.

Email: jkwagner@unm.edu