Do Binding Beat Nonbinding Agreements? Regulating International Water Quality

• Author: Detlef F. Sprinz,Martin Köppel
• Published date: 01 September 2019
• Date: 01 September 2019
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/0022002718822127
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article

Do Binding Beat

Nonbinding Agreements?

Regulating International

Water Quality

Martin Ko

¨ppel

1

, and Detlef F. Sprinz

1

Abstract

Does the form of a multilateral agreement (MEA) by itself improve environmental

performance? In particular, do legally nonbinding MEAs pose a rival to the effect of

more traditional legally binding international agreements? Our theory builds on the

legal and international regimes literatures and postulates that legally binding

agreements (LBAs) have more benign effects on water quality than legally nonbinding

agreements (LNBAs). We probe two operationalizations of the form of MEAs. First,

we purely focus on the form: of legally binding versus legally nonbindings. Second, we

combine the form of an agreement each with an index of precision and an index of

delegation. The empirical focus is on upstream–downstream water quality in Europe

during 1990 to 2007. Our regression analyses, regardless of specification, find that

LBAs beat LNBAs and that LBAs with high degrees of precision and delegation beat

the effect of any other configuration of agreements with respect to enhancing water

quality.

Keywords

international regimes, international institutions, international law, international

treaties

1

Research Domain Transdisciplinary Concepts and Methods, Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact

Research, Potsdam, Germany

Corresponding Author:

Detlef F. Sprinz, Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, P.O. Box 60 12 03, 14412 Potsdam,

Germany.

Email: dsp@pik-potsdam.de

Journal of Conflict Resolution

2019, Vol. 63(8) 1860-1888

ªThe Author(s) 2019

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DOI: 10.1177/0022002718822127

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Introduction

Over the past decades, research on international regimes had a marked impact on the

study of world politics. In particular, the reasons for their creation (Roberts, Parks,

and Va´squez 2004; Stinnett and Tir 2009; Sprinz and Vaahtoranta 1994), the degree

of behavioral change (Goldstein, Rivers, and Tomz 2007; Von Stein 2005), and the

degree of their effects (Ko¨ppel 2009a; Breitmeier, Young, and Zu

¨rn 2006; Miles

et al. 2002) have been debated. On the impact or effect of international regimes, the

conclusion emerged that they do matter—yet are far from perfect in solving the

problems that led to their creation (Miles et al. 2002; Young 2011). Comparatively

little attention has so far been placed on the question whether the form of (environ-

mental) agreement matters and, in particular, whether legally binding agreements

(LBAs) or legally nonbinding agreements (LNBAs) have greater effect—and which

their directional impact is.

1

This article provides empirical evidence whether LBAs

as compared to LNBAs lead to improvements in the quality of our environment.

The existing literature on the effectiveness of LBAs and LNBAs offers contra-

dictory empirical evidence. Breitmeier, Young, and Zu

¨rn (2006) show that legaliza-

tion of international institutions raises their effectiveness. Yet case studies by

Gurtner-Zimmermann (1998), Holtrup (1999), and Tschanz (2001) indicate that soft

law can be at least as effective as binding treaties. In addition, Victor, Raustiala, and

Skolnikoff (1998) argued that soft law has proven more effective in changing the

behavior of relevant actors than legally binding treaties. Breitmeier, Underdal, and

Young (2011, 12) showed that when rules are legally binding, compliance is, at best,

only marginally higher than is the case for LNBAs, yet LNBAs outperform LBAs in

terms of problem-solving. Moreover, Skjærseth, Stokke, and Wettestad (2006)

assessed the effects of hard and soft law on international nutrient agreements in

Norwegian agriculture. Skjærseth found that adding legally binding to LNBAs in

domestic law does not necessarily lead to improved implementation of international

agreements. Thus, the effect of LBAs as compared to LNBAs has so far remained

unresolved.

In order to shed light on whether LBAs versus LNBAs have the greater effect on

environmental problem-solving, we chose the field of transboundary river quality as

a test case as it embraces a long time span, offers substantial variation in the

dependent variable of river water quality across time and space, allows us to keep

the problem structure constan t, is politically relevant to b roader sections of the

population (human consumption, biodiversity, fishing), and aff ords a reasonable

balance of cases that have not been regulated with those with different combinations

of LBAs and LNBAs.

This article makes three major contributions. First, we employ multiple opera-

tionalizations of LBAs versus LNBAs.

2

The initial operationalization purely focuses

on the form of legally binding versus legally nonbinding multilateral environmental

agreements (MEAs). Subsequently, we refine this approach by combining the form

of an agreement, each with an index of precision (combining depth and clarity of

Ko

¨ppel and Sprinz 1861