Divided we stand: How contestation can facilitate institutionalization

• Author: Eun Young Song
• Date: 01 June 2020
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/joms.12532
• Published date: 01 June 2020

© 2019 Society for the Advancement of Management Studies and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Divided we stand: How contestation can facilitate

institutionalization

Eun Young Song

University College London

ABSTRACT Existing literature on institutionalization highlights that regulatory institutions emerge

from resolving disputes, paying little attention to the key behavioral aspect of disputes: contesta-

tion. In this paper, I aim to advance the literature by developing a model of contestation-based

institutionalization; contestation facilitates the adoption of new regulatory institutions, laws.

Drawing on socio-legal and network perspectives on the way people argue in a dispute, I focus

on a behavioral code of contestation – the shared understanding and expectation about how to argue

rather than what to argue. Contestation makes it easier for lawmakers to adopt a new regulatory

institution when the lawmakers argue in conformity with the code. Network and event history

analyses of animal lawsuits and laws in the United States from 1865 to 2010 confirm this model.

This paper highlights the value of looking into the behavioral dimension of disputes and ad-

vances our understanding of institutionalization without emphasizing dispute resolution.

Keywords: behavioral code, contestation, institutionalization, regulatory institutions

INTRODUCTION

[The inclusion rider] is going to cover all of our television, film, video game and digi-

tal productions. We believe that this is what audiences want. It’s the right thing to do.

And ultimately, it’s just good business.

- Former chairman and CEO of Warner Bros. Entertainment,

Kevin Tsujihara (Del Barco, 2018)

In September 2018, Warner Brothers announced a new corporate-wide policy: the

inclusion rider, a policy commitment to diversify the workforce both behind and in front

of the camera with respect to gender, race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, and disability.

Journal of Man agement Studi es 57:4 June 2020

doi:10. 1111/j oms .12 53 2

Address for reprints: The Bartlett School of Construction & Project Management, University College London,

1-19 Torrington Place, London, WC1E 7HB, United Kingdom (ey.song@ucl.ac.uk).

838 E. Y. Song

© 2019 Society for the Advancement of Management Studies and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Still, inclusion remains a highly conflicted issue as it imbricates with other issues, such as

consumer demands, meritocracy, and profitability. Some audiences rail against replacing

fan-favorite male characters with women simply for the sake of inclusion. Critics argue

that barring well-qualified cisgender/straight actors from playing transgender/gay roles

would be unfair. To cast unknown actors is risky, investors stress, although these actors

reflect the precise ethnicity of their characters. It is questionable whether the adoption of

this inclusion policy is based on the end of disputes over inclusion or a community-level

understanding of to what extent women and minorities should be included. However,

when Warner Brothers announced the policy, it did so in relation to other issues people

talk about, namely, pleasing audiences, upholding certain values, and turning a profit: ‘[T]

his is what audiences want. It’s the right thing to do. And ultimately, it’s just good business’.

Existing literature has long considered the adoption of a new regulatory institution,

such as a law or a policy, the institutionalization of the way in which we behave. Whether

it is the introduction of a new policy by a large corporation, such as Warner Brothers’

inclusion policy, or Congress’ passage of a new bill, the adoption of a regulatory institu-

tion represents the ‘social process by which individuals come to accept a shared definition

of social reality’ that enacts the institution (Scott, 1987, p. 496). Because institutions are

based on the shared (definition of) reality or mutual understanding of each other’s defini-

tions of situations and the state of things (Berger and Luckmann, 1967, p. 150), they carry

‘normative expectations that guide one’s behavior’ (Barley, 2008, p. 496), reinforcing the

shared reality. For example, a shared reality that women and minorities are under-repre-

sented in show business underpins an inclusion policy. Its spread will then create an expec-

tation that major studios ought to hire more women and minorities and will lead people

to expect to see more of them in films and television. As a result, casting diverse members

of society will likely persist, and such a way of doing business will become institutionalized

rather than a fad (Purdy and Gray, 2009, p. 376). The lack of a shared reality thus com-

plicates the very existence of an institution and hinder s the process of institutionalization.

The literature highlights institutionalization as a process of resolving disputes and forg-

ing a shared reality. When people do not share the same reality, they often conflict with

one another. Frequent disputes in turn reinforce the belief that there is no shared real-

ity. Accordingly, individuals who want to introduce new regulatory institutions purposely

settle disputes. Conflict resolution, including compromise, negotiation, and truce, shapes

institutions in a unified way (Fiss and Hirsch, 2005; Guérard et al., 2013; Kuttner, 1997;

Murray, 2010), promoting the adoption of institutions and the sharing of the same real-

ity (DiMaggio, 1991). However, conflict resolution may be hard-won, and compromise

can create a fragile truce. Although disputes are much more common than resolution by

mutual concession, the literature has considered disputes something to be resolved. As a

result, it has paid little attention to contestation, which is the key behavioral aspect of every

dispute, and how institutionalization occurs when disputes continue. The current under-

standing of institutionalization therefore prompts the following questions. Does contestation

enable us to share the same reality, and if so, how? Does institutionalization make it easier for us to keep

arguing rather than to seek a compromise, and if so, how? Under what conditions does contestation facilitate

the adoption of regulatory institutions, and what are implications for understanding post-adoption variation?

In answering these questions, this study advances our understanding of institutional-

ization. As a working definition, I refer to institutionalization in two ways: (1) as a process