Divided nation, united military: the Burmese government as junta par excellence.

• Author: Koo, Matthew

In Myanmar, the official discourse of reform and its praxis are clearly at odds. Certain observers were quick to hail the post-2011 reforms in Myanmar as "irreversible." (1) Some such as Hillary Clinton went so far as to describe the U.S. support of the reform process as "America at our best." (2) Contrary to such starry-eyed predictions of a democratic Myanmar and a permanent solution to the protracted civil war, a survey of post-2011 official nationalism tempers such optimism. Official nationalism, as Benedict Anderson observes, privileges the state's interests "first and foremost" and is the state's act of "stretching the short, tight, skin of nation over the gigantic body of the empire." (3) Taken in this vein, official nationalism refers to the Myanmar government's conservative reaction to the mass movements which have militated for regime change.

Couched in the rhetoric of reform, the authoritarian streak of the Myanmar state persists even in this age of reform. The prioritization of non-disintegration of the Union above substantive reform showcases the trajectory of authoritarian Myanmar to be largely unaltered. As it stands, the prospects for ethnic minorities and Burmans to resolve their differences remain dim. Even if a national ceasefire is secured, the Myanmar government's strategy involves the sweeping of salient political issues under the carpet in the hope that socio-economic development would eventually placate minority aspirations for autonomy. (4) Such an approach to deep-rooted socio-economic and political grievances is misguided and will not bear fruit. A nation, as Ernest Renan understood it, is comprised of individuals possessing a collective memory together with a voluntary compact to live for the present and future. (5) Only when the Myanmar government admits and atones for its dark past can the nation-building process truly begin--not just from the top-down, but also, organically, from the bottom-up.

Given the implausible nature of the reforms, it is worth considering why the regime's illiberal character has remained fundamentally unaltered. This question requires an investigation of the state in Myanmar and, more specifically, its civil-military relations. As one of the longest surviving authoritarian regimes, Myanmar remains an intriguing outlier with respect to the burgeoning research on authoritarianism. For instance, Barbara Geddes et al argue that military regimes tend to "... cling less tightly to power than do other kinds of authoritarianism and, in fact, often initiate transitions" to civilian rule. (6) Sustained military rule, according to Michael Desch, paradoxically undermines the military's institutional cohesion, therefore resulting in a return to the barracks. (7) Moreover, research on the sources of regime support in Southeast Asia suggests that the outputs of political systems are more important than receiving inputs. (8) In other words, public support for authoritarian regimes is possible as long as states continues to provide public goods. Yet, given the absence of performance legitimacy and public support, the longevity of Myanmar's military regime thus proves an analytical challenge for such broad theorizing.

So why has the Myanmar armed forces, or Tatmadaw, remained so entrenched within Myanmar politics? Adopting a structural approach, this paper submits that institutions, both informal and formal, explain the durability of the regime in politics more so than an agent-based approach. More specifically, my argument is threefold. First, as Section I argues, the Tatmadaw's response to the external and internal threat environment strengthened the military as an 'institution'. Next, Section II posits that accompanying this institutional development was the expansion of the Tatmadaw's role which crowded out fledging civilian institutions and entrenched the military's position as 'government'. Section III caps off the previous two sections by contending that this dual institutionalization of the military has become path dependent, therefore explaining the protracted military rule. Accordingly, the military's dominance in politics arises from its successful institutional measures to control the masses and maintain elite unity. After which, Section IV addresses possible critiques and Section V concludes by considering the prospects of a military withdrawal from politics.

In short, this structural approach privileges the Tatmadaw's successful institutional development--in response to the threat environment--as the reason behind the military's continued dominance of politics. To utilize Samuel Huntington's definition of political institutionalization, (9) the military regime has acquired not only "value and stability", but also "adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence" in what over time has become a path dependent trajectory of self-reproducing sequences. (10) Recognizing that a comprehensive exposition on the Tatmadaw's historic dominance in Myanmar politics is beyond the scope of this paper, developments from 1948 to the post-2011 reforms are specifically analyzed to demonstrate the military's institutionalization in politics. Such a lengthy timeframe is necessary since observable instances of mass repression (i.e. 1988 and 2007) while important, only highlight the military's cohesion and ability to dominate against the people's will. Like the dog that does not bark, (11) the institutional evolution of the military to dominate Myanmar politics can only be observed over the longue duree.

I: TATAMADAW AS 'INSTITUTION'

From the onset of Burma's independence in 1948, the external and internal threat environment, both real and perceived, (12) facilitated the institutional development of the Tatmadaw. Civil war broke out in Burma because the state's desire for a unitary state clashed with ethnic minorities' aspirations for autonomy within a federal arrangement. (13) With ethnic tensions festering and outbreaks of rebellions among certain minority groups, the threat situation was further exacerbated with Muslim insurgents and the CIA-backed Kuomintang (KMT) along the western and northern borders respectively. Burmese elites feared the significant KMT presence would result in a PRC invasion of Burma. (14) Moreover, the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) shifted from paralyzing urban strikes to an armed insurrection against the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL) government in 1948. (15) As a reaction to these threats, the Tatmadaw's institutionalization can be understood in three mutually reinforcing ways: professionalization, organizational consolidation in command structure and a shared identity.

The Tatmadaw first became professionalized through the act of war-fighting as it engaged with existential threats from within and without. To survive in an environment where insurgency had become "a way of life", (16) the Tatmadaw ruthlessly relied on brutal coercion to preserve the Union. Though initially an incompetent, ragtag army, (17) the Tatmadaw's defeats at the hands of the better-trained KMT and ethnic rebels triggered a period of introspection and organizational development as seen in the creation of organs such as the Military Planning Staff (MPS), Defense Service Institute (DSI) and...