Diversionary Theory of War and the Case Study Design

• Author: Mikael Blomdahl
• Published date: 01 July 2017
• Date: 01 July 2017
• DOI: 10.1177/0095327X16651866
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article

Diversionary Theory

of War and the Case

Study Design: President

Clinton’s Strikes on

Iraq and Yugoslavia

Mikael Blomdahl

1

Abstract

This article examines President Clinton’s decisions to launch military actions against

Iraq in June 1993 and Kosovo in 1999. This study represents an attempt to test the

descriptive accuracy and further developing the diversionary theory of war. Using a

qualitative framework for diversionary use of force developed by another researcher,

Ryan C. Hendrickson, this researchexamines and compares the twocases in order to

determine whether or not these strikes appear to be diversionary in nature. This

article generally suggests that empirical support for the diversionary argumentin these

cases is ‘‘mixed’’ but has more validity in the actions against Iraq. Two proposals to

further develop qualitative tests for diversionary use of force are advanced.

Keywords

diversionary war, the United States, case studies, Iraq, Congress

Introduction

Many scholars argue that the nexus linking domestic and foreign policy occasion-

ally is so influential that leaders from time to time use force to divert the public

from domestic political problems. While some scholars claim it to be a

1

Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Stockholm, Sweden

Corresponding Author:

Mikael Blomdahl, Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Box 27035, SE-102 51 Stockholm, Sweden.

Email: mikael.blomdahl@ui.se

Armed Forces & Society

2017, Vol. 43(3) 545-565

ªThe Author(s) 2016

Reprints and permission:

sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav

DOI: 10.1177/0095327X16651866

journals.sagepub.com/home/afs

questionable view, others emphasize that decisions to employ force are linked to,

for example, electoral gain, presidential approval, the e conomy, and congressional

support (Brule´ & Hwang, 2010; Brule´ & Williams, 2009; DeRouen, 2000; Ford-

ham, 1998; James & Oneal, 1991; Morgan & Bickers, 1992; Ostrom & Job, 1986;

Stoll, 1987). The commander in chief is, hence, assumed to employ force to

distract the public from what is called ‘‘deteriorating political conditions at home’’

(Meernik & Waterman, 1996).

The central foundations of the theory are constituted by two interconnected

processes: diverting and rallying. The concept of rally events isbasedonthe

assumption that domestic political considerations can influence presidents to seek

rally effects, and it follows that a ‘‘rally’’ is a foreign policy event that is supposed

to have a positive impact on the status of a leader. Given that leaders are aware of

the possibility of public rallying when the nation is facing external threats, they

have motives to redirect focus to their adversaries by means of the use of militar-

ized force. Noticeably, this domestic political account of war advances one of

several significant alternatives to rationalist explanations of international conflict.

Convincing empirical support for the diversionary argument would, hence, con-

firm another path to international conflict, while restricted support for this argu-

ment would cast distrust on ‘‘one class of second-image theories of international

conflict’’ (Fravel, 2010, p. 308).

The empirical findings of the diversionary argument have been weakened by

studies that show no evidence of diversionary behavior. This has led some scholars

to believe that the diversionary use of force hypothesis is a myth (Meernik &

Waterman, 1996). However, the wider body of research on this question is quan-

titative and seems to consist of an imposing collection of methods and data that

lacks scientific consensus. These conflicting findings have led a few qualitative-

oriented scholars to call for a refinement of the theory and methods used to study

the diversionary hypothesis (Cramer, 2006, p. 178; Hendrickson, 2002a; Hall, &

Polak, 2013).

The aim of this article is to address the calls for further qualitative studies of a

small number of cases as a way to further the understanding of the possibility of

diversionary behavior. In view of the mixed and contradictory empirical findings in

large-Nresearch of diversionary war, this article uses the case study design to

explore the diversionary hypothesis. Methods of this type are well matched for a

number of reasons. They can, for example, distinguish incorrect links between

domestic politics and the use of force. They can also be employed to ‘‘discover the

decision-making process by which leaders favor force with the purpose of diverting

domestic political problems’’ (Fravel, 2010, p. 308).

One scholar, Ryan Hendrickson, takes a qualitative approach and acknowledges

the difficulties of determining presidential motives without uncertainty. Hendrick-

son describes and defines four different propositions. The propositions illuminate

the circumstantial evidence, plausible characteristics of the decision-making process

and expected international and domestic reactions, suggesting a strong probability

546 Armed Forces & Society 43(3)