Divergence, similarity and symmetry in Sino-Indian threat perceptions.

• Author: Saalman, Lora
• Position: Sino-Indian Relations - Report

China and India remain locked in a stagnant embrace when it comes to the most intractable of security dilemmas: the Sino-Indian border issue. A closer look at Chinese and Indian strategic, scientific and academic experts" security perceptions vis-a-vis one another reveals that there is much more to the Sino-Indian security dynamic than meets the eye. Chinese and Indian strategic analysts hold divergent interests when evaluating each other's military modernization, the former preoccupied with India's naval development and the latter with China's army. Technical analysts in each country share a similar level of interest in the other's aviation and aerospace programs. Scholars exhibit a strong, if not symmetrical, level of focus on the other country's nuclear strategy and status. Using this tripartite discourse as a baseline, this essay provides both a quantitative and qualitative analysis of each group's perceptions to better understand Sino-Indian security relations and to propose measures within each arena to enhance mutual understanding. It shows that the Sino-Indian security dilemma cannot be simply viewed through the prism of the border anymore.

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Chinese and Indian interlocutors have spent countless hours debating the border issue in the years following the Sino-Indian border conflict of 1962. The latest set of border talks between India's National Security Adviser Shivshankar Menon and China's State Councilor Dai Bingguo in November 2010 represented the fourteenth in a series, followed in rapid succession by Premier Wen Jiabao's visit to India. (1)

Yet, both meetings resulted in tepid pronouncements of "steady progress" when it came to the border, which markedly contrast with the tit-for-tat politics of late. (2) Despite years of confidence building measures (CBMs) and agreements, China and India are currently locked in a stagnant embrace when it comes to this most intractable of security dilemmas.

There is no question that the border issue assumes both a looming and lingering presence in Sino-Indian relations. However, when analysts are divided into three groups--namely strategic, technical and academic--it becomes apparent that there is much more to the Sino-Indian security dynamic than meets the eye.

Chinese and Indian strategic analysts maintain a divergent approach, the former preoccupied with India's navy and the latter with China's army. Technical analysts in each country share a similar level of interest in the other country's aviation and aerospace programs. Experts with a more scholarly bent exhibit a strong, if not symmetrical, level of focus on the other country's nuclear strategy and status.

Using this tripartite discourse as a baseline, this essay provides a quantitative and qualitative analysis of each of these groups' views to gain a better sense of the level and nature of future Sino-Indian interaction. This approach mitigates some of the generalizations and abstractions that hamper improved communication. It demonstrates that the Sino-Indian security dilemma cannot be simply viewed through the prism of the border anymore.

METHODOLOGY

The primary sources for this essay consist of Chinese and Indian journals and interviews that fall into three categories: strategic, technical and academic. While these groups may never be neatly defined or separated, they serve as the guiding framework for perceptual evaluation. Two comparable journals from China and India within each of the three categories were selected--six in total. These journals were then surveyed from January 1991 through December 2009. (3)

These materials were used to statistically account for the number of times Chinese and Indian analysts made reference to the military-related systems and training of the other (e.g., India's Su-30MKI procurement from Russia, China's M-9/M-11 cooperation with Pakistan), as well as the various concepts relating to security intentions (e.g., Chinese views on India's potential "Indian Ocean control," Indian views on China and Pakistan's "two-front" threat).

Beyond statistical evaluation and these six journals, this essay surveys a wide range of Chinese and Indian journals and books for qualitative measures of threat perception, supplementing this data with interviews and discussions with more than 120 analysts and experts within both countries. (4) Finally, it integrates social psychology terminology to explain perceptual phenomena. (5) Using quantitative and qualitative analysis, this essay seeks to compare and contrast Chinese and Indian analysts' views of one another in the security sphere.

MILITARY/STRATEGIC ANALYSTS

Divergence

The disparity between Chinese and Indian military and strategic analysts' security focus relates closely to the concept of social identity. (6) Both quantitative and qualitative analyses demonstrate that Chinese analysts largely view India as an ocean power, while the prevalent Indian view of China is as a land power. (7)

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Findings from China

When asked which areas of Indian military modernization have surpassed or have the potential to challenge China, Chinese analysts point to India's navy. This attention has been shifting from the simple listing of systems toward more in-depth analyses that probe the basic question of whether India can catch up to China's navy. (8)

In the journal Hangjian bingqi (Shipborne Weapons), one author demonstrates this focus on India's rapid naval rise, stating:

India has always sought global great power status.... Since the beginning of the 21st century, India has increased the speed of its development of a strong navy with global war-fighting capabilities. In the past few years, India has not only increased its joint exercises with the strong naval countries of the United States, France, Russia, etc., it has also sped up the development and purchase of new naval equipment. (9) Chart 1 shows the number of references to Indian systems and themes made by Chinese journals from 1991 to 2009. Graph I and chart 1 reveal just as much about how China views itself as about how it views India. India's pursuit of, and advances in, second-strike capabilities, nuclear submarines and aircraft carriers garners lengthy analysis within China, given that these are capabilities that China seeks to either acquire or improve.

While in India there has long been a tendency to include China in strategic doctrines and writings, similar writings from China have made scant reference to India. However, China's goals in naval development are increasingly being compared with those of India. In one recent example, India crept into a review of the sixtieth anniversary of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). (10) While India has historically been viewed in the context of its security relations with Pakistan, Chinese analysts have begun to de-hyphenate the two countries and treat India as an entity unto itself.

These two parallel changes do not necessarily mean that Chinese analysts perceive India as a direct threat, but they are starting to take India more seriously.

Findings from India

Perhaps just as striking as Chinese analysts' evolving perceptions when it comes to India is the relative lack of any marked shifts in Indian strategists' accounts of China. Articles twining China and Pakistan and those featuring the "two-front" threat posed by China and Pakistan to India are littered throughout materials from 1991 to 2009. (11)

As recently as December 2009, Indian Army chief general Deepak Kapoor publicly stated that the Indian army must prepare for a two-front war. (12) While eliciting debate, this viewpoint has a number of corollaries under the rubric "China threat." (13) As chart 2 shows, China's decades of military assistance to Pakistan continue to be viewed by a number of India's strategic analysts as part of China's strategy of keeping India bogged down in South Asia.

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Overall, China's long-term threat casts a much wider shadow over India than does Pakistan's near-term threat. (14) According to this conception, the scope of China's perceived challenge to India is ever-expanding, with growing coverage of China's military engagement of India's neighbors, including Bhutan, Nepal, Bangladesh, Myanmar and Sri Lanka. (15)

Perception

Overconfidence Phenomenon and Victim Mentality

The legacy of 1962 feeds overconfidence phenomenon and victim mentality, which play integral roles in defining Sino-Indian threat perceptions. (16) China leans toward the former, while India tilts toward the latter. China and India's history at the border ranks highest with the largest number of citations (see chart 2). This historical precedent, in the words of Major General G. D. Bakshi, was

just a tactical engagement in which India suffered a traumatic and uncalled for humiliation. This battle is hardly remembered in China. However it had a very disproportionate impact on the Indian national psyche. (17) Not only was the border conflict a "humiliation," but a number of Indian strategists connect the 1962 loss to phenomena in military funding occurring over forty years later, arguing that it was integral to India's ongoing emphasis on investment, self-reliance and, more recently, offsets. (18) Air Marshal Brijesh Dhar Jayal states,

the Department of Defence Production in the Ministry of Defence was set up in 1962, in the aftermath of the Chinese aggression to create a self-reliant and self-sufficient indigenous defence production base. (19) The border issue has been elevated to the source of blame, causation and ultimate arbiter of India's military modernization. (20) By contrast, Chinese analysts' mention of the border tends to be largely based on a basic reportage of facts and comparatively diminished interest. (21)

In the Indian Ocean, the asymmetrical dynamic between China and India, where China is the dominant force, is turned on its head. India has a more advantageous position in terms of geography, maritime capabilities and...