A Distinction Without a Difference? Examining the Causal Pathways Behind Ideologically Motivated Mass Public Shootings

Date01 August 2018
Published date01 August 2018
AuthorJoel Alfredo Capellan,Alexei Anisin
DOI10.1177/1088767918770704
Subject MatterArticles
/tmp/tmp-172bnjpTotSJ8S/input 770704HSXXXX10.1177/1088767918770704Homicide StudiesCapellan and Anisin
research-article2018
Article
Homicide Studies
2018, Vol. 22(3) 235 –255
A Distinction Without a
© 2018 SAGE Publications
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https://doi.org/10.1177/1088767918770704
DOI: 10.1177/1088767918770704
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Causal Pathways Behind
Ideologically Motivated Mass
Public Shootings
Joel Alfredo Capellan1 and Alexei Anisin2
Abstract
This study utilizes crisp-set qualitative comparative analysis to assess 306 mass
shootings. We compare non-extremist and extremist mass shooters according to
characteristics that capture mental health histories of offenders, their grievances, and
strains. We discover that offenders who sympathized with extremism were driven
by grievance against a social group and were suffering from either mental health
issues or from general strain. Extremist sympathizers differ from non-extremists in
the nature of their grievances and the strains they experience. These results imply
there may exist different causal mechanistic activity underpinning extremist and non-
extremist violence, specifically with regards to mass shootings.
Keywords
mass public shooting, lone wolf terrorism, homicide, qualitative comparative analysis,
ideologically motivated violence
Introduction
Due to their motivations, ever-increasing incidence, and lethality, ideologically moti-
vated mass public shootings represent a pressing threat to the national security of the
United States (Capellan, 2015). Extremist ideologies may be causally associated with
mass murder due to a combination of strains and grievances held by offenders (Hamm
1Rowan University, Glassboro, NJ, USA
2Univerzita Karlova, Praha, (Charles University in Prague) Czech Republic
Corresponding Author:
Joel Alfredo Capellan, Rowan University, 201 Mullica Hill Road, Glassboro, NJ 08028, USA.
Email: capellan@rowan.edu

236
Homicide Studies 22(3)
& Spaaij, 2015). For example, Omar Mateen (Orlando Nightclub shooting, 2016)
sympathized with Al Qaeda and Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) but also had
lifelong struggles with mental health, aggression, obsession with violence, and
thwarted career goals. These factors can indeed make Mateen seem indistinguishable
from the nonideological mass murderers such as the Sandy Hook shooter—Adam
Lanza or the Aurora—and Colorado movie theater shooter—James E. Holmes.
Empirical research has revealed that the demographic profiles and background charac-
teristics of ideologically driven and nonideological perpetrators are remarkably simi-
lar (Capellan, 2015; Horgan, Gill, Bouhana, Silver, & Corner, 2016; Lankford, 2013;
McCauley, Moskalenko, & Van Son, 2013). Individual-level characteristics of extrem-
ist and non-extremist offenders such as their age, sex, and occupation tend to be simi-
lar across time. These parallels have led researchers to believe that extremist and
non-extremist violence is brought about by similar if not the same social and psycho-
logical processes.
Extremist and non-extremist violence have also been observed to impact macro-
societal outcomes in similar ways. Criminologists have presented evidence that points
to linkages between adverse social outcomes in both crime and homicide (Bursik &
Grasmick, 1993; Sampson & Bean, 2006). When there are high rates of homicide in a
given society, social trust and cohesion tend to be eroded (Kirk & Matsuda, 2011).
Similarly, low levels of social capital have been associated with higher rates of homi-
cide (Rosenfeld, Baumer, & Messner, 2001). There is also a long tradition associating
ideologically and nonideologically motivated violence with social disorganization
(Freilich & Pridemore, 2007). In this tradition, scholars have noted that societies with
higher levels of social cohesion tend to experience lower levels of antisocial behavior
(Durkheim, 1951). Cross-nationally, Fahey and LaFree (2015) discovered that social
disorganization was linked with increased numbers of terrorist attacks and fatalities.
Further adding to this debate, research on lone wolf terrorism has revealed that most
lone wolves are indeed loners and socially isolated, and around one third suffered from
mental illness (Gill, Horgan, & Deckert, 2014). Interestingly enough, many of histo-
ry’s well-known mass shooters also have been observed to be loners and bearers of
mental health problems such as Seung Hui Cho who killed 32 at Virginia Tech
University in 2007.
When it comes to extremism and mass shootings, it remains unclear if violence car-
ried out by extremist sympathizers and extremists, in general, differs from violence
carried out by non-extremist offenders. To the best of our knowledge, all of the com-
parative research carried out thus far on extremist and non-extremist violence has
relied on traditional statistical methods, including descriptive statistics, linear regres-
sion, and multivariate analysis. Approaches of this sort are based on “net-effects”
thinking (Ragin, 2008), in which researchers purposely isolate variables and estimate
their effect on an outcome. In contrast, this study adopts a methodological framework
in qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) that provides several advantages. As an
explanatory framework, QCA has been extensively used throughout social science but
surprisingly has not been exploited in the study of mass shootings or criminological
investigations of extremist violence. We utilize a recent R Programming software

Capellan and Anisin
237
package to assess mass shootings and attempted mass shootings according to the ideo-
logical characteristics of offenders, as well as other factors such as offender
grievance(s), mental health history, and personal strains.
We assess data on 306 mass public shootings and shooting attempts that occurred
in the United States from 1965 to 2016. Here, we carry out numerous procedures that
have yet to be implemented in scholarship on extremist and non-extremist violence—
including set-theoretic assessments between explanatory conditions and several out-
comes, Truth Table analysis, logical minimization (based on the Quine–McCluskey
algorithm), and visualization of output through Venn diagrams. In addition, this study
differs from previous criminological inquiries into mass shootings because we analyze
offenders that were sympathetic to extremist ideologies but were not formally affili-
ated with any extremist organization. We then compare this shooter type to non-
extremist offenders. Most “lone-actor” terrorists in the post–9/11 era have not been
affiliated with a formal extremist group (Hamm & Spaaij, 2015). Through assessing
shooters that sympathized with extremism, but were not necessarily aided by an
extremist group to carry out violence, this study provides new comparative insight into
a previously unaddressed area. Our assessment of this outcome is fruitful for both
crime prevention and theory building, given that the overwhelming majority of ideo-
logically motivated mass shootings have been perpetrated by extremist sympathizers
who were not formally affiliated to an extremist group or network.
Research on Extremist Violence
Similarities and Differences
Even though mass murder and nonideological violence have traditionally been inter-
preted through criminological perspectives (Dietz, 1986; Fox & Levin, 2003), and
ideologically motivated violence has been understood through political paradigms
(Michael, 2012; Pape, 2003), it is necessary to overview both literatures. Beginning
with those that identified similarities between extremists and non-extremists (Capellan,
2015; Gill et al., 2014), here scholars observed that offenders tended to be loners who
are socially marginalized, single, and unable to maintain thriving careers. Similarly,
researchers have pointed to factors pertaining to an offender’s obsession with extreme
violence as a possible explanation for extremism (Dietz, 1986). In his study of ideo-
logical mass public shootings, Capellan (2015) concluded as follows:
[The similarities between both types of offenders] . . . suggests that “lone wolves” and
“deranged shooters” may be outcomes of the same social and psychological processes.
The only meaningful difference may be that for ideological shooters ideological
extremism is intertwined with their personal frustrations and aversions toward society.
These findings are consistent with the idea that lone wolves and deranged shooters are
but a part of a larger phenomenon of lone-actor grievance-fueled violence. (p. 13)
Ideological and nonideological mass murderers often display a deep-rooted fasci-
nation with violence, military-grade apparel, tactics, and weaponry, as well as a

238
Homicide Studies 22(3)
fixation with prior massacres and the resulting infamy (Dietz, 1986; Lankford, 2016b;
Spaaij, 2010). For some individuals, this obsession may act as a self-fulfilling proph-
ecy. Another relevant factor that holds importance for an individual’s ability to cope
with negative emotions is mental illness. Out of a sample of nearly 300 ideological and
nonideological mass shooters, half were observed to have suffered from a variety of
mental illnesses, including personality disorder (Capellan, 2015). Along similar lines,
strain has been associated with both extremist and non-extremist violence. Agnew’s
(1992) general strain theory (GST) captures how social-economic stressors lead a
given individual to...

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