Dissent Networks, State Repression, and Strategic Clemency for Defection

• Author: Howard Liu
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/00220027221077220
• Published date: 01 August 2022
• Date: 01 August 2022
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article

Journal of Conflict Resolution

2022, Vol. 66(7-8) 1292–1319

© The Author(s) 2022

Article reuse guidelines:

sagepub.com/journals-permissions

DOI: 10.1177/00220027221077220

journals.sagepub.com/home/jcr

Dissent Networks, State

Repression, and Strategic

Clemency for Defection

Howard Liu

Abstract

Why do governments severely punish some dissidents while showing mercy to others?

This study argues that when constrained by limited information on dissent, states have

incentivesto cast the net of repression wider by executingnot just key dissent actors but

also members closely connected to them to ensure demobilization. States also crave

information,and granting clemency to defectorswho bring in informationimproves state

intelligence. Given that tips have different values, regimes will grant clemency to de-

fectors who are closely connected to key dissent actors and possess high-value tips,

allowing the state to pursue top fugitives and dissolve resistance more efficiently. Using

newly declassified data on political victims during Taiwan’s White Terror authoritarian

period, I find that the regime tends to execute both key actors (i.e., leaders and re-

cruiters) and their closely connected members. Defectors who share information tend

to receive mercy, but defectors closely connected to key actors are much less likely to

face execution than less connected defectors. These findings shed new insight into the

toolkit dictatorsuse to gather intelligenceon dissent and how strategic clemency induces

defection and betrayal among dissidents, helping destroy dissent networks from within.

Keywords

Repression, political violence, information, clemency for defection, dissent networks,

authoritarian control, Taiwan

Department of Government, University of Essex, UK

Corresponding Author:

Howard Liu, Department of Government, University of Essex, Wivenhoe Park, Colchester CO4 3SQ,

United Kingdom, Great Britain CO4 3SQ, UK.

Email: howard.liu@essex.ac.uk

The first responsibility of state actors is building and maintaining order. It is particularly

vital for autocracies as their survival hinges critically on enforcing order and exerting

political control. In the literature of authoritarian politics and state repression, scholars

often assume that autocrats possess the necessary tools to control the population; for

example, dictators can use violence and deploy surveillance to penetrate society and

preempt dissent. Yet, evidence from previous research suggests otherwise (Zhukov,

2014;Dimitrov and Sassoon, 2014;Greitens, 2016). Dictators often struggle to find the

resources they need to exercise control, and one of the main resources they struggle

with is information and intelligence (Kalyvas, 2006,Berman et al., 2011). Few states

function like contemporary China or Russia, where the state apparatus possesses

tremendous information-gathering capacities with which to wield state powe r. Most

dictators fight dissent movements in information-poor environments and seek ways to

gather intelligence to aid their repression campaigns. However, we know relatively

little about how regimes employ repression as a strategy to obtain information on

dissent. Thus, important but previously unanswered questions emerge: Under

information-limited environments, why do regimes selectively repress certain dissi-

dents while showing mercy to others? What strategies do regimes use to counter

information deficit and maximize control?

This study proposes a network-based explanation for state repression and argues that

regimes leverage network relationships to gather dissent information and punish

political opponents. When operating with limited information, states are uncertain

whether they have captured all key actors and whether removing these actors can

sufficiently demobilize dissent movements. This insecurity motivates regimes to widen

the net of repression by executing people closely connected to key actors to ensure that

all important figures are eliminated and movements are sufficiently demobilized.

Strategically eliminating central actors and the closely connected members in the

dissent network also strikes a delicate balance between costly massive killing and the

risk of targeting too narrowly.

More importantly, states crave information, and this hunger drives them to extract

information and enhance intelligence. Violence can be substituted by clemency if

dissidents defect and share information “tips”that help state repression campaigns.

Given that not all tips have equal value, regimes will reward defectors who are closely

connected to key dissidents and possess high-value intelligence, such as leaders’

identities and whereabouts, allowing the state to pursue top fugitives and dissolve

resistance organizations more efficiently. Generally, tips from inside dissent move-

ments cost less and provide better intelligence than information gained from external

surveillance. Substituting between violence and clemency incentivizes dissent de-

fection and insider tipping, aiding the regime with extra power to combat resistance and

destroy it from within.

I test this argument using new data on political victims in the authoritarian period of

Taiwan (1949–1991) collected from the Injustice Compensation Foundation and the

Transitional Justice Commission. The data provide a rare opportunity to empirically

study relational punishment and dissident defection in authoritarian regimes at the

Liu 1293