DISSENT AND DISARRAY IN PUTIN'S RUSSIA: THE AUTHORITARIAN PRESIDENT'S HOLD ON POWER MAY BE SHAKIER THAN IT LOOKS.

• Author: Young, Cathy
• Position: Vladimir Putin

THIS YEAR, WITH the start of a new presidential term that runs out in 2024, Vladimir Putin has achieved the dubious milestone of having been in power longer than Leonid Brezhnev, who led the country from 1964 to 1982. It is an apt comparison, since the age of Putin in Russia bears definite resemblances to the Brezhnev era in the Soviet Union.

Now, as then, large segments of the population enjoy mostly oil-enabled material comfort relative to previous generations (even if the 1970s version of comfort, in which a color television was the height of luxury, bananas were a rare delicacy, and a trip to Crimea was a dream vacation, looks like squalor in the 2010s). Now, as then, there is a relatively mild authoritarian regime with occasional spikes of repression (even if the level of freedom in modern-day Russia, where dissidents can sell books and virtually all content is accessible on the internet, would have been unthinkable in Brezhnev's USSR). Now, as then, there was a stagnant stability and a cynical national mood, with no visible alternatives to the existing system.

Of course, the Brezhnev era turned out to be a prelude to reform, upheaval, and ultimately the collapse of the Soviet Union. What comes after Putinism--and when?

The fall of Soviet Communism and the turn toward liberal values in the new Russia was a major victory for freedom, notwithstanding the massive flaws of both post-Soviet economic reform and Boris Yeltsin's leadership. Russia's authoritarian backsliding under Putin in the 21st century, and the rise of an amorphous but aggressive anti-liberal "Russian idea" composed of a mishmash of aggrieved nationalism, populism, and cultural traditionalism, is not the only factor in the worldwide rise of illiberalism in the 2010s. But it has made the world less safe for freedom and empowered freedom's enemies.

Today, resistance to authoritarianism in Russia is weak but very much alive. In the past year and a half, tens of thousands have turned out in cities across Russia to protest corruption, internet censorship, Putin's return for yet another presidential term, and most recently austerity measures; even Russia's Libertarian Party (yes, there is one) has managed to organize a fairly large rally in Moscow. Recent polls show declining approval ratings for the president, an upturn in pro-Western attitudes, and rising expectations of political protests. If Russian reformers can use this moment to get their message across to mass audiences and break Putinism's stranglehold on the largely apathetic majority, a rebirth of Russian liberalism may be possible--and would have far-reaching repercussions.

THE 2018 PRESIDENTIAL election in Russia was a particularly depressing one for anti-authoritarians, even by Russian standards. Putin received almost 77 percent of the popular vote, compared to 63 percent in 2012, with the turnout slightly up this time. Six years ago, there was at least one liberal candidate, businessman Mikhail Prokhorov, among the top runners-up; he came in third with about 8 percent of the vote. This year, the only two other candidates who received more than 2 percent were Pavel Grudinin, a millionaire Communist (11.8 percent), and perennial ultranationalist buffoon Vladimir Zhirinovsky (5.7 percent).

The only opposition figure with a sizable following, anti-corruption blogger and activist Alexei Navalny, was barred from running because of a 2017 fraud conviction widely considered to have been fabricated by his opponents in power. The liberal opposition candidate who did run--notorious TV personality Ksenia Sobchak, an ex-reality show host sometimes dubbed the "Russian Paris Hilton"--was almost certainly a Kremlin pick, intended not only to maintain the pretense of a "real" election but to add a bit of excitement to the suspenseless campaign.

Sobchak, whose father Anatoly Sobchak, the late mayor of St. Petersburg, was once Putin's boss and mentor, freely admitted that she told Putin about her intent to run, though she denied that her candidacy was coordinated with him. She was the only person during the campaign who openly criticized Putin on television and raised the issue of the lack of political freedom in the country. Still, Navalny blasted her as a stooge. After receiving more coverage from the Kremlin-controlled media than usual for the opposition, she pulled in just 1.7 percent of the vote and then essentially vanished from the political scene.

The weakness of the liberal Russian opposition is due to many factors. To some extent, "liberals get blamed for the economic disasters of the 1990s," says Moscow-based political scientist Lilia Shevtsova, an associate fellow at the Chatham House Institute, "even though those policies had nothing to do with liberalism." ("Pro-market" policies in 1990s Russia amounted largely to former Communist apparatchiks reinventing themselves as capitalists and "privatizing" former state properties; meanwhile, protections for private property remained weak and state intervention in the economy remained rampant.) But ultimately, the opposition has been marginalized by the systematic actions of the regime, not spontaneous consensus.

Putin's Western apologists believe that his electoral wins--no matter how unfree and unfair the elections--and his sky-high approval ratings reflect genuine popularity and gratitude for saving his country from chaos. The Weekly Standard's Christopher Caldwell has asserted that Russians "revere" Putin. But unless one counts reverential comments from politicians and pro-Kremlin pundits, the reality is considerably more complex.

Writing in Nezavisimaya Gazeta (The Independent Gazette) in July, political analyst Vitaly Shklyarov noted that public opinion polling in Russia runs up against a basic paradox: The message of official propaganda is that agood, well-adjusted citizen must regard Putin as "the national leader, a sacred figure who is above all institutions and all criticism and is identical to the state itself"; thus, to ask for someone's opinion of Putin is to probe his adherence to a key social norm. Shklyarov believes this skews poll results, not only because people feel pressured to give the...