Dismantling the Cults of Stalin and Khrushchev
| Author | Thomas B. Larson |
| DOI | 10.1177/106591296802100302 |
| Published date | 01 September 1968 |
| Date | 01 September 1968 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
383
DISMANTLING
THE
CULTS
OF
STALIN
AND
KHRUSHCHEV
THOMAS
B.
LARSON
Columbia
University
HATEVER
ELSE
Communist
power
brought
to
Russia,
it
did
not
V guarantee
rule
by
&dquo;good&dquo;
leaders.
The
toppling
from
their
pedestals
W
V
of
Stalin
and
then
Khrushchev
forced
the
introduction
of
a
very
sober-
ing
note
into
the
treatment
of
the
past
history
of
the
Soviet
regime.
The
present
top
leaders
can
point
to
no
honorable
predecessors
in
the
chief
party
and
govern-
ment
posts
for
the
entire
period
between
Lenin’s
death
in
1924
and
the
ouster
of
Khrushchev
forty
years
later.
The
list
of
fallen
chiefs
included
every
single
chair-
man
of
the
Council
of
Ministers
(formerly Peoples
Commissars)
of
the
period.
These
government
chiefs
were
not
much
celebrated
during
their
tenure
of
oflice,
however,
so
the
only
serious
problems
of
iconoclasm
related
to
Stalin
and
Khrush-
chev,
the
principal
party
secretaries
during
the
four
decades.
It
is
now
admitted
even
by
party
ideologists
that
Stalin
amassed
and
retained
almost
absolute
power
despite
a
long
catalogue
of
costly
mistakes
and
serious
abuses.
Despite
this
experi-
ence,
the
system
allowed
his
successor
Khrushchev
to
impose
his
impulsive
ideas
and
&dquo;hare-brained&dquo;
schemes
on
Soviet
society
without
even
having
to
resort
to
the
terror
that
stilled
opposition
to
Stalin.
In
their
effort
to
lighten
the
great
shadow
cast
on
the
&dquo;heroic&dquo;
past
of
the
Soviet
regime,
the
spokesmen
have
focused
attention
on
the
peerless
father
of
the
Soviet
order,
Lenin,
while
doggedly
insisting
that Soviet
institutions
remained
basically
sound
even
in
the
period
when
errant
successors
ruled.
Nevertheless,
it
has
not
been
easy
to
combine
a
repudiation
of
past
leaders
with
glorification
of
the
Soviet
past,
and
the
tension
between
these
seemingly
irreconcilable
tendencies
has
continued
to
trouble
Soviet
ideological
policy.
These
past
leaders
left,
of
course,
rather
different
legacies.
Stalin
could
take
years
to
nourish
his
&dquo;cult
of
personality.&dquo;
Although
it
took
major
form
by
1929,
in
the
succeeding
decades
it
went
to
lengths
far
beyond
anything
achieved
(or
perhaps
contemplated)
under
Khrushchev,
who
attained
a
lofty
eminence
at
a
much
later
age
and
could
not
have
expected
to
occupy
the
top
post
for
a
period
comparable
to
Stalin’s.
Stalin
died
in
honor
and
only
later
lost
his
good
standing,
in
a
gradual
shift
punctuated
by
outbursts
of
accusations
at
the
1956
and
1961
Party
Congresses.
Khrushchev
was
removed
from
office
in
silent
disgrace
as
he
was
consigned
to
virtual
oblivion.
Stalin
was
always
credited
with
some
virtues
and
some
good
deeds,
but
recognition
of
these
from
1961
became
infrequent.
In
Octo-
ber
1964,
there
was
an
abrupt
and
complete
halt
to
acknowledgement
of
Khrush-
chev’s
virtues
and
an
almost
complete
ban
on
mention
of
his
name,
whether
in
a
negative
or
positive
context.
These
differences
in
handling
the
two
ex-leaders
were
due
not
only
to
the
fact
that
one
was
safely
buried
and
the other
still
living.
Stalin’s
faults
were
on
a
grand
scale,
as
were
the
virtues
formerly
attributed
to
him.
Tragedy
did
not
become
farce
with
Khrushchev,
but
certainly
the
faults
laid
on
Khrushchev
were
pedestrian
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