Disentangling Diffusion: The Effects of Social Learning and Economic Competition on State Policy Innovation and Expansion

AuthorRichard Witmer,Frederick J. Boehmke
DOI10.1177/106591290405700104
Date01 March 2004
Published date01 March 2004
Subject MatterArticles
Traditionally, political science studies of state policy
adoption have focused exclusively on explaining
policy innovation—the timing of when a state first
implements that policy. One problem with this approach is
that it does not consider the extent of policy adoption fol-
lowing this innovation.1Further, the focus on the initial
date of adoption has diverted our attention from studying or
theorizing about changes in the extent of policy adoption
within a state, which we refer to as policy expansion. In this
article we apply a method for combining the study of policy
adoption and policy expansion to an important and expand-
ing policy issue, casino-style Indian gaming.
To demonstrate the advantages of studying policy adop-
tion and subsequent changes in the extent of policy, we dis-
tinguish and test two theories of policy diffusion. Policy dif-
fusion is the process whereby a state is more likely to adopt
a policy if other states have already adopted that policy. In
general, researchers have focused on a regional diffusion
effect motivated by social learning theory. Social learning
theory posits that state officials tend to draw on the experi-
ence of nearby states when considering whether they should
adopt a policy. On the other hand, economic competition
may explain policy diffusion as a response to inter-state
pressures in the form of lost business, tax revenues and jobs.
We argue that these two types of diffusion may have differ-
ent effects for policy innovation and policy expansion and
that these effects may vary across policy areas.
To distinguish between these two types of diffusion we
employ an event count model that allows us to study not
just the timing of initial innovation, but also the extent of
policy adoption in that year and whether it is expanded in
subsequent years. Thus we are able to obtain a better meas-
ure of the extent of adoption than the dichotomous measure
c u r rently employed by most innovation re s e a r ch. We
believe that applying event count models to the many
appropriate types of state policy adoption will allow us to
test a more diverse set of theories than currently exists in the
l i t e r a t u re. Examples of such policy areas include the
number of licenses to operate commercial casinos, the
number of different lottery games offered, and the number
of charter schools.
Event count models are also a perfect fit for the specific
policy that we are interested in: Indian gaming. Indian
nations2that wish to establish casino-style gaming on tribal
lands must secure agreements with the state in which they
have land in trust. States that agree to additional compacts
are clearly agreeing to more gaming. This provides an excel-
lent opportunity for us to test whether social learning and
39
Disentangling Diffusion:
The Effects of Social Learning and Economic Competition
on State Policy Innovation and Expansion
FREDERICK J. BOEHMKE, UNIVERSITY OF IOWA
RICHARD WITMER, GRINNELL COLLEGE
When modeling regional policy diffusion effects, scholars have traditionally made appeals to both social learn-
ing and economic competition as causes of diffusion. In their empirical studies of policy adoption, however,
they do not attempt to determine which of these two processes are at work. In this article, we argue that these
two types of diffusion may have different implications for when a state first adopts a policy and subsequent
changes in the extent of that policy and that these effects vary by policy area. In the specific policy area that
we study, Indian gaming, we expect social learning diffusion to influence adoption but not expansion; eco-
nomic competition should influence both policy adoption and policy expansion. Our empirical results con-
firm these predictions. To study both policy adoption and innovation, we apply models for event counts to
state policy data, which allows us to model the extent of policy adoption over time, rather than just the timing
of first adoption as is common with event histor y models.
1Though see the literature on policy re-invention (Glick and Hays 1991;
Hays 1996) for studies of how later innovators may modify the policies
adopted by early innovators.
NOTE: The authors would like to thank participants at the 2001 Iowa
Conference of Political Scientists, the 2002 Midwest Political Sci-
ence Association Meetings, a faculty research workshop at The
University of Iowa, and seminar participants at the Harris School
of Public Policy at the University of Chicago for comments and
suggestions on earlier drafts of this article. Suggestions from Gary
King and comments from Gary Segura and Chuck Shipan are also
gratefully acknowledged. Richard Witmer would like to thank
Northern Arizona University for an Intramural Grant that helped
fund his participation in the project.
Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 57, No. 1 (March 2004): pp. 39-51
2We use American Indian, Indian, and Native American interchangeably
in this paper. We also use nation as it more accurately describes the sov-
ereign rights of Indian people. See Bordewich (1996) for additional dis-
cussion of appropriate terminology.

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