Discretion in Traffic Stops: The Influence of Budget Cuts on Traffic Citations

• Published date: 01 May 2021
• Author: Min Su
• Date: 01 May 2021
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/puar.13300

Research Article

446 Public Administration Review • May | June 202 1

Abstract: In traffic enforcement, officers have a broad range of discretionary power. They decide whether to initiate

a stop. They also decide whether to write a ticket or to give a warning. Various factors affect officers’ discretion, such

as a driver’s race, gender, and neighborhood characteristics. This study examines the influence of budget cuts to the

sheriff’s department on a county’s traffic fines revenue. This study applies a difference-in-difference approach to analyze

traffic citations issued by two groups of traffic enforcement officers—California’s county sheriff deputies and California

Highway Patrol (CHP) officers. Results show that deputies raised more traffic fines after their department experienced

budget cuts in the previous years. In contrast, the number of tickets issued by CHP officers who do not receive financial

benefits from the county government is not affected by a county’s fiscal condition changes. This study provides evidence

that traffic enforcement is under financial influence.

Evidence for Practice

• Officers’ citation decisions are affected by their departments’ budget appropriations. Budget cuts to the

sheriff’s department lead to an increase in traffic fines revenue.

• Defunding the police may cause revenue-induced traffic enforcement practices. The funding pressure may

push police officers to seek revenues from traffic citations. Such practices compromise the primary role of

traffic law enforcement and jeopardize citizen–police relations.

• Local governments transmit their fiscal pressure to the police and sheriff’s departments. The police and

sheriff’s departments’ financial stress inevitably affects individual officers, and officers’ discretion in traffic

stops. Thus, local governments are not free from blame on revenue-induced traffic enforcement practices. If

local governments’ reliance on fines revenue is left unchecked, it is unlikely to remove the revenue incentive

in traffic enforcement entirely.

• Institutional designs that separate law enforcement agencies from the revenue they generate can restrain the

revenue-induced activities; For instance, revenue from citations and other fines go to a local government’s

general fund rather than retained by law enforcement agencies.

Traffic enforcement is a highly discretionary

practice in most states. State laws typically

empower officers to take enforcement actions

but do not require them to do so (Schafer and

Mastrofski2005). For observed infractions such as

speeding, running a stop sign, and expired vehicle

registration, officers decide whether to initiate a

stop. After a stop is initiated, they determine how

to sanction the offending driver. Depending upon

the legal circumstances of the situation, officers

may opt for full enforcement—issuing citations.

They may decide to show leniency to the offender

by giving a written or verbal warning that carries

no legal consequence or monetary punishment. In

disposing of minor traffic violations, it is common

for officers to use lenient sanctions. A study based

on field observations and interviews with officers

in a Michigan city shows that leniency in traffic

enforcement was the norm—about two-thirds (66.1

percent) of infractions resulted in verbal or written

warnings (Schafer and Mastrofski2005). A national

survey finds the same pattern—of all drivers who were

pulled over by police in 2015, about half (49 percent)

received warnings or left with no enforcement action

(Davis, Whyde, and Langton2018).

Giving officers some degree of discretion in

traffic enforcement is necessary because this

allows them to utilize their expertise and good

judgment to tackle their work tasks in an adaptive

way (Hupe and Hill2007). Some traffic offenses

are excusable under certain circumstances, and

the use of full enforcement seems excessive; For

instance, it is probably too harsh to give a speed

ticket to a mother who is rushing her sick kid

to the hospital. Sometimes efficiency factors

Min Su

Louisiana State University

Discretion in Traffic Stops: The Influence of Budget Cuts on

Traffic Citations

Min Su is assistant professor in the

Department of Public Administration at

Louisiana State University. She holds

a Ph.D. in public policy from Georgia

State University and Georgia Institute of

Technology. Her research focuses on the

budgeting and financial management of

state and local governments. Her work has

appeared in

Public Administration Review

,

Journal of Public Budgeting & Finance

,

American Review of Public Administration

,

and

International Journal of Public

Administration

.

Email: minsu@lsu.edu

Public Administration Review,

Vol. 81, Iss. 3, pp. 446–458. © 2020 by

The American Society for Public Administration.

DOI: 10.1111/puar.13300.