Discreet Inequality: How Party Agendas Embrace Privileged Interests

• Author: Till Weber
• Published date: 01 September 2020
• Date: 01 September 2020
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/0010414020912286
• Subject Matter: Articles

https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414020912286

Comparative Political Studies

2020, Vol. 53(10-11) 1767 –1797

© The Author(s) 2020

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DOI: 10.1177/0010414020912286

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Article

Discreet Inequality:

How Party Agendas

Embrace Privileged

Interests

Till Weber1

Abstract

A growing literature documents that public policy in modern democracies fails

to represent the preferences of traditionally marginalized subconstituencies.

By dissecting party agendas, I show that inequality already permeates the

very politicization of issues before democratic decision-making even begins.

Election platforms worldwide predominantly reflect the concerns of male,

educated and affluent citizens. That parties disregard large voter groups at

this early stage seems surprising given that campaign agendas are inherently

public. My analysis reveals that looming electoral backlash is anticipated

by a strategy of “discreet” inequality. In particular, agendas are designed

to appear inconspicuous and agreeable by exempting issues from unequal

responsiveness that voters perceive as divisive or threatening. Discreet

inequality thus appeases marginalized groups while ignoring their views on

the large majority of more ordinary issues. The article demonstrates these

patterns for gender, education, and income using comparative survey and

manifesto data covering 42 countries.

Keywords

substantive representation, political inequality, issue emphasis, party

competition, issue yield

1Baruch College & The Graduate Center, City University of New York, NY, USA

Corresponding Author:

Till Weber, Baruch College & The Graduate Center, City University of New York, 1 Bernard

Baruch Way, Box B5-280, New York, NY 10010, USA.

Email: Till.Weber@baruch.cuny.edu

912286CPSXXX10.1177/0010414020912286Comparative Political StudiesWeber

research-article2020

1768 Comparative Political Studies 53(10-11)

Introduction

A common criticism of representative democracy is that public policy favors

socioeconomic elites. A professional campaign machine may promise every-

thing to everyone, but in the course of institutionalized decision-making, the

interests of traditionally marginalized groups will routinely go by the board.

Albeit this statement may sound populist, empirical evidence for it is unpleas-

antly impressive. Beginning in the United States, researchers detected that

democratic institutions fail to aggregate the preferences of different subcon-

stituencies equally into collectively binding decisions, with lower classes and

racial minorities often neglected (e.g., Bartels, 2008; Beramendi & Anderson,

2008; Enns & Wlezien, 2011; Gilens, 2012; Griffin & Newman, 2008; Jacobs

& Skocpol, 2005; Schumaker & Getter, 1977). Comparative research fol-

lowed suit to document unequal representation with regard to socioeconomic

status and gender in European democracies (e.g., Bernauer et al., 2015;

Donnelly & Lefkofridi, 2014; Giger et al., 2012; McEvoy, 2012; Peters &

Ensink, 2015; Piketty, 2019; Reher, 2018; Rosset et al., 2013).

On both sides of the Atlantic, empirical work focused on the end of the

chain of representation, that is, on legislative voting, budget allocation and

executive action. This article suggests a “deeper” way in which inequality

may materialize: Rather than asserting privileged interests in explicit con-

frontation, a political system may simply prevent marginalized issues from

becoming politicized in the first place. This is essentially the other “face of

power” in the classical distinction of Bachrach and Baratz (1962), who saw

that “power may be, and often is, exercised by confining the scope of deci-

sion-making to relatively ‘safe’ issues” (p. 948).

By dissecting party agendas for national elections in 42 countries, I trace

the origins of political inequality far up the chain of representation. As politi-

cal parties pay unequal attention to different subconstituencies when assem-

bling their campaign platforms, the issues that make it onto the agendas of

these central democratic actors are already permeated with inequality before

voters are ever presented with a choice. In fact, biased party platforms may

well be one source of unequal policy responsiveness: if we observe inequality

at the start of the process, it is hard to imagine how there could be equality at

the end of it.

Platform design differs from other expressions of political inequality stud-

ied in the literature in that it is meant to be out in the open. According to a

substantial body of theory, the whole purpose of the fight over the issue

agenda is to shape the public discourse in such a way that it favors certain

electoral ambitions over others (e.g., McKelvey, 1976; Riker, 1986;

Schattschneider, 1960).1 While strategic decisions may certainly emerge