Diplomacy for irregular warfare.

• Author: Holliday, Sam C.
• Position: Letter to the editor

TO: Editor, American Diplomacy

In "Diplomacy in the Age of Terror," (http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2007/1012/free/freeman_diplomacy.html) Ambassador Chas W. Freeman describes our failures to use diplomacy properly since 2001. While some of his discussion rings true, some of it is problematic. He finds fault with the decision to destroy the Saddam regime in Iraq rather than to eliminate al-Qaeda. He says we need to "devise a cohesive strategy," yet the four actions he mentions are not a strategy for irregular warfare--the primary conflict in the "Age of Terror." He fails to mention the importance of strategic communications--the center of gravity in the "Age of Terror." He does not distinguish strategy from implementation (methods and tactics). He fails to provide a way to eliminate the "amateurism in diplomacy" he condemns, or a way to coordinate all U.S. government agencies involved in foreign affairs (State, Defense, CIA, etc.) during policy formulation and implementation.

His statement that the United States has used "diplomacy-free foreign policy that relies almost exclusively on military means" is questionable. No doubt Freeman disagrees with the diplomacy used and how our armed forces were used. However, since September 11, 2001, diplomats have worked very hard, displayed great intelligence, and used appropriate tact to advance U.S. national interests. Also, U.S. armed forces have only been used after diplomacy was attempted, and our leaders decided that diplomacy was not going to achieve our aims.

Ambassador Freeman correctly notes that our enemies "have a strategy," and he identifies the key part of that strategy: to expel us (including western influence) from the Middle East so that they can overthrow regimes they regard as corrupt. If successful the "near enemy" would be eliminated. But the second part of their strategy is to establish a Great Caliphate from Morocco to Indonesia that would then be able to convert the rest of the world to "the way of the Prophet." The goal of this messianic aspect of their strategy is to eliminate the "far enemy." His reference to al-Qaeda, and cavemen in Waziristan, suggests that he does not accept that our enemies are more than al-Qaeda. Our enemies include all of those that support, directly or indirectly, the global Muslim revivalist movement.

Freeman is clearly thinking of armed forces in conventional war when he states, "Armed forces specialize in killing and capturing the enemy."...