Dimott v. United States: Requiring Petitioners Prove That Sentence Enhancement More Likely Than Not Resulted from the Armed Career Criminal Act's Residual Clause

• Jurisdiction: United States,Federal
• Citation: Vol. 52
• Publication year: 2022

52 Creighton L. Rev. 191. DIMOTT V. UNITED STATES: REQUIRING PETITIONERS PROVE THAT SENTENCE ENHANCEMENT MORE LIKELY THAN NOT RESULTED FROM THE ARMED CAREER CRIMINAL ACT'S RESIDUAL CLAUSE

DIMOTT V. UNITED STATES: REQUIRING PETITIONERS PROVE THAT SENTENCE ENHANCEMENT MORE LIKELY THAN NOT RESULTED FROM THE ARMED CAREER CRIMINAL ACT'S RESIDUAL CLAUSE

Ryan Baker-'20

I. INTRODUCTION

In passing the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"), ^[1] Congress established a mandatory sentencing scheme designed to address the issue of career criminals previously convicted for particular drug or violent offenses coming into possession of firearms. ^[2] The ACCA imposed a minimum fifteen year prison sentence for an individual convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) for being a felon in possession of a firearm with three or more previous convictions for serious drug offenses or violent felonies. ^[3] The ACCA defined violent felonies through three clauses: the enumerated clause, the force clause, and the residual clause. ^[4] The residual clause broadened the definition of violent felonies beyond particular listed felonies and felonies involving force to include felonies consisting of conduct risking physical harm to another. ^[5]

In Johnson v. United States, ^[6] the United States Supreme Court ruled on the constitutionality of the ACCA's residual clause after multiple attempts to establish a workable framework for the residual clause. ^[7] The Court found the ACCA's residual clause to be unconstitutionally vague. ^[8] The Court determined the clause was incapable of rendering adequate notice to defendants and of providing a consistent framework for judges to apply. ^[9] One year later, the Court reasoned that Johnson created a retroactive substantive rule of law, allowing convicted individuals to contest and potentially correct their ACCA-enhanced sentences if the sentencing court applied the residual clause. ^[10] A prisoner in federal custody may seek to correct his or her imposed sentence under Johnson by asserting that the sentence resulted from the sentencing court's application of the ACCA's residual clause. ^[11]

When the Court invalidated the ACCA's residual clause in Johnson, it left the United States courts of appeal without express guidance in addressing motions to correct ACCA-enhanced sentences alleged to have resulted from courts' application of the residual clause. ^[12] Where the record clearly indicated that a petitioner's enhanced sentence resulted from the residual clause, an appellate court's examination of the record sufficed to determine whether the claim warranted relief. ^[13] However, an unclear record complicated the process of determining whether to grant relief and required courts to interpret convictions in the context of the constitutional provisions of the ACCA. ^[14] A split developed among the circuit courts concerning the burden of proof to be placed on petitioners to show a court ought to address the merits of a petitioner's alleged Johnson claim for collateral relief. ^[15]

In Dimott v. United States, ^[16] the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit addressed the burden imposed on petitioners alleging their sentences were enhanced through the ACCA's invalid residual clause when the record is unclear regarding how the trial court determined their sentences. ^[17] The petitioners in Dimott brought claims seeking to correct their sentences and asserted that application of the ACCA's residual clause resulted in their enhanced sentences. ^[18] After the United States District Court for the District of Maine denied their petitions, the First Circuit affirmed the district court's denials. ^[19] In the process, the First Circuit held that where the record was unclear, a petitioner must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the district court enhanced his sentence through application of the ACCA's residual clause before the court fully analyzes the petitioner's Johnson claim. ^[20]

This Note begins with a review of the facts and holding of the First Circuit's decision in Dimott. ^[21] An examination will follow detailing how the United States Congress and the Supreme Court have established the parameters of the collateral relief process through interpretation and application of the presumption of the finality of a criminal conviction. ^[22] Next, the Court's decision in Johnson will be discussed to establish context for collateral relief based on the ACCA's residual clause, and then this Note will examine the approaches of other United States courts of appeal in determining when a court may entertain the merits of a petitioner's alleged Johnson claim. ^[23] This Note will argue that the presumption of finality requires petitioners demonstrate the merits of their collateral claim to establish the court's subject matter jurisdiction before the court fully entertains the petition. ^[24] Additionally, this Note will then argue that imposing a burden of proof weaker than a preponderance of the evidence on the petitioner subverts the presumption of finality and allows meritless claims to come before the courts. ^[25] This Note concludes by demonstrating that the First Circuit's requirement that a petitioner prove a Johnson claim by a preponderance of the evidence before a court fully entertains its merits is consistent with the presumption of finality in granting collateral relief. ^[26]

II. FACTS AND HOLDING

In Dimott v. United States, ^[27] Richard Dimott, Wayne N. Collamore, and Charles H. Casey, Jr. brought individual actions against the United States under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 seeking post-conviction relief. ^[28] In each action, the petitioners alleged their sentences no longer qualified for enhancement under the ACCA and should therefore be corrected. ^[29] The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit consolidated the claims into a single appeal following each claim's dismissal on procedural grounds. ^[30]

The United States District Court for the District of Maine convicted Richard Dimott in September 2007 for one count of criminal contempt and one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. ^[31] The court determined Dimott to be an armed career criminal due to his eight previous burglary convictions under Maine law. ^[32] The court subsequently enhanced his sentence under the ACCA to 150 months of incarceration and 5 years of supervised release. ^[33] After the United States Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. United States, ^[34] Dimott filed a motion in June 2016 under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 for the district court to correct his sentence in light of the Supreme Court's ruling. ^[35] Dimott argued his burglary convictions no longer fell within the ACCA's enumerated clause, and his sentencing resulted from the ACCA's invalidated residual clause. ^[36]

The district court denied Dimott's motion and first found that it properly based his sentence on prior burglary convictions. ^[37] The court then determined that Dimott's § 2255 motion did not invoke Johnson and, therefore, was untimely. ^[38] The court further determined that even if his motion was timely, Dimott's burglary convictions fell under the umbrella of the ACCA's enumerated clause. ^[39] The district court issued a certificate of appealability following the denial of Dimott's motion. ^[40]

Similarly, the district court convicted Wayne N. Collamore in March 2011 for one count of escape from federal custody and one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. ^[41] The court also determined Collamore to be an armed career criminal and sentenced him to 210 months imprisonment through the ACCA. ^[42] In May 2016, Collamore filed a § 2255 motion to correct his sentence. ^[43] In denying his motion, the district court echoed the reasoning adopted by the Dimott court by determining that Collamore's motion was untimely because he failed to raise a Johnson claim. ^[44]

The district court also convicted Charles H. Casey, Jr. in April 2012 for one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. ^[45] With three prior convictions for burglary under Maine law, the sentencing court determined Casey to be an armed career criminal and enhanced his sentence under the ACCA to 180 months imprisonment. ^[46] Without appealing the district court's sentence, Casey filed a motion to correct his sentence under § 2255 in June 2016. Casey alleged that sentencing for his prior burglary convictions resulted from the ACCA's residual clause and was unconstitutional in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson. ^[47] The district court rejected this argument and found Casey's sentence constitutionally enhanced throughthe ACCA. ^[48]

The First Circuit consolidated the petitioners' claims into a single appeal. ^[49] In addressing Dimott and Collamore's petitions, the First Circuit determined that the one-year statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1) barred their § 2255 motions because their convictions clearly did not stem from the residual clause of the ACCA. ^[50] Deciding Casey's appeal, the court first determined that the Government did not waive the issue of timeliness of a Johnson motion by failing to raise the issue at the district court proceeding. ^[51] In contrast to Dimott and Collamore's petitions, the record did not indicate which clause formed the basis of Casey's sentence. ^[52] Casey asserted that where the record is silent, the assumption should be that the residual...