Diluted regulations—a need to review the theoretical classification of the different lobbying regulatory environments

• Published date: 01 February 2015
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1002/pa.1495
• Date: 01 February 2015

■Academic Paper

Diluted regulations—a need to review the

theoretical classification of the different

lobbying regulatory environments

Albert Veksler*

College of Business, Dublin Institute of Technology, Dublin, Ireland

Regulation has been claimed to be acquired by the industry,yet while the economic regulation was often established with the

approval and encouragement of the regulated industry, social regulation has usually been thrust upon industry following

demands by public interest groups. Why would the social regulation still fail to produce behaviour, or results in accordance

with the public interest, if the public interest groups initiated it? The failure to define clearly the concept of ‘public interest’

and the absenceof adequately clear regulatory objectives would not provideall the convincing answers. The wish of the

politiciansto respond to a mischief beforepublic concern dies down, seems to pointtowards the symbolic politicsclaims.

Although lobbying is integral to democratic politics, it challenges the policy making process as the risks and oppor-

tunities associated with policy change are large. Lobbying regulations, belonging to the social regulations fold, have

been observed as symbolic in Israel and are diluted by tricky loopholes. Recent research has used data from Centre of

Public Integrity (CPI) in order to theoretically classify different regulatory environments. The CPI measures only what

the law says, but it does not measure the outcome—the application of the law. This paper points out that the possible

interaction of symbolic politics with social regulation may lead to the reoccurring legislative void, resulting in the

dilution effect of the lobbying regulations, and it highlights the need to review the theoretical classification, and

thereby, also the actual strength of the different regulatory environments. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

INTRODUCTION

The practice of regulating markets through licensing

and or planning permits belongs to the oldest func-

tions of the state.There are several theoriesexplaining

the regulation that has evolved throughout the last

several decades. Are politicians acting in the public

interest? Are all regulations acquired by the industry

and are they designedand operated for their benefit?

Several researchers have distinguished between the

economic regulation and social regulation, which is

claimed to be thrust upon industry following de-

mands by public interest groups.

Scandals that involved lobbyists have been the

reason for lobbying regulations in many countries.

Integrity regulatory agencies, which deal with moral

issues in thepublic sphere, relate clearlyto the charac-

ter of the lobbying regulations. Lowery and Gray

(1997: 145) asked whether the lobby laws are exer-

cises in symbolic politics whereby legislatures can

appear to do something while changing little. Matten

(2003) characterised symbolic politics by the gap

between codification and implementation as some-

thing alreadyknown and tolerated, if not deliberately

intended, while he observed the use of the symbolic

politics in environmental regulation.

So far, only certain aspects of lobbying legislation

have been measured in order to theoretically clas-

sify different lobbying regulatory environments.

One needs to take into account the dilution effect

by measuring the application of the law and to

research the interaction of the symbolic politics with

social regulations in general and lobbying regula-

tions in particular.

*Correspondence to: Albert Veksler, College of Business, Dublin

Institute of Technology, Dublin, Ireland.

E-mail: albert.veksler@mail.huji.ac.il

Journal of Public Affairs

Volume 15 Number 1 pp 56–64 (2015)

Published online 11 November 2013 in Wiley Online Library

(www.wileyonlinelibrary.com) DOI: 10.1002/pa.1495

Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.