Dignity, Social Reintegration of Prisoners, and the New Penal Power: European Human Rights, Experiences of Belgian Prisoners, and Professional Practices

• Author: Caroline Devynck,Sonja Snacken,Kasia Uzieblo
• DOI: 10.1177/0306624X221099489
• Published date: 01 July 2022
• Date: 01 July 2022
• Subject Matter: Articles

https://doi.org/10.1177/0306624X221099489

International Journal of

Offender Therapy and

Comparative Criminology

2022, Vol. 66(9) 980 –1000

© The Author(s) 2022

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DOI: 10.1177/0306624X221099489

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Article

Dignity, Social Reintegration

of Prisoners, and the New

Penal Power: European

Human Rights, Experiences

of Belgian Prisoners, and

Professional Practices

Sonja Snacken1, Caroline Devynck1,

and Kasia Uzieblo1,2

Abstract

Over the last 30 years, prisoners’ dignity and fundamental rights have increasingly been

protected by European human rights bodies such as the European Court of Human

Rights and the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or

Degrading Treatment or Punishment. This protection is aimed particularly at the

traditional power relations between prisoners and uniformed staff. More recently,

social reintegration of prisoners has also been recognized by these European human

rights standards as a fundamental element of human dignity and an equally important

aim of imprisonment as retribution and deterrence. However, it is also accepted that

some offenders may be too dangerous to be returned back to society. Psychiatric/

psychological assessments are a major element in this decision-making. This “new

penal power” receives much less attention in human rights protection. This article

compares three intertwining perspectives on this issue: the European human rights

perspective on dignity and social reintegration; the experiences and mental suffering

of Belgian prisoners who find themselves being stuck in prison as a result of structural

problems in the risk assessment and risk management practices; and the professional

perspective on how professional standards and good practices based on scientific

insights might alleviate some of these threats to human dignity.

1Department of Criminology, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Belgium

2The Forensic Care Specialists, Utrecht, The Netherlands

Corresponding Author:

Sonja Snacken, Department of Criminology, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Belgium.

Email: sonja.snacken@vub.be

1099489IJOXXX10.1177/0306624X221099489International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative CriminologySnacken et al.

research-article2022

Snacken et al. 981

Keywords

dignity, social reintegration, new penal power, risk assessment, human rights,

practices, professional standards, assessment

Dignity and the New Penal Power in Prison: A European

Human Rights Perspective

“Human dignity” is an often invoked but also highly debated concept. Described by

some as a container concept lacking consensus in a pluralistic society (Raes, 2001) or

even a useless concept (e.g., in medical ethics: Macklin, 2003), it is invoked amongst

others by lawyers, philosophers, historians, medical doctors, and the public at large,

with different intentions and varying meanings. Definitions of human dignity are often

divided into religious, secular humanist, and social categories. Religious definitions

refer to the intrinsic dignity of all human beings as God’s creatures. Humanistic defini-

tions focus on personal dignity that can be defined only by individuals for themselves.

Social dignity is defined by society, for example through judicial decisions. Tensions

arise between those perspectives (see also Snacken, 2021). In prison, empirical

research illustrates that although the values of “dignity” and “humanity” are difficult

to operationalize, “prisoners are articulate about them (..) and know the difference

between ‘feeling humiliated’ and ‘retaining an identity.’” (Liebling, 2011, p. 530).

These values determine the quality of prison life and the moral performance and

bureaucratic legitimacy of prisons, making some prisons more survivable than others

(Crewe et al., 2015; Liebling, 2004; Liebling et al., 2005; Sparks et al., 1996).

This subjective experience of the “personal dignity” by prisoners may however be

at odds with their “social dignity,” which is socially constructed and granted by others,

such as legislation, courts, prison professionals and society at large. In Europe, prison-

ers’ dignity has increasingly been translated into protection of their fundamental

human rights. Prisoners were traditionally seen as “slaves of the state,” who lost all

their rights as a result of their conviction and deprivation of liberty. This “theory of

inherent limitations” on prisoners’ rights was upheld by the European Court of Human

Rights (ECtHR) until 1975. That position changed gradually, influenced by a combi-

nation of societal developments (prisoners’ rights movements starting in the 1970s);

political changes in Europe in the 1990s (increased acceptance of a supranational

European authority and expansion of the Council of Europe1 to include former soviet

bloc countries); and evidence by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture

and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT), the independent monitor-

ing body inspecting all places of detention within the Council of Europe (see for more

details Snacken, 2021). The Court thus stated in Hirst v. United Kingdom (6 October

6, 2005) that “Prisoners in general continue to enjoy all the fundamental rights and

freedoms guaranteed under the [ECHR] save for the right to liberty (..). For example,

prisoners may not be illtreated, subjected to inhuman or degrading punishment, or

conditions contrary to Article 3 of the Convention; they continue to enjoy the right to