Digging deeper.

• Author: Nicholson, Roger L.
• Position: LETTERS - Letter to the editor

Ken Ward's article ("Shafted," March 2007) contains several erroneous facts and distortions that typify his ongoing biased reporting of the Sago mine incident.

Two points merit specific mention. At the time of the Sago accident, the federal Mine Safety and Health Administration required mine seals to be built to withstand explosive forces at 20 pounds per square inch (psi). In testing performed by governmental agencies after the accident, seals constructed in the same manner as those at Sago withstood explosion forces at or above 20 psi, the regulatory standard. More importantly, however, according to the report of the West Virginia Office of Miners' Health, Safety and Training, the explosive forces at Sago likely exceeded 95 psi.

Second, Mr. Ward writes that rescue operations at Sago were delayed because "not enough rescue teams were available." This is also erroneous. The first mine rescue team was on-site at Sago at 10:40 a.m. on January 2. Other mine rescue teams continued to arrive during the day. What Mr. Ward did not say in his article is that federal and state authorities would not let rescue teams enter the mine until 5:25 p.m. Contrary to Mr. Ward's reporting, rescue efforts were not hampered by a lack or a delay in the arrival of rescue teams.

When it comes to mine safety, we believe that the interests of all are best served by a focus on the facts rather than a distortion of the truth.

Roger L. Nicholson

Senior Vice President,

General Counsel and Secretary

International Coal Group, Inc.

Ken Ward responds:

ICG General Counsel Roger Nicholson is right that federal standards at the time of the Sago disaster required mine seals to withstand explosive forces of 20 pounds per square inch.

But he is wrong to suggest that the seals that failed catastrophically during the Sago explosion were properly built. Investigators from the West Virginia Office of Miners' Health, Safety and Training found that the Sago seals varied in a number of ways from the mine's approved seal permit. For example, mortar was improperly applied, inadequate header boards were installed, and the seal size did not comply with approved mine plans, according to the state agency's report. Further, sworn testimony given to investigators showed that inexperienced contractors with little if any background in constructing such seals performed the work at the Sago mine.

More importantly, Nicholson does not mention that the Sago disaster has exposed the Mine Safety and...