Differing Site Conditions

AuthorCarol J. Patterson - Ross J. Altman - Stephen A. Hess - Allen Overcash
Pages457-495
15.01 INTROdUCTION
Many construction projects involve work below the visible surface of the earth,
or rely in some part on the conditions that exist below ground. Planning and pric-
ing the work from a contractor’s perspective requires some determination of what
those subsurface conditions entail and how they will impact the work. In many
situations, however, neither the owner nor the contractor truly knows the precise
subsurface conditions when entering into an agreement. Often the subsurface
conditions that would affect the work and, therefore, the cost of the work, do not
manifest themselves until after the project has begun. Since the nature of these
site conditions can dictate the resources needed to perform the work and, there-
fore, the price of the contract, both owners and contractors share a keen interest
in managing the risk of unknown subsurface conditions.
The phrases “differing site condition” and “changed conditions” are terms
of art; the terms refer to unknown physical conditions encountered at the
job site that differ materially from the conditions reasonably expected.1 For
The authors wish to thank Julia S. Kopcienski for her valuable assistance in the preparation of
this chapter.
1. See Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 52.236-2(a) (APR 1984).
15
Differing Site Conditions
RICHARD F. SMITH, VAL S. MCWHORTER,
AND W. STEPHEN DALE
CHAPTER
457
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CONSTRUCTION LAW
458
example, a differing site condition (DSC) may exist where a contractor unex-
pectedly encounters rock rather than sand in its excavation, or a geologic for-
mation that should not have been present in the region, or where the soil
reects a moisture content higher than expected. Regardless of whether the
unexpected condition is latent or obvious, natural or manmade, the contrac-
tual question arises as to how the risk associated with unexpected conditions
should be allocated between the parties, and how to resolve disputes between
the parties when such conditions are encountered. The DSC clause and other
similar provisions help allocate this risk and provide a vehicle for resolving
disputes between project owners and contractors relating to these unexpected
conditions.
Contractors, owners, and the courts have developed several mechanisms to
cope with the lack of perfect information about subsurface conditions. These
mechanisms, as discussed in this chapter, typically seek a balance between
a variety of competing factors, including (1) the extent of pre-bid investiga-
tions that both parties must undertake; (2) the degree of risk each party must
bear; (3) the amount a contractor should include as contingency in its bid; and
(4)the likelihood of unexpected problems.
As a general rule, in the absence of a specic contract clause addressing
subsurface conditions, common law allocates the risk to the contractor and
generally places the burden of discovering and/or overcoming unexpected sub-
surface conditions on the contractor. In practice, however, the bidding process
rarely allows time for a contractor to conduct extensive subsurface investi-
gations on its own, and contracts rarely provide a reimbursement tool for
expensive investigations by each prospective bidder. This inability to conduct
investigations forces contractors to add contingencies to their bids to cover
eventualities that may never occur. This practice articially inates bid prices
to incorporate these contingencies and causes the government or the owner to
pay for contingencies, regardless of whether the adverse subsurface problems
ever materialize.
To combat the practice of adding these kinds of contingencies into bid
prices, standard contract clauses adopted by federal and state governments and
trade organizations place a heavier contractual focus on information provided
by the government or owner to the contractor. These clauses seek to reduce
the contingency included by contractors in their bids by encouraging contrac-
tors to rely on information provided by owners and promising an adjustment
in the contract price for material deviations from the information provided.
This practice allows the government or owner to avoid paying for expensive
contingencies that never occur, and allows the contractor protection against
unforeseen problems that could impact project cost. In addition, it allows the
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Differing Site Conditions 459
owner to evaluate bids from contractors on the same pricing basis, rather than
on unknown contingencies.
To provide context for the modern clause-based approach to changed
subsurface conditions, this chapter rst reviews the common law heritage of
the Differing Site Conditions clause and the evolution of risk allocation for
subsurface conditions. The common law tradition employed general contract
principles, including warranty, misrepresentation, mutual mistake, and other
conceptual frameworks to allocate responsibility for price increases due to
unexpected conditions. After reviewing the various common law approaches,
this chapter turns to an overview of governmental and commercial contract
clauses designed to address these issues as well as their application in the fed-
eral, state, and private context.
15.02 co mmon l aW
A. Contracts without a Site Indications or Risk Allocation Clause
Where xed-price construction contracts include no special provision for sub-
surface conditions, the contractor normally bears the risk of unforeseen con-
ditions. In that context, the U.S. Supreme Court summed up the allocation of
risk in such circumstances stating: “Where one agrees to do, for a xed sum,
a thing possible to be performed, he will not be excused or become entitled
to additional compensation, because unforeseen difculties are encountered.”2
This method of contract risk allocation has been echoed in decisions from
state and federal courts as well as in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR).
The FAR declares that a rm, xed-price contract without more
provides for a price that is not subject to any adjustment on the basis of the
contractor’s cost experience in performing the contract. This contract type
places upon the contractor maximum risk and full responsibility for all
costs and resulting prot or loss. It provides maximum incentive for the
contractor to control costs and perform effectively and imposes a minimum
administrative burden upon the contracting parties.3
This concept of “maximum contractor risk” governed construction contracting
until the advent of special risk-allocating clauses and other legal theories that
allowed a contractor to recover increased costs due to unexpected subsurface
conditions.
2. Spearin v. United States, 248 U.S. 132, 136 (1918).
3. Dalton v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 98 F.3d 1298, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 1996), discussing FAR
16.202-1 and rm xed-price services contracts (emphasis added).
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