Development Planning: Lebanon

• Author: N. Raphaeli
• DOI: 10.1177/106591296702000309
• Published date: 01 September 1967
• Date: 01 September 1967
• Subject Matter: Articles

DEVELOPMENT PLANNING: LEBANON
N. RAPHAELI
The Hebrew University, Jerusalem
EBANON
is a small country, unique in its economic framework and singularly
complex in its political and cultural composition. It is today one of the last
vestiges of the liberal state par excellence, but its economic liberalism is forced
to embrace not only free enterprise but a large measure of political feudalism and
confessionalism as well. The country is small in size (4,000 square miles) and poor
in natural resources, yet in the Arab Middle East it is second only to the oil-rich
shaikhdoms in per capita income ($350 per annum). In fact, Lebanon &dquo;scores well
ahead of all Arab neighbors on every index of modernity.&dquo;~ Its economy thus con-
fronts the observer with an enigma which receives dramatic expression in Van Zea-
land’s famous observation: &dquo;I don’t know what makes it work. But it seems to do
pretty well. I suggest that you leave it alone.&dquo;2
2
Development planning reflects a collective determination to steer a country or
an economy in the agreed direction of progress. And, as the concept is commonly
used in Lebanon, development planning denotes two primary things: first, the con-
struction of infrastructural projects (e.g., roads, power, and irrigation), and second,
and probably more important, the creation of conditions where national wealth can
be more equitably distributed.
This paper attempts first to explore some of the difficulties involved in introduc-
ing development planning into a politico-economic setting such as Lebanon’s; sec-
ond, to delineate the antithetical economic and political forces which call both for
free enterprise and state planning; and finally, to try to answer the following ques-
tions : (a) Is planning in Lebanon possible? (b) Is planning in Lebanon necessary?
But since more than theoretical doctrines are involved in these conflicts, a sketch of
the historic, social, and political background, or what is commonly known as the
&dquo;environment of planning&dquo; is relevant.
I
Lebanon was carved by the French from historical Greater Syria in order to
insure political autonomy for its Christian communities. It was in 1920 that the
state of Greater Lebanon, later known as the Lebanese Republic, was created as a
unit, one of four units that constituted the mandated territories of Syria and Leba-
non.3 Because the Lebanese were predominantly Christian they received preferen-
tial treatment over neighboring Syria from the Mandatory power, France. As Ler-
ner observed, &dquo;Christianity and modernization grew together.&dquo;4 The major ac-
NOTE : The author wishes to thank the Center for Near Eastern and North African Studies of
the University of Michigan for financial support.
1
Daniel Lerner, The Passing of the Traditional Society (Glencoe: Free Press, 1958), p. 169.
’ Quoted by A. J. Meyer, Middle Eastern Capitalism (Cambridge: Harvard U. Press, 1959),
p. 109. Some Lebanese feel that this observation reflects the prejudice of Mr. Van Zea-
land who is the leader of the Liberal Party in Belgium. al-Jaryda, November 22, 1960.
3
A. H. Hourani, Syria and Lebanon (London: Oxford U. Press, 1954), p. 173.
4
Lerner, op. cit., p. 170.
714

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715
complishment of France was to establish law and order and to bring into existence
&dquo;some of the essential conditions which would make possible the transition from a
medieval to a modern society.&dquo;5
Ever since it attained its independence from the French in 1943, Lebanon’s
political system has been based on the &dquo;National Charter&dquo; (al-Mithaq al-Watani)
-
an unwritten but rigidly enforced pact which recognizes the division of the coun-
try into religious communities. According to this &dquo;charter&dquo; the presidency, the high-
est political ofhce, is to be retained by the Maronites (the largest Christian commu-
nity) -
the real intention being to maintain Lebanese entity in the face of those who
might advocate a unity with Syria or even greater Arab unity.&dquo; The constitution is
silent with regard to the powers of the Moslem sunni prime minister, except that he
is a minister, chosen by the president from among other ministers, to serve as their
head. Nor does the constitution delegate any power to the Moslem shi’i president of
the Chamber of Deputies. While the president is elected to an unrenewable term of
six years, the office of the premier is rotated, on the average of once every six months,
among &dquo;premierables.&dquo;? Cabinet and administrative posts are divided down the line
among communities. Seats in parliament have also been allocated to individual
communities. The total number of deputies is always a multiple of 11, six elevenths
of the seats going to Christians and five elevenths to non-Christians. (There were
66 members prior to 1960 elections; now the number stands at 99.) The system is
thus predicated on the assumption that Christians are in the majority,&dquo; and that &dquo;a
man’s denomination takes priority over his capacity.&dquo;9
Political confessionalism in Lebanon is complemented by another phenomenon
commonly referred to as political feudalism -
a system of political relationships between share tenants and large landowners in the plains
area, between small estate owners and descendants of the ruling elite of the past two or three
centuries in the mountain area, and between the city mass (mostly immigrants from the country-
side) and influential politicians whose power largely derives from origins in the countryside
supplemented by urban political affiliation and economic influence. The followers in this
system owe allegiance to the leader personally and support him in elections. On the leader’s
side, the obligation is to seek benefits and public works funds for his men, help them out if they
fall into trouble, and generally act as their political guardian.’o
5
Hourani, op. cit., p. 174.
6
A noted French expert on the Levant observed that for "cultural, sentimental and religious"
reasons the Maronites remain Western-oriented, while the Moslems are attached to
"l’Islam arab." Pierre Rondot, "Brèves réflexions sur l’évolution des structures libanais,"
Orient, 2
e
Trimestre, No. 14 (1960), p. 23. Also Lerner, op. cit., pp. 205-6.
’ This is my translation for the Arabic word mustar’iseen, i.e., those who aspire to become prime
ministers. The Arabic word mustawzireen would mean ministrables, or those who aspire
to become ministers. All subsequent translations from the Arabic and the French are mine.
8
The last population census of 1932 serves as the base for this distribution. Since then estimates
have been made by adding births and subtracting deaths, while the registration of births
and deaths has been, itself, far from accurate. Lebanese population is estimated at ap-
proximately 2.1 million at present.
’ Lemer, op. cit., p. 206.
10
Yusif A. Sayigh, Entreprenuers of Lebanon (Cambridge: Harvard U. Press, 1962), p. 2. See
also Iliya F. Harik, "The Iqta’ System [Feudalism] in Lebanon: A Comparative Political
View," Middle East Journal, 19 (Autumn 1964), 405-21. An interesting, and not off-
balanced view of Lebanon is provided by the Great Soviet Encyclopedia (1954) to the
effect that Maronites are ruled by "feudalists and comprador bourgeoisie" and that the
government is a "bourgeois parliamentary republic."

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716
Some of these feudal forces have, in recent years, transcended their traditional in-
dividual and tribal frameworks, entering into large financial networks, exercising
considerable control both over the country’s economy and over its politics.
In spite of the fact that many Lebanese intellectuals are frequently critical of
both the feudal and confessional bases of politics there have been diminishing at-
tempts to force a redistribution of political power.&dquo; In fact, some would say it is
upon these &dquo;countervailing forces of the fragmented society&dquo; that political stability
is based. 12
Communal structure affects planning in more than one way. The different
confessional communities radiate the fear that one may dominate the government,
at the expense of the others, and all consequently work to keep the role of the gov-
ernment limited in all spheres. However, the non-Christian communities represent,
on
the whole, the economically less privileged sections of the society, and, hence, they
view planning as an equalizer and social leveler. They also adhere more readily to
Arab nationalism with its emphasis on a strong state supported by an industrial and
military complex. The Christian communities not only dominate the highest yield-
ing sectors of the economy but many of them are the recipients of regular financial
support from Lebanese emigr6s overseas. For them, therefore, planning has little, if
any, utility or appeal.
The political style in Lebanon is also deterrent to planning in that it is manipu-
lated by politicians famous for their avoidance of long-term and definitive commit-
ments. As one observer pointed out, it is difficult &dquo;to pin down Lebanese politicians
as to just what they did advocate or oppose.&dquo; The Lebanese, he continued, &dquo;are
experts at shifting from one position to another and usually leave an escape valve or
two in order to be able to extricate themselves from any rigid policy which they
might momentarily espouse.&dquo;13
Lebanon’s location has made it one of the most important centers for the Middle
East trade. Beirut, Lebanon’s principal port and the largest transit port in the Mid-
dle...