Determining the Right Requirements for Restarting the Limitation Period in Private Antitrust Conspiracy Suits

• Author: Reid J. Shepard
• Position: J.D. Candidate, The University of Iowa College of Law, 2019; B.A., Hamline University, 2015
• Pages: 957-984

957

Determining the Right Requirements for

Restarting the Limitation Period in Private

Antitrust Conspiracy Suits

Reid J. Shepard*

ABSTRACT: This Note explores how the Eighth Circuit and other circuits

have recently expanded the liability of antitrust defendants significantly by

holding that plaintiffs do not need to allege that a conspiracy was ongoing

during the four-year statute of limitation period to restart the statute. These

decisions undermine both the federal antitrust regime’s goal of proactive

private enforcement and the repose and efficiency interests underlying statutes

of limitations. This Note argues that these decisions improperly rely on the

Supreme Court’s RICO precedent and contradict the Court’s pleading

standard precedent. This Note proposes legislative solutions to this problem in

the form of clarification to the “accrual” language in the statutory regime and

through the enactment of a statute of repose. Either solution would provide

clarity to defendants as to the limits of their liability and encourage plaintiffs

to promptly bring their claims.

I.INTRODUCTION ............................................................................. 958

II.ANTITRUST CONSPIRACY SUITS AND STATUTES OF

LIMITATION .................................................................................. 960

A.ANTITRUST CONSPIRACY SUITS ................................................ 960

B.RATIONALES BEHIND PRIVATE TREBLE DAMAGES ..................... 962

C.THE RATIONALES BEHIND STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS .............. 964

1.The Repose Rationale ................................................... 965

2.Promote Efficiency ........................................................ 966

D.CONTINUING VIOLATION DOCTRINE ......................................... 967

III.PROPANE TANK AND LIVING CONSPIRACIES ................................... 969

A.IN RE PRE-FILLED PROPANE TANK ANTITRUST LITIGATION ....... 970

B.THE RICO ANALOGY ............................................................... 972

*

J.D. Candidate, The University of Iowa College of Law, 2019; B.A., Hamline University,

2015. I would like to thank the Editorial Board of Volume 104 of the Iowa Law Review for their

help in editing this Note.

958 IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 104:957

1.The Relationship Between Antitrust Regulation

and RICO ....................................................................... 972

2.Distinctions Between Antitrust Regulation

and RICO ....................................................................... 973

C.TENSION WITH THE ANTITRUST REGIME .................................. 974

1.Pleading Requirements under Twiqbal ........................ 974

2.Impact of Propane Tank on Private Antitrust Suits ...... 976

D.TENSION WITH STATUTORY LIMITATION PERIODS ..................... 977

1.Extending Stale Claims and Preventing Repose ......... 977

2.Chilling Economic Activity ........................................... 978

IV.SOLUTION S: RECONCILING PROPANE TANK WITH THE

ANTITRUST REGIME ...................................................................... 980

A.CLARIFY “ACCRUAL” ............................................................... 980

B.ADOPT A STATUTE OF REPOSE .................................................. 981

V.CONCLUSION ................................................................................ 983

I. INTRODUCTION

In 2008, Apple and a group of book publishing companies tried to

challenge Amazon’s place of dominance in the e-book market.1 Their strategy

was to work together to raise the price of e-books. Unfortunately for them,

their actions attracted the attention of no fewer than 33 state governments,

who accused Apple of violating the laws that regulate competition itself: the

antitrust laws. In the end, Apple’s unsuccessful attempt cost the company

$450 million to settle the suit.2

Congress first formally recognized the incredible danger posed to

consumers by businesses joining together to conspire against their interest

when it passed the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890.3 Private enforcement by

consumers is a cornerstone of the antitrust regime enforcement mechanism.

Coupled with heavy criminal punishments,4 the regime provides consumers

1. Nate Raymond & Jonathan Stempel, Apple Conspired to Fix E-book Prices: U.S. Appeals Court,

REUTERS (June 30, 2015, 9:05 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-ebooks-decision-

idUSKCN0PA1RS20150630.

2. Id.

3. See Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended

at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012)).

4. The Sherman Act’s heavy punishments are given in section 1 of the Act:

Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or

conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on

conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $100,000,000 if a

corporation, or, if any other person, $1,000,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding

10 years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.

15 U.S.C. § 1.