Determinants of Differences in Feelings Toward Senators Representing the Same State

• Author: Robert A. Bernstein
• DOI: 10.1177/106591299204500308
• Published date: 01 September 1992
• Date: 01 September 1992
• Subject Matter: Articles

DETERMINANTS

OF

DIFFERENCES

IN

FEELINGS

TOWARD

SENATORS

REPRESENTING

THE

SAME

STATE

ROBERT

A.

BERNSTEIN

Auburn

University

he

belief

that

ideologically

disparate

senators

must

have

differ-

ent

support

coalitions

or

constituencies

within

a

state

is

so

~~-

widespread

that

many

scholars

take

it

to

be

virtually

axiom-

atic ;

their

inquiries

deal

only

with

uncovering

the

coalitions

or

constit-

uencies

that

must

be

molding

the

behavior

of

each

senator.

Bullock

and

Brady

(1983)

uncover

those

different

support

coalitions

in

differ-

ent

geographic

constituencies

in

heterogeneous

states.

Poole

and

Rosenthal

(1984)

uncover

them

in

ideologically

extreme

groups

in

all

states.

And

Wright

(1989)

uncovers

them

in

ideologically

different

party

elites.

Krassa

and

Davison

(1988)

also

assume

that

ideologically

disparate

senators

mobilize

distinct

reelection

constituencies,

but

they

find

that

those

senators

broaden

their

bases

of

support

by

papering

over

the

full

extent

of

their

ideological

disparity,

especially

in

reelec-

tion

years.

The

belief

that

ideologically

disparate

senators

must

have

different

support

coalitions

is

deduced

from

the

basic

assumption

that

senators’

ideological

positions

must

reflect

the

wishes

of

the

coalitions

that

put

those

senators

into

office:

if

senators

take

markedly

different

ideologi-

cal

positions,

they

must

have

had

different

support

coalitions.

That

syllogism

is

explicitly

stated

in

Poole

and

Rosenthal

(1984:

1062),

Krassa

and

Davison

(1988:

2),

and

Wright

(1989:

465).

The

major

premise

is

a

widely

accepted

assumption

of

political

and

economic

research

on

elections

and

representation

(see,

e.g.,

Pitkin

1967;

Peltz-

man

1984;

Erikson

and

Wright

1985;

Hamilton

1987).

Received:

April

12,

1991

Accepted

for

Publication:

October

28,

1991

NOTE:

This

was

a

revision

of

a

paper

presented

to

the

Southern

Political

Science

Association

meetings

in

Atlanta,

November,

1990.

I

am

grateful

to

the

Center

for

Political

Studies

at

the

University

of

Michigan

and

the

Inter-University

Consortium

for

Political

and

Social

Research

for

providing

much

of

the

data

that

is

analyzed

in this

study.

I

am

also

grateful

to

Dean

Mann,

Walter

Stone,

and

reviewers

for

The

Western

Political

Quarterly

for

comments

on

an

earlier

draft

of

this

research.

702

However,

there

is

substantial

research

challenging

the

extent

to

which

elected

representatives

have

to

reflect

the

wishes

of

the

general

electorate

(see,

e.g.,

Bernstein

1989;

Bogart

and

VanDoren

1991).

Senators

may

have

sufficient

freedom

to

support

different

ideological

positions

even

if

they

have

similar

or

largely

overlapping

support

coa-

litions.

Supporting

that

possibility

is

extensive

research

into

incum-

bency

advantage

that

suggests

that

representatives

can

strengthen

feel-

ings

of

trust

and

warmth

regardless

of

ideological

or

party

congruence

(see,

e.g.,

Fenno

1978;

Payne

1980a,

1980b;

Johannes

1984;

Fiorina,

1989;

Parker

1989;

Parker

and

Parker

1989;

Larson

1990).

The

trust

and

warmth

they

build

on

a

non-ideological

basis

then

gives

them

freedom

to

deviate

from

constituents’

ideological

preferences

while

retaining

the

support

of

those

constituents.

This

research

questions

the

extent

to

which

ideologically

disparate

senators

must

represent

different

support

coalitions

within

their

states.

It

investigates

the

strength

of

the

association

between

the

ideological

distance

between

senators

and

the

difference

in

feelings

people

have

toward

those

senators.

If

ideological

distance

between

senators

is

not

reflected

in

different

feelings

toward

those

senators,

then

ideologically

disparate

senators

can

be

mobilizing

support

from

largely

overlapping

coalitions,

at

least

within

the

general

electorate.

The

same

people

can

be

supporting

both

senators

in

a

state

because

they

like

them

both-

despite

the

ideological

distance

between

them.

There

is

substantial

research

showing

that

affection

influences

vote

choice

(Page

and

Jones

1979;

Markus

and

Converse

1979;

Cain,

Ferejohn,

and

Fiorina

1984;

Kenney

and

Rice

1988),’

and

that

affec-

tion

influences

the

extent

to

which

constituents

believe

their

senator

is

representing

them

(Parker

and

Parker

1989).

If

constituents

can

like

ideologically

disparate

senators

equally

well,

substantial

numbers

of

those

constituents

might

support

and

feel

represented

by

both

a

Cranston

and

a

Wilson,

a

Moynihan

and

a

D’Amato.2

While

we

might

suppose

that

there

would

be

substantial

cognitive

dissonance

involved

in

liking

ideologically

disparate

senators

equally

well,

it

is

not

clear

that

such

dissonance

has

to

be

avoided

by

adjusting

1

Probit

analysis

of

data

from

the

1988

Senate

Election

Study

(SES)

shows

that

with

party

and

perceived

ideological

distance

from

their

senator

controlled,

the

feeling

thermometer

is

a

significant

determinant

of

vote

choice

in

reelection

races

(Miller

1988).

2

It

would

be

valuable

to

ask

people

if

they

recall

whether

they

voted

for

both

a

Cranston

and

a

Wilson,

a

Moynihan

and

a

D’Amato.