Descartes's paradoxical politics.

• Author: Taylor, Quentin
• Position: Rene Descartes

In his Discours preliminaire to the Encyclopedie, the French philosophe d'Alembert penned the following tribute to Descartes:

He can be thought of as a leader of conspirators who, before anyone else, had the courage to arise against a despotic and arbitrary power and who, in preparing a resounding revolution, laid the foundations of a more just and happier government, which he himself was not able to see established. (1)

From this statement one may gather that Descartes was not only a political thinker, but one of a particularly revolutionary bent. Yet nothing could be further from the truth. In reality, Descartes had less to say about politics than any of the major philosophers, and the little he did say was of a markedly conservative, even reactionary nature. (2) This fact did not, however, deter subsequent writers from finding the seeds of revolt and liberalism in Descartes's philosophy. Indeed, the Revolutionaries of 1789 acknowledged Descartes as a forerunner, and the Marquis de Bouillier (cousin of Lafayette) even proclaimed him as the inspiration behind the Declaration of the Rights of Man. (3)

If the Revolutionaries can be excused for republicanizing Descartes, why would a philosophe like d'Alembert credit his conservative countryman with overturning the political order in France and laying the groundwork of a new and better government? Conversely, given his apolitical (even anti-political) orientation, why have scholars spoken of Descartes's "political philosophy" and dedicated books and articles to the subject? (4) More fundamentally, in what way is it possible to speak of Descartes as a political thinker, and what was his actual contribution to political thought? Given his pivotal role in the history of philosophy and profound impact on intellectual culture, such questions speak not only to the student of political ideas, but go to the very roots of modern civilization. In Descartes we find the birth pangs of the modern-the tensions, ambiguities, and contradictions of a society in the midst of an intellectual revolution. Descartes's political thought embodies this struggle no less than the awkwa rd co-existence of reason and revelation in his general philosophy. And while the latter has dominated scholarly discussions, the former is arguably of equal significance given the sharp contrast between Descartes's reactionary conservatism and the revolutionary liberalism he is said to have inspired. (5) In what follows I will underscore this contrast through an analysis of the two sources commonly looked to in reconstructing the French philosopher's "political thought"-the Discourse on Method and his correspondence. (6) It will be seen that Descartes can be spoken of as a political thinker in only the most qualified sense, and that his own politics-in conjunction with the political implications of his philosophical project-are ultimately inconsistent and paradoxical. This conclusion suggests that Descartes's status as an eminently progressive force in Western culture stands in need of qualification.

Politics Denied

As a preliminary to a close reading of the Discourse on Method and the correspondence, it will be useful to summarize the central tenets of Descartes's orientation towards the political. First, Descartes personally disavows politics. In a letter from his correspondence with Elizabeth, Princess of Bohemia, he writes: "I lead such a retired life, and have always been so far from the conduct of affairs, that I would be no less impudent than the philosopher who wanted to lecture on the duties of a general in the presence of Hannibal if I took it on me to enumerate here the maxims one should observe in a life of public service." (7) Similarly, in the Discourse Descartes emphatically denies that his ideas on intellectual reform imply any parallel in the realm of politics. "If I thought the slightest basis could be found in this Discourse for a suspicion that I was guilty of this folly [suggesting political reforms], I would be loathe to permit it to be published. Never has my intention been more than to try to refo rm my own ideas, and rebuild them on foundations that would be wholly mine" (II:10). From these views Descartes never wavered.

Second, politics for Descartes is not a part of philosophy proper. Writing to Elizabeth he observes: "I do not doubt your Highness' maxim is the best of all, namely that it is better to guide oneself by experience in these matters [of ruling or dealing with others] than by reason. It is rarely that we have to do with people who are as perfectly reasonable as men ought to be, so that one cannot judge what they will do simply by considering what they ought to do; and often the soundest advice is not the most successful." (8) Given man's less-than-fully rational nature, his conduct (individually and collectively) is not subject to strict philosophical (read: scientific) analysis. It is therefore meaningless to speak of political "truths," for "[t]ruth can be discovered only little by little, and in a few subjects" (VI:46), and for Descartes politics is not one of them. Politics, then, is primarily a matter of "experience" as opposed to "reason." (9) If politics can be called a "science" at all, it is a prudentia l science: it is "the art of the possible," often requiring an acquiescence in the lesser of two evils. As he informs the Princess, "In all the affairs of the world there are many reasons pro and many reasons contra; and so we must dwell principally on those which make us approve what we cannot avoid." (10)

Third, Descartes accepted the established authorities, secular and sacred. In the Discourse, the first rule of his morale par provision is "to obey the laws and customs of my country, constantly retaining the religion in which, by God's grace, I have been brought up since childhood..." (III:15). That this rule is only "provisional" did not lessen Descartes's commitment to its injunction: he never modified the rule, and placed it "aside with the truths of the Faith ..." (III:18).

Fourth, Descartes held that only the sovereign (or his appointed deputies) should be concerned with politics and public morals. In response to a query regarding his failure to address moral or political questions, Descartes expressed his belief that "only sovereigns, or those authorized by them, have the right to concern themselves with regulating the morals of other people." (11) Apparently, he maintained this view on both practical and principled grounds. On one hand, "everyone is so convinced of his own good sense that there might be as many reformers as individuals ..." (VI:39). On the other, Descartes appears to subscribe to the "divine right" theory of sovereignty, and speaks of "those whom God has established as sovereigns over his peoples...." Moreover, he did not believe those outside the immediate circle of power were capable of grasping the nature of governance or qualified to judge the wisdom of policy. (12)

Finally, Descartes was a conservative to the point of reaction. In the Discourse, he acknowledges the presence of "defects" in current institutions, but considers even "the slightest reform of public affairs" so complex and risky as to cast grave doubts on its desirability (II:9). Best to let custom, which "has no doubt inured us to many [defects]," provide a remedy, for "[c]ustom has perhaps even found ways to avoid or correct more defects than prudence could have done." And even when custom fails to ameliorate the flaws and abuses of institutions, the latter "are practically always more tolerable than would be a change in them" (11:9-10). For this reason, Descartes "cannot at all approve those mischievous spirits who, not being called either by birth or by attainments to a position of political power, are nevertheless constantly proposing some new reform" (II:10). This attitude shares some important affinities with the "classical" conservatism of Burke, but the suggestion that defects in the political and s ocial order are largely beyond the competence of the governing authority is a view that Burke, as a conservative reformer, would not have accepted.

The Discourse on Method

Having summarized Descartes's attitude towards politics, we may now consider the text typically used to explore the political implications of his philosophy, the Discourse on Method (1637). Part two contains the only explicit mention of politics in the entire Cartesian corpus. The remaining five parts take the form of an intellectual autobiography in which Descartes chronicles his early search for truth and outlines the method to attain it. On occasion he suggests that the application of this method will have important, indeed, monumental social consequences. He begins by noting that "[g]ood sense is mankind's most equitably divided endowment ..." (I:1). By this Descartes means that "the ability to judge correctly, and to distinguish the true from the false--which is really what is meant by good sense or reason--is the same by nature in all men; and that differences of opinion are not due to differences in intelligence, but merely to the fact that we use different approaches and consider different things" (I: 2). (13) Taken literally this passage affirms that all men are equally endowed with native reason and capable of arriving at the truth; a kind of epistemic equivalent of Jefferson's "self-evident" truth that "all men are created equal." (14) Given that Descartes considered reason the most exalted of human faculties, indeed, the only truly human faculty--for "no actions can be reckoned human unless they depend on reason" (15)--does not his cognitive egalitarianism imply a political corollary? Descartes did not draw this conclusion, but some of his successors (as well as more recent observers) have. (16) For if reason "is fully present in each one of us," is it not reasonable that all people should be viewed as equals and entitled to equal treatment and rights? Descartes...