Derolph v. State: Who Really won Ohio s School Funding Battle?
| Author | Mary J. Amos |
| Pages | 153-192 |
Page 153
May 11, 2000 was a day of déjà vu for members of the Ohio General Assembly when the Ohio Supreme Court rendered its decision that Ohio's school funding formula remained unconstitutional. The Plaintiffs ("the Coalition")1were hailed to be victors2as the majority of the court concluded that, despite complete revisions to Ohio's school funding statutory scheme by the General Assembly, the "Thorough and Efficient" Clause of the Ohio Constitution3had not been met.4
This note focuses on one of the most historical school funding decisions in our state's history, DeRolph v. State ("DeRolph II").5There are four purposes for this note. First, to summarize the background of this historical case that is actually still pending. Second, to discuss whether the Coalition really won this round of the case. Third, to provide a thorough and efficient response to the court's decision. Finally, to discuss the Ohio Supreme Court's ruling in DeRolph III.6
As stated above, while it is obvious the Defendants ("the State") did not win DeRolph II, it is questionable whether this is really a victory for the Coalition. In the Plaintiffs' brief, the Coalition asked the court to declare that education is a fundamental right under the Ohio Constitution.7
This issue is not even addressed in the majority opinion of DeRolph II. Page 154
In addition, the Coalition advocated that the court should specify what programs and services must be provided by the State at every level of educational opportunity.8In doing so, the Coalition believes that a market basket approach should be used.9In other words, instead of establishing a funding formula like the methodology enacted by the General Assembly,
In DeRolph II, the court reject the market basket approach by asserting the ability to identify and cost each component is impossible.13In fact, by refusing to specify what level of educational services must be provided or to set minimum funding levels, the court seems to have embraced the methodology that the State employs to determine the cost of an adequate education. 14In addition, the court did not insist upon a settlement conference, as the Coalition requested.15
The court did maintain jurisdiction over this case and set a deadline of June 15, 2001 for statutory revisions by the General Assembly.16In its decision, the court set seven general guidelines for the General Assembly to follow.17However, before discussing and analyzing the guidelines Page 155 necessary to provide a thorough and efficient response, it is necessary to review a history of this case and the General Assembly's response that led to the majority's analysis.
This case began in 1991 when the Coalition filed suit in the Perry County Court of Common Pleas claiming Ohio's statutory school funding scheme to be unconstitutional. The trial began in 1993 and, in 1994, Judge Lewis found that Ohio's school funding method violated numerous provisions of the Ohio Constitution, including the Thorough and Efficient Clause.18
The Fifth District Court of Appeals overturned this decision in 1996.19
In the majority opinion, Judge Wise found that Ohio's school funding statutory scheme needed to only meet a rational basis test to be constitutional.20Therefore, the concept of local control could be relied upon to find Ohio's system of financing did not violate the Ohio Constitution.21In fact, Judge Wise indicated that the facts of the case should give rise to concern, but not to the level of overcoming the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Board of Education of Cincinnati v. Walter.22
In Walter, the court upheld the constitutionality of a statutory school funding scheme that established basic aid to local districts by an equal yield formula.23In doing so, the court continued to adopt the definition of thorough and efficient established by the court in Miller v. Korns.24"A thorough system could not mean one in which part of any number of the school districts of the state were starved for funds. An efficient system could not mean one in which part of any number of the school districts lacked teachers, buildings, or equipment."25
In the appellate court's majority opinion, the court held that this definition of thorough and efficient was met based upon the record in the case.26The court found there was no expert testimony offered at trial to establish that districts in Ohio lacked the means to come into compliance Page 156 for areas in which school administrators may have believed that a lack of compliance may have existed.27
Judge Reader, in his concurring opinion, agreed with Judge Wise's majority opinion.28He reasoned that, although the current funding may not be sufficient, insufficient does not mean unconstitutional.29In addition, Judge Reader stressed that the General Assembly is the proper forum for solving the problem of insufficient funding.30
Judge Gwinn, in his dissenting opinion, disagreed with the majority.31
He found that Ohio's method to fund its public schools simply did not provide a basic education.32He relied on the Ohio Supreme Court's definition of thorough and efficient in Miller33to find the system unconstitutional.34Judge Gwinn also reminded the court that it has the authority and the duty to review legislation to determine its constitutionality.35
In DeRolph I,
The mission of education is to prepare students of all ages to meet, to the best of their abilities, the academic, social, civic, and employment needs of the twenty-first century, by providing high-quality programs, that emphasize the lifelong skills necessary to continue learning, communicate clearly, solve problems, use information and Page 157 technology effectively, and enjoy productive employment.39
However, before the court addressed its finding in great detail, it addressed the separation of powers doctrine.40The majority dismissed as "unfounded any suggestion that the problems presented by this case should be left for the General Assembly to resolve."41
A school funding case addresses a question of public or great general interest over a provision of the Constitution.42Therefore, under the doctrine of judicial review, the court believed its duty is to determine whether the statutory school funding scheme is constitutional.43Although there is a rebuttable presumption that the laws enacted by the General Assembly are constitutional, the court explained that it does not have to turn "a deaf ear" to a challenge that calls constitutionality into question.44
At the heart of the court's decision was the School Foundation Program.45The court found unconstitutional the General Assembly's allocation of basic state aid and the manner in which the allocation formula caused or permitted vast wealth-based disparities among Ohio's schools to continue.46
There were two primary sources of revenue provided through the School Foundation Program: basic state aid and local revenue, which consisted primarily of voted school district property tax levies.47The combined foundation amount in the 1992-93 school year was $2817 per pupil.48
State basic aid was available for school districts that levied at least twenty mills of local property tax revenue for current operating expenses (referred to as the charge off).49A foundation amount was multiplied by a cost of doing business factor and average daily membership in the district Page 158 to determine the total funds needed by a local school...
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