Book Review - Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies that led to Vietnam

• Author: Major Robert K. Fricke
• Pages: 05

248 MILITARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 160

DERELICTION OF DUTY:

LYNDON JOHNSON, ROBERT MCNAMARA, THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, AND THE LIES THAT LED TO VIETNAM1

REVIEWED BY MAJOR ROBERT K. FRICKE2

"Vietnam was not forced on the United States by a tidal wave of Cold War ideology. It slunk in on cat's feet."3

1. Introduction

   In his book, Dereliction of Duty, H. R. McMaster vigorously argues that neither the American entry into the war in Vietnam, nor the manner in which it was conducted was inevitable.4 Instead, he reasons that the escalation of U.S. military intervention "grew out of a complicated chain of events and a complex web of decisions that slowly transformed the conflict in Vietnam into an American war."5

   After his own experiences in the Persian Gulf War as the commander of an armored cavalry troop, McMaster wondered how and why Vietnam had become an American war. As the full title of the book suggests, the author answers these two questions by focusing primarily on the personalities of, and the interactions between, Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

   Ultimately, McMaster argues that American policy on Vietnam was arrived at by default-there was no strategic vision or planning. It was instead, the by-product of the dynamic that existed between these individuals, the advice they gave or failed to give, and the conflicts that Vietnam posed to Lyndon Johnson's primary goals of reelection in 1964 and the

   passing of his "Great Society" legislation during his second term. McMaster supports his thesis through extensive research that relies primarily on personal papers, oral histories, and tape-recorded interviews of the people named in the book's title and others who worked closely with them.

   McMaster's thorough analysis of the personalities of these essential figures, their selfish goals, and the policy-making structure in which they operated helps to answer how we fought in Vietnam. Dereliction of Duty is not nearly as probative as he would have us believe in answering why we fought there. To use his metaphor, while Vietnam may have "slunk in on cat's feet,"6 the feet of this "cat" were the feet of a wild, hungry tiger that had escaped from its cage long before the Johnson administration. This "cat" remained on the prowl until it was returned to its cage during the Reagan administration.

   Sprinkled throughout Dereliction of Duty are isolated references to the events of the Cold War. Among some of the crises and Cold War doctrine mentioned within the book are Truman's "Domino Theory;" Korea; the Bay of Pigs; the Cuban missile crisis; the Laotian crisis; the Congo from 1961-1963; confrontation with the Kremlin over a divided Berlin; Kruschev's support for communist insurgents fighting wars of national liberation in the countries of the developing world; and Kennedy's inaugural speech where he exhorted America's youth to "pay any price" and "bear any burden" to extend the virtues of their country to the rest of the world. Johnson, McNamara, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff lived through these events as adults.

   McMaster's sparse treatment of these events helps to lessen their impact on his theory of the why of Vietnam. He uses these events not to explain a Cold War mentality that led to Vietnam, but rather to explain the relationships that were formed based on the advice given during these crises. He argues that it is the nature of these advisory relationships that ultimately led to the Americanization of Vietnam.

   It is his attempt to use the interaction of these personalities to explain the why of Vietnam that causes McMaster's work to fall short. He offhand-edly discounts, and all but ignores, the cumulative affect these Cold War events had on the "inevitability theory" of why Vietnam. In fact, McMaster waits until a footnote in his epilogue to acknowledge the argument of a large majority who believe the war in Vietnam was inevitable due to this

   "Cold War mentality."7 McMaster's view of this theory is that the Cold War crises, particularly those that occurred during the Kennedy years, shaped advisory relationships that carried over into the Johnson administration.

   McMaster, however, betrays his why theory early on in his book. "November 1963 marked a turning point in the Vietnam War. The U.S. role in fomenting a change in the South Vietnamese government saddled the United States with responsibility...