Department Stores on Sale: an Antitrust Quandary
| Publication year | 2010 |
Georgia State University Law Review
Article 1
3-21-2012
Department Stores on Sale: An Antitrust Quandary
Mark D. Bauer
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Recommended Citation
Bauer, Mark D. (2009) "Department Stores on Sale: An Antitrust Quandary," Georgia State University Law Review: Vol. 26: Iss. 2, Article 1.
Available at: http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol26/iss2/1
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DEPARTMENT STORES ON SALE: AN ANTITRUST QUANDARY
Mark D. Bauer*
Introduction
Department stores occupy a unique role in American society. With memories of trips to see Santa Claus, Christmas window displays, holiday parades or Fourth of July fireworks, department stores— particularly the old downtown stores—are often more likely to engender civic pride than a city hall building or a courthouse.1 Department store companies have traditionally been among the strongest contributors to local civic charities, such as museums or symphonies. In many towns, the department store is the primary downtown activity generator and an important focus of urban renewal plans. The closing of a department store is generally considered a devastating blow to a downtown, or even to a suburban shopping mall.
Many people feel connected to and vested in their hometown department store.2 In 2005, Macy's,3 already the largest department
* Associate Dean and Associate Professor of Law, Stetson University College of Law. A.B., The University of Chicago; J.D., Emory University. The author was formerly an attorney with the Federal Trade Commission and the U.S. Department of Justice. This article was presented as a work in progress at the Southeastern Association of Law Schools' annual conference, Indiana University School of Law -Indianapolis, Mercer University School of Law, Texas Wesleyan School of Law, and the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Law & Economics Association of the University of Toronto Law Faculty. The author also gratefully acknowledges student research assistants Ryan McGee, Dana Dean, Marisa Gonzalez, Mike Kincart, and Marc Levine, who all did background research. This article has benefited from helpful critiques and suggestions from Jon Baker, Richard Benedikt, Darren Bush, and Janice McClendon. Finally, this article was supported by Pamela Burdett, Wanita Scroggs, Julieanne Hartman Stevens, and Sally Waters, Stetson's reference librarians; a generous research grant from Stetson University College of Law; and the unfailing support of Dean Darby Dickerson and Associate Dean Ellen Podgor.
1. See, e.g., Barbara Cloud, Department Stores Evoke Warm Memories, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Dec. 4, 2006, at C3. See also Alan Lupo, When a Store Closes Its Doors, a Bit of the Past Disappears, boston Globe, Dec. 20, 1998, at 3.
2. Sandra Jones, Hoarding Names No Game: Federated Keeps Tight Grip on Dearly Departed Department Stores to Protect Its Star Brand, CHI. TRIB., July 23, 2006, § 5, at 1.
3. In 2005, Macy's was an operating arm of Federated Department Stores (FDS). On February 27, 2007, FDS announced that it would seek shareholder approval to change its corporate name to Macy's
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store group in the United States, acquired May Department Stores, its largest competitor, for $17 billion.4 The merger was closely examined by federal antitrust authorities, but the regulators took no action.5 Although this industry was no stranger to mergers, name changes, or reorganizations, nothing came close to Macy's dramatic decision in 2005 to rename—and indeed, drastically alter—hundreds of former May department stores to Macy's.6 Although each Marshall Field's, Filene's, Hecht's, Strawbridge's, and Foley's store, among others, had long since become part of a distant holding company, shoppers in each separate city were able to participate in an unbroken chain of tradition and memories that hearkened back to each stores' local founder.
According to the doctrine of law and economics, however, none of this really matters.7 To a devotee of law and economics, antitrust is a study of elasticity of demand, market power, and a concept called "consumer welfare" that has little to do with lay definitions of the
Inc., recognizing that 90% of its sales come from Macy's (the other 10% coming from its other department store chain, Bloomingdale's). Press Release, Federated Department Stores, Inc., Federated Plans Corporate Name Change, Feb. 27, 2007, http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=84477&p=irol-newsArticle&II>=967632&highlight. That name change was approved by stockholders and became effective June 1, 2007. Sandra Jones, Macy's: State St. Store 'Doing Badly': Official Says Greater Effort Needed to Get Traffic into Flagship, Cm. TRIB, May 19, 2007, at CI. The mixed lineage and nomenclature of the various entities discussed in this article can be confusing because FDS and Macy's both had long independent histories before finally merging in 1993. Although many of the events discussed occurred while Macy's was part of FDS, this article will only refer to FDS when necessary for historical clarity, particularly relating to the period before 1994 when FDS bought Macy's.
4. Brenon Daly, Federated, May to Tie Knot, Daily Deal, Mar. 1, 2005; David Moin, Evan Clark, Vicki M. Young & Amy S. Choi, Federated-May Merger: With a Deal Imminent, Market Weighs Fallout: Federated Department Stores and May Department Stores to Merge, women's wear daily, Feb. 28,2005, at 1.
5. See, e.g., Stephanie Strom, FTC Ends Inquiry into Macy Deal, N.Y. times, Aug. 20, 1994, at 37; Statement of the Commission Concerning Federated Department Stores, Inc/The May Department Stores Company, FTC File No. 051-0111 at 1 (FTC 2005); see generally Federal Trade Commission, Pre-Merger/Hart-Scott Rodino Act, available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/hsr/ (last visited Aug. 17, 2008); Federal Trade Commission, Revised Jurisdictional Thresholds for Section 7A of the Clayton Act, http://www.ftc.gov/os/2007/01/P859910RevisedSection7AClaytonAct2007.pdf.
6. Jones, supra note 2, at 1.
7. Law and economics—often referred to as "the Chicago School"—boiled down to its most simplistic description, would argue that "[ajntitrust concerns should kick in only when a firm had a dominant market share in a market protected by entry barriers, and entry itself could be relied upon to solve most competitive problems, except when government action protected incumbents." Jonathan Baker, A Preface to Post-Chicago Antitrust, in post-chicago developments in antitrust
Analysis 60,66 (2002).
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words "consumer" or "welfare. To these scholars, department stores are analogous to a basket of goods, or simply a retail channel distributing products made by others and offering nothing substantive of value to purchasers.9 Were a department store to raise prices, law and economics informs us that shoppers would make rational economic decisions by flocking to less expensive sellers of similar wares.
At odds with the predictions of the law and economics crew, however, was the reaction of consumers to Macy's acquisition of May, particularly in Chicago. Upon hearing of Macy's plan to change the name of Marshall Field's, Chicago's iconic downtown anchor, hundreds of Chicagoans took to the streets in protest.10 These shoppers were not content to purchase similar or even identical goods elsewhere. Even now, several years after the merger, fans of Marshall Field's continue to protest at Macy's annual shareholders meeting.11
8. The term "consumer welfare" is confusing to some because it does not mean that the welfare of the majority of consumers is maximized. Stephen F. Ross, principles of antitrust Law 3-4 (The Foundation Press, Inc. 1993). Consumer welfare means maximization of societal wealth, not that of individuals, which can simply mean there is more wealth, but it is concentrated among the already wealthy. Id. Similarly, "allocative efficiency" does not mean "competition." Id. at 4. The Chicago School usually focuses on short-term rather than long-term efficiencies. Id.
9. The concept of a collection of goods taking on a characteristic separate and apart from the individual goods themselves has not received considerable attention from antitrust scholars. See generally Jonathan B. Baker, Product Differentiation Through Space and Time: Some Antitrust Policy Issues, 42 Antitrust Bull. 177 (1997); Jonathan B. Baker, Unilateral Competitive Effects Theories in Merger Analysis, 11 Antitrust 21-26 (Spring 1997); Jonathan B. Baker & Timothy F. Bresnahan, The Gains from Merger or Collusion In Product-Differentiated Industries, 33 J. indus. econ. 427 (1985); Craig M. Newmark, Price Concentration Studies: There You Go Again 12, http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/workshops/docs/202603.htm (suggesting that consumers compare prices on individual products but are actually interested in buying a package of bundled services); 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41552, §§ 2.2-2.21 (Sept. 10, 1992). The Supreme Court did, however, at least hint at this in one of the earliest merger cases. See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321,356-57 (1963).
10. Gail Heriot, Give the Lady What She Wants, Wall St. J., June 17, 2006, at A10; Rummana Hussain, Protestors Wear Green, See Red: 200 Demonstrate on State As Field's Becomes Macy's, Cm. Sun-Times, Sept. 10, 2006, at A9. Slogans on the protestors signs included "Boycott Macy's, Field's is Chicago," "Hell No, Not My Dough," and, thinking along similar lines as this author with regard to the title of this article, "Give the Lady What She Wants and...
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