Democratization in Egypt in the 1990s: stagnant, or merely stalled?

• Author: Goodson, Larry P.

Democratization is the process of moving from nondemocratic or authoritarian forms of government to democratic forms of government (Sorenson, 1991, 14). It has been argued by Huntington (1993) that the world is currently in a "third wave of democratization" that has seen the widespread transformation of previously non-democratic regimes toward democracy, especially in Eastern Europe, Latin America, Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa. This wave of democratization has been far-reaching; indeed, over half of the world's current states can now be classified, at least nominally, as democracies (Singer and Wildavsky, 1993). Only one major region, the Arab World, still lags behind in this worldwide movement of democratization. And yet, this region has not been without recent progress, as numerous aspects of political liberalization and democracy, such as elections, multi-partyism, more open media and political participation, more powerful legislatures, stronger judicial bodies, and more autonomous civil society have come about in various countries in the region. This essay examines the state of the democratization process in Egypt as of early 1997, in the wake of the legislative elections of late 1995, the new Kamel El-Ganzouri government of early 1996, and more generally recent years of reported progress in political liberalization.

Perhaps no Arab country has made greater claims to democratization and is a more important test case of its possibilities than Egypt. Long considered a regional leader, Egypt has also been outspoken in its promise to democratize. Since Anwar Sadat opened Egyptian politics and society in the mid-1970s, and continuing in a more publicly explicit manner during the regime of Hosni Mubarak since 1981, Egypt has claimed that it is moving toward democracy. Yet this process has been slow and often retrograde. Furthermore it has been flawed by a blanket refusal to allow democracy to intrude upon certain elements of the Egyptian elite. Still, as the Mubarak era has worn on, pressure from Egypt's Western supporters for real progress in the major elements of liberalization, namely political democratization and economic privatization, has increased. This article explores the progress made in democratization in Egypt during the 1990s.

A MODEL OF EGYPTIAN DEMOCRATIZATION

In order to make a reasonable assessment, it is first necessary to determine what democracy consists of - that is, what characteristics must be present for a state to be said to be democratic? Schumpeter provides a now widely-accepted definition of democracy as "that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote" (1976, 269). Dahl cites eight minimum requirements of democracy, namely:

1. Freedom to form and join organizations

2. Freedom of expression

3. The right to vote

4. Eligibility for public office

5. The right of political leaders to compete for support

6. Alternative sources of information

7. Free and fair elections

8. Institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference (Ibid., 1971, 3).

   Numerous studies have subsequently attempted to measure democracy (see, e.g., Freedom House, 1976-1996; Diamond, Linz, and Lipset, 1988, 1989; Inkeles, 1991), and to varying degrees all center on the same conceptual determinants. Democracy is essentially thought to have two clear criteria that center on: 1) the need for widespread participation in governance by most of the population, normally through open and free elections, and 2) real competition between alternative claimants to leadership. Furthermore, citizens must also have basic civil and political rights essential to the fostering of a democratic atmosphere. There may be a number of other factors that foster (or retard) democracy in a society, such as level of economic development or degree of modernity, but competition, participation, and protection of basic political/civil rights are the minimal requirements (Huntington, 1991, 7; Sorenson, 1993, 1213).

   A nuanced analysis of democracy and democratization in a society obviously involves many factors, some of which are especially resistant to data gathering. Others may not be essential to the early functioning of immature democracies. In order to assess recent democratization in Egypt within the limits of this short essay, the support for democracy provided by four major variables is examined during the period from 1990 to the present. These variables are the following:

1. Political institutions

2. Political processes and culture

3. Civil liberties and political rights

4. Underlying socioeconomic and demographic realities

   Each of these variables has several dimensions.

   Political institutions include the presidency, legislature, judiciary, bureaucracy, military, and constitution. In Egypt the struggle between government institutions and informal, often vested interests is critical to understanding political decision making.

   Political processes and culture include various aspects of political participation such as elections, political party activity and competitiveness, interest group activity, and media activity. Factors influencing the underlying attitudes and behavior of the population such as political socialization, the status of civil society, economic liberalization, and the development of an autonomous business elite are also involved.

   Civil liberties and political rights center on the realization of widespread protection of basic freedoms (speech, religion, press, assembly), protection from the state, and a balance in the ongoing struggle between the rule of law embodied by the constitution and the continuation of Emergency Law dating back to 1981.

   Finally, underlying socioeconomic and demographic factors such as the inequitable distribution of wealth and income, increasing deprivation of the poor, an eroding middle class, and rapid population growth, provide a background context that raises serious questions about democracy's salience for the majority of Egyptians at present, especially in light of low legitimacy from the government.

   It is thought that these variables are interrelated as expressed in the following model:

   As indicated by the direction of the arrows, the key independent variable for democratization in Egypt is political institutions. The democratization of political institutions directly impacts how rapidly or slowly democratization proceeds both directly and through its impact on two other independent variables, civil liberties/political rights and political processes/culture. Influencing these three independent variables are underlying socioeconomic and demographic realities that provide the societal framework within which democratization must occur.

   To explore these variables, data comes from numerous sources. These sources include: direct observation of the Egyptian political scene throughout the period, (including poll-watching in the 1995 legislative elections); interviews with leading Egyptian political analysts; information gathered, in English and Arabic, from Cairo research centers and think tanks; data from non-Egyptian organizations that focus on social, economic, and human rights conditions in many countries; Egyptian newspapers, and academic literature on Egypt's political liberalization.

   Our analysis reveals that democratization in Egypt is stalled. Indeed, in certain respects the process has lost ground. A brief summation of our analysis by the four variables outlined reveals more precisely the various obstacles involved in the path to democratization in Egypt in the 1990s.

   POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

   The development of viable and effective political institutions is one of the most important characteristics of any democratic political system, and must be the centerpiece of Egyptian democratization. However, despite a constitution that embraces democratic principles, Egypt's political institutions are dominated by the enormous powers of the executive which overwhelm the legislature and marginalize the judiciary. Egypt has a highly centralized and paternalistic political culture which endorses the dominant presidency. The president has substantial constitutional and legal authority, and controls a large public sector which primarily performs social control and welfare functions.

   Furthermore, the military still remains very powerful, and while the cabinet is increasingly staffed by academicians and technocrats, the district governors are still overwhelmingly retired general officers from the police or armed forces. Therefore the analysis of the complex variable of political institutions focuses primarily on the presidency and legislature.

   Moreover, in addition to the formal state machinery of the executive branch, which the president controls and in which resides most governmental power, there are also informal ties that bind together the governing elite and supersede Egypt's legal institutions.

   Presidential Control And Influence

   Egypt is a presidential state, which, despite recent economic and political liberalization, is still characterized by a dominant presidency. The president has enormous constitutional and legal authority in a society that has a millennia-old paternalistic political culture. Almost all influential and authoritative bodies of the state machinery are necessarily affiliated to the Presidential office, either formally or informally. To implement any new project in Egypt successfully, it has to be endorsed by the president or one of the government bodies or persons affiliated to the "Presidential Establishment." As Ayyubi notes, "Any important policy or project must normally have the 'blessing' of the President before it can proceed with a reasonable prospect of success" (Ayyubi, 1989, 2).

   The President also has great influence over and through the military and security forces, which in turn perform several roles for the state...