Democratization and Troop Contributions to United Nations Peacekeeping

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Published date	01 April 2022
DOI	10.1177/0095327X20968197
Date	01 April 2022
Author	Timothy J. A. Passmore
Subject Matter	Articles

https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X20968197

Armed Forces & Society

2022, Vol. 48(2) 274 –301

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DOI: 10.1177/0095327X20968197

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Article

Democratization and

Troop Contributions to

United Nations

Peacekeeping

Timothy J. A. Passmore

Abstract

What explains the post–Cold War surge in peacekeeping contributions from the

developing world? I argue that, amid a wave of democratization and expanded

peacekeeping activity, such countries use peacekeeping deployments to reduce the

threat of the military to nascent democratic institutions. Peacekeeping participation

serves to placate the military in the short term with resources and continued activity,

while socializing and professionalizing it to pro-democracy behaviors in the long

term. Assessing troop contributions from 1990 to 2011, I find evidence that new

democracies make larger contributions than other states, where the effect dimin-

ishes as democracy becomes consolidated. Moreover, the effect is amplified in

countries with a greater military legacy. I supplement this with a study of Argentina to

further support the proposed mechanism. These findings help explain the shift in

state peacekeeping contributions in recent years, the role of democracy in peace-

keeping efforts, and the impact of international actors in supporting democratization.

Keywords

civil–military relations, conflict resolution, coups and conflicts, democracy,

peacekeeping

In recent decades, the provision of personnel for United Nations peacekeeping

operations (UNPKOs) has shifted largely from th e developed to the developing

Virginia Military Institute, Lexington, VA, USA

Corresponding Author:

Timothy J. A. Passmore, Virginia Military Institute, 323 Scott Shipp Hall, Lexington, VA, 24450, USA.

Email: passmoretj@vmi.edu

world. Where mission compositions were once dominated by Europe and North

America, they now consist heavily of peacekeepers from Africa, South Asia, and

Latin America. While various studies have attempted to explain this pattern, there

remains a lack of consensus. I argue that the process of democratization creates

strong incentives for states to support peacekeeping missions with their own per-

sonnel and that such states will subsequently make larger contributions than both

established democracies and nondemocracies. Democratizing states

face unique

challenges relating to domestic demand for public goods provision as well as pres-

sures from the military. Participation in peacekeeping creates a means to satisfy both

of these challenges. I argue that participation addresses the domestic threat of the

military both by placating it in the short term with resources and continued activity,

while also socializing and professionalizing its members in the long term to pro-

democracy behaviors. In achieving these outcomes, domestic opposition to contin-

ued high spending on the military can be assuaged, while much needed funds can be

diverted to domestic purposes. By achieving these outcomes, a newly democratic

state can decrease the likelihood of opposition and regime instability and thereby

increase the probability of democratic consolidation.

I test my argument empirically by examining the effect of being a new democracy

on personnel contributions to UN peacekeeping operations between 1990 and 2011.

While previous studies have considered the relationship between democracy and

contributions (e.g., Andersson, 2002; Lebovic, 2004; Perkins & Neumayer, 2008),

they focus only on a state’s regime type rather than considering states in transition,

much less the internal political dynamics of the country. I therefore offer a novel

insight into this relationship, considering democracies in transition. The results show

support for my arguments: Newly democratized states make larger personnel con-

tributions than other states, but their commitments decrease as democracy becomes

more consolidated. I also find that the effect is amplified where the country expe-

rienced coups in the past and where the military was more prominent prior to

transition. To offer further support for the proposed mechanisms, I supplement the

statistical analysis with a case study of Argentina, whose involvement in peace-

keeping in its postdemocratization years was critical for establishing stable civil–

military relations that supported the successful consolidation of democracy.

This project contributes to the understanding of civil–military relations in the

context of democratization, while also considering the undertheorized role of inter-

national organizations in this process, contributing to a broader literature on how

involvement in international organizations can support the process of democratiza-

tion. It also adds to an ongoing discussion on the determinants of peacekeeping

personnel contributions. In particular, prior consideration of regime characteristics

has overlooked heterogeneous factors a mong democracies and has subsequently

produced mixed results. With that, I offer the first large-ntest of the role played

by democratization in peacekeeping contributions and add to a sparse understanding

of how states use peacekeeping as a strategic means to address threats posed by the

military.

Passmore 275