Democratic versus Authoritarian Coups: The Influence of External Actors on States’ Postcoup Political Trajectories

• Date: 01 November 2020
• DOI: 10.1177/0022002720935956
• Author: Clayton Thyne,Kendall Hitch
• Published date: 01 November 2020
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article

Democratic versus

Authoritarian Coups:

The Influence

of External Actors

on States’ Postcoup

Political Trajectories

Clayton Thyne

1

and Kendall Hitch

1

Abstract

Once considered artifacts of history, research on coups has burgeoned recently.

Most studies focus on decisions to stage coups, considering factors like individual

benefits, organizational interests, and government legitimacy. Less work considers

what happens following coups. This article considers the political trajectory of states

following coups. We argue that external reactions to coups play important roles in

whether coup leaders move toward authoritarianism or democratic governance.

When supported by external democratic actors, coup leaders have an incentive to

push for elections to retain external support and consolidate domestic legitimacy.

When condemned, coup leaders are apt to trend toward authoritarianism to assure

their survival. We test our argument by considering how international responses to

coups from states and international organizations influence coup states’ political

trajectories. Our findings indicate that international actors play key roles in deter-

mining democracy levels of coup-born regimes.

Keywords

democratization, domestic politics, legitimacy, military intervention

1

Department of Political Science, University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY, USA

Corresponding Author:

Clayton Thyne, Department of Political Science, University of Kentucky, 1615 Patterson Office Tower,

Lexington, KY 40506, USA.

Email: clayton.thyne@uky.edu

Journal of Conflict Resolution

2020, Vol. 64(10) 1857-1884

ªThe Author(s) 2020

Article reuse guidelines:

sagepub.com/journals-permissions

DOI: 10.1177/0022002720935956

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The world watched when Egyptian President Morsi was removed from power by the

military in 2013. As Egypt’s first democratic-elected president, many Western

countries were disappointed with the undemocratic nature of Morsi’s government

leading up to the coup (Hamid 2015). Nevertheless, most Western states swiftly

condemned the coup and urged return to civilian governance (Tansey 2016, 168-73).

Not all states agreed. Anticoup hardliners like Senators John McCain and Lindsey

Graham called for the United States to halt aid to Egypt (Chulov 2013). In contrast,

leading members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee like Chairman Ed Royce

urged President Obama to forge even tighter relationships with Egypt, arguing that

continued support will give the United States leverage over Egypt’s future political

trajectory. As explained by the Committee’s top-ranking Democrat, Eliot Engel, “If

you’re ...pulling away, then their attitude is going to be, ‘Well, why do we have to

listen to you?’” (Zengerle 2013). President Obama largely agreed with the latter

viewpoint. He avoided labeling the incident as a “coup,” aid continued, and democ-

racy derailed (Pecquet 2013).

The Egyptian case presents more puzzles than lessons. Condemning the coup

may have shocked Egypt back to the democratic path as implied by McCain and

Graham. It may have pushed Egypt even further toward authoritarianism as sug-

gested by Royce and Engel. Or, signals from external actors may n ot matter in

determining states’ postcoup political trajectories especially for strategically impor-

tant states like Egypt. Unfortunately, current research does little to inform policy

makers about appropriate stances to shape democracy following coups. We know

that coups are one of the biggest threats to democracy (Kieh and Agbese 2005).

However, coups also provide windows for democratization (Goemans and Marinov

2014; Thyne and Powell 2016; Miller 2016). Focusing on international relations,

scholars have shown that international actors influence the onset of coups (Thyne

2010). We also have some idea about when and why international actors respond to

coups (Shannon et al. 2015). However, we know little about what internationa l

actors can do to take advantage o n the window of opportunity to move t oward

democracy following coups.

Given the dearth of policy-relevant work that might influence postcoup decision-

making, it is unsurprising that even democratic actors respond to coups haphazardly

(Morey et al. 2012). US laws include specific rules to guide actions when coups

arise, which is that all aid should be restricted until civilian government is restored.

Other states and international organizations (IOs) have instituted similar policies.

However, these policies are rarely applied consistently. As demonstrated by the

Morsi incident, Obama prolonged policy decisions on foreign aid by avoiding using

the term “coup” to describe the overthrow. Although states and IOs often have clear

positions in writing, coup leaders are left to guess how external actors will apply

these policies. If external actors consistently took paths shown to promote democ-

racy, juntas would have clearer pictures of the support they should receive. The

result could be more coups leading to democracy.

1858 Journal of Conflict Resolution 64(10)