Democratic responses to terrorism: a comparative study of the United States, Israel, and India.

• Author: Bhoumik, Arunabha

1. INTRODUCTION

   On September 11, 2001, nineteen men hijacked four planes, crashing one each into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and in Shanksville, Pennsylvania. (1) Approximately three-thousand people from eighty-seven countries were killed. (2) That evening President Bush addressed the nation, stating that the full resources of the intelligence and law enforcement communities would be devoted to finding those responsible for the attacks. (3) The President further stated that, "We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them." (4) On September 20, the President addressed a joint session of Congress, declaring, "[o]n September the 11th, enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our country." (5) The war against terrorism was soon in full swing. (6)

   Terrorism is of course not a new problem. Many have noted that history is replete with instances of groups using violence to achieve political objectives. (7) Modern terrorism, with its emphasis on "liberty and self-determination" can be traced to the Britain's Glorious Revolution, and the use of violence for symbolic purposes was later legitimated by the French Revolution. (8) Others have noted that terrorism was an effective tool of national liberation movements after the Second World War. (9) During the 1970s and 1980s, the frequency of terrorist attacks substantially increased. The U.S. Department of State, for example, recorded 13,572 incidents of international terrorism between 1968 and 1991. (10) In 2002, the State Department recorded 199 incidents of international terrorism. (11) Furthermore, there is good reason to believe that terrorist activity will persist in coming years. Yonah Alexander, for example, notes that terrorism will increase because 1) it has been successful in attracting publicity, 2) resources such as weapons, financing, and communication are readily available, and 3) an international network of groups and states supporting terrorism already exists. (12) More importantly, many of the underlying causes of terrorism, including the ideological roots of terrorist movements, remain. (13)

   Given these trends, it is clear that all governments need a comprehensive strategy for effectively combating terrorism. This paper takes a comparative approach to studying strategies implemented by various countries to combat terrorism. I first examine what we mean by "terrorism." Next, I will examine three models for dealing with terrorism: the "criminal justice" model, the "intelligence" model, and the "war" model. Next, I will examine the counterterrorism approaches employed by the United States, Israel, and India. Using a functional approach, I will attempt to place each country's counterterrorist policy within one of the three models discussed. Particular attention will be paid to the civil liberties implications of counterterrorist policies in each country. Specifically, I argue each country has adopted a war-model of counterterrorism, and except in the case of India, has increased its application since the September 11 attacks. The "war on terror" terminology is more than just a rhetorical device. Rather, it reflects a new model for both U.S. counterterrorism policies and those of other countries--policies which have increasingly encroached on the civil liberties and human rights, while at the same time ignoring the underlying causes of terrorism and therefore exacerbating the terrorist threat.

2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

   1. Defining the Problem

      Terrorism is not simply the act of madmen. It is "a calculated move in a political game." (14) Actors engage in terrorism with objectives in mind. Moreover, terrorism is an important means for non-state actors who lack resources to achieve these objectives. (15) Violence is perceived to advance objectives, most typically by inciting fear and bringing attention to the terrorist's cause, and by increasing the bargaining power of groups engaged in terrorism. (16) Terrorism, therefore, is not merely an act of violence; it is "propaganda by deed." (17)

      Beyond these observations, however, defining "terrorism" is problematic. First, terrorism is not a monolithic concept. (18) Wilkinson, for example, notes that a typology of terrorism would include distinctions between "state" and "factional" terrorism, international and domestic terrorism, and distinctions based on politics. (19) Ideological underpinnings may include nationalism (as in the case of the Irish Republican Army), ideological (Germany's Red Army Faction), religio-political terrorists (Hamas in the Middle East), and single issue terrorists (such as antiabortion groups). (20)

      Second, the term terrorism has a significant negative connotation. One condemns something by calling it terrorism. (21) As a result, many have noted that the terms "terrorist" and "terrorism" have become so overused that they have lost much of their significance. (22) At the same time, this continuous expansion of the definition of the word exaggerates the threat posed by terrorism and influences public reaction, and therefore government policy. (23) For example, some have noted that compared to traffic accidents, drug crimes, or domestic violence, terrorism is a minor problem. (24) Yet large amounts of resources are devoted to the terrorist threat. (25) As a result, terrorists have disproportionate power over policy relative to their threat. (26) More importantly, the implicit condemnation of the word "terrorism" ignores the accurate if cliche observation that, "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter." (27) The German occupying force during the Second World War, for example, referred to the Dutch resistance as "terrorists." (28) In 1948, several prominent American clergyman condemned Menachem Begin for leading "a terroristic band." (29) Begin, repeatedly asserted, however, that members of his organization were "freedom fighters" rather than terrorists. (30)

      Statutory definitions have tended to ignore this terrorist/freedom-fighter ambiguity. The United States defines terrorism as "violent acts" or acts "dangerous to human life" that appear to be intended to i) intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping. (31) Similarly, the British Prevention of Terrorism Act of 1974 defined terrorism as "the use of violence for political ends, and includes any use of violence for the purpose of putting the public or any section of the public in fear." (32) Such definitions are unsatisfying because they are the creation of policymakers, for whom acts that constitutes "terrorism" are often self-evident. (33) In addition, in marginal cases, the ability of executive officials to use discretion in the enforcement of statutory provisions, allows legislators to be over-inclusive in their definitions of terrorism. Statutory definitions are therefore not useful frameworks for understanding terrorism, and may also be poor mechanisms for understanding a country's counterterrorist policy.

      In contrast, moral ambiguities considerably curtail the ability of academics to settle on a single definition of terrorism. In 1988, Schmid and Jongman reported 109 different definitions currently in use among leading academics. (34) Eventually, and based on comments from the academic community, Schmid put forth his own definition:

      Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal, or political reasons, whereby--in contrast to assassination--the direct targets of the violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen at randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat--and violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organisation), (imperiled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought. (35) While Schmid's definition is comprehensive, the definition of terrorism I will employ will differ in several ways. First, while States may engage in terrorism, I will only be concerned with terrorism committed by sub-state actors. State terrorism will typically involve conduct by a state against its own citizens, as was the case in the Soviet Union under Stalin. (36) In such situations, a state's "counterterrorist" policy is irrelevant. In situations where a state engages in direct acts of violence against citizens of another State, such acts would constitute acts of war. The models of counterterrorist policy that are the focus of this paper are irrelevant in both situations. (37)

      Second, terrorism in this paper will only refer to activities which have the purpose of effectuating political change. Idiosyncratic or purely "criminal" terrorism, for example when organized crime actors use violence to prevent prosecution, can most likely be dealt with through standard law enforcement techniques because such terrorists will typically not have the resources of State sponsorship or popular support that would require a state to choose between the models discussed in this paper. In short, idiosyncratic, criminal, and state terrorism, do not present the interesting dilemmas for democratic states that does political sub-state terrorism.

      Finally, Schmid's definition does not address the moral ambiguities of terrorism. As mentioned earlier, policymakers perhaps do not need to concern themselves if their definitions are over-inclusive because political forces will dictate when they decide to employ their counterterrorist...