Democracy, Inequality, Modernization, Routine Activities, and International Variations in Personal Crime Victimization

• Author: David Hussey,Abbey L. Eng,Sener Uludag,Mark Colvin
• Published date: 01 September 2009
• Date: 01 September 2009
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/1057567709334955

Articles
International Criminal
Justice Review
Volume 19 Number 3
September 2009 265-286
# 2009 Georgia State University
Democracy, Inequality,
Research Foundation, Inc.
10.1177/1057567709334955
Modernization, Routine
http://icjr.sagepub.com
hosted at
Activities, and International
http://online.sagepub.com
Variations in Personal
Crime Victimization
Sener Uludag
Turkish National Police, Ankara
Mark Colvin
David Hussey
Abbey L. Eng
Kent State University, OH
Using the International Crime Victimization Survey (ICVS), this study investigates the
relative contribution of macro-level variables (democracy level, modernization, world
system status, and inequality) and individual-level variables (marital status, age, gender,
education, income) in predicting the occurrence and intensity of personal crime
victimization. The analysis utilizes multilevel regression, which controls for the ‘‘nesting’’
of individuals living in the same nation and controls for unmeasured random effects among
the 42 nations under study. The results of the zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB)
regression analysis indicate that individual characteristics are better predictors of both the
occurrence and intensity of personal crime victimization than are macro-level variables
related to political and economic conditions of nations. Findings of the current study
diverge from those of previous international studies that used official crime data.
Keywords:
international crime victimization; democracy; modernization; world system;
inequality; routine activities; multilevel regression
Thisstudy exploresvariations inpersonal crimevictimization amongindividuals living
in 42 nations by examining the democratization, modernization, world system status,
and inequality levels of the nations in which these individuals reside. In the analysis, the
study compares these macro-level variables to individual-level variables (respondents’
marital status, age, gender, education, and income) to determine their relative efficacy for
explaining personal crime victimization, which involves direct contact between the victim
and the offender. The study uses data from the International Crime Victim Survey (ICVS), a
self-report victimization survey that uses standardized questionnaire items to measure
whether respondents have been victims of personal crime (occurrence of victimization)
Authors’ Note: Please address correspondence to Mark Colvin, Department of Justice Studies, Kent State
University, Bowman Hall 113, Kent, OH 44242; e-mail: mcolvin1@kent.edu.
265

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International Criminal Justice Review
and, if so, how often they have been victims (intensity of victimization). Given that indi-
vidual respondents live under the same macro-level context in each of the 42 nations, the
study uses multilevel regression to take into account these ‘‘nesting’’ effects among indi-
viduals in the international survey and to take into account the random effects of coun-
try-level variables not directly measured in the analysis.
The study informs the emerging field of comparative criminology (Beirne & Hill, 1991;
Bennett, 2004). International comparisons of and explanations for variations among nations
in crime victimization remain relatively unexplored. Most studies on international crime var-
iations use official statistics generated by governmental agencies (Fajnzylber, Lederman, &
Loayza, 1998; Lafree & Tseloni, 2006; Reichel, 2002). A unique feature of the current study
is that it uses self-report crime victimization data from samples of citizens in each of 42 nations.
Democracy, Modernization, Inequality, Routine
Activities, and Crime Victimization
Four sets of variables inform this exploratory study of individuals’ experiences with per-
sonal crime victimization in 42 nations: Level of Democracy (focusing on the rule of law,
political rights, and civil liberties that accompany greater democratization); Modernization
(focusing on levels of economic development); Inequality (focusing on inequality among
nations in the modern world system and on inequality levels within each nation); Routine
Activities (focusing on individual demographic characteristics connected to lifestyles and
daily activities that make individuals more or less likely to be victims of crime). This study
explores the relative efficacy of these macro-level and individual-level variables for
explaining international variation in personal crime victimization.
Level of Democracy and Crime Victimization
The relationship between the level of democracy and crime has not been studied until
recently (Karstedt & LaFree, 2006). Most of these studies focus on violent crime, especially
homicide, and use official crime data. The existing literature suggests that crime increases
during the initial process of democratization but declines later (LaFree & Tseloni, 2006;
Neumayer, 2003). The finding of higher crime rates during the transition to democracy has
been apparent in Latin America (Diamond, 1999; Mendez, O’Donnell, & Pinheiro, 1999),
Eastern Europe (Barak, 2000; Savelsberg, 1995), and Sub-Saharan Africa (Daniel, South-
all, & Lutchman, 2005).
The connection between rising crime rates and transition to democracy have been ques-
tioned. Shaw (2002) notes the unreliability of crime data that encompass pretransition and
posttransition periods, since most of the transition countries do not have appropriate infra-
structures and institutions for reliable crime statistics. He also questions whether a dramatic
transition to democracy actually leads to rising crime rates or if some forms of crime merely
become more visible and thus more frequently reported.
In light of these questions, proposing an inverse correlation between level of democracy
and crime rates, rather than proposing a positive correlation linking transition from auto-
cracy to democracy to rising crime rates, seems an appropriate avenue to explore. Thus, the
independent variable should measure the extent to which states include, reflect, and apply

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Uludag et al. / Variations in Personal Crime Victimization
267
the elements of democracy to their administrations and policies. In fact, recent research
indicates an inverse relationship between level of democracy and levels of crime using offi-
cial crime data (Lafree & Tseloni, 2006; Neumayer, 2003).
Level of democracy is the most frequently used term to conceptualize quantitative mea-
sures of democracy (McClintock & Lebovic, 2006). We avoid the term quality of democ-
racy since it is vague, and an intense debate among scholars about the meaning of ‘‘quality
of democracy’’ has been ongoing (Foweraker & Krznaric, 2002; Montero, 1998; Munck,
2001).
Several scholars offer criteria to indicate the level of democracy (Beetham, Bracking,
Kearton, & Weir, 2002; Chambers & Kymlicka, 2002; Diamond & Morlino, 2004; O’ Don-
nell, 1998; Schedler, 1999; Schneider & Ingram, 1997; Thomas, 1998). These scholars’
ideas are reflected in the criteria used by Freedom House (1998), which designates a
nation’s level of democracy by its political rights (presence of electoral processes, political
pluralism and participation, functioning accountable government, and formal protections of
political rights) and by its civil liberties (presence of the rule of law, equal treatment under
law, freedom of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, personal
autonomy, and formal protections of individual rights). Freedom House indicators are the
most widely used measure of the level of democracy (McClintock & Lebovic, 2006).
There are theoretical reasons to expect an inverse relationship between nations’ levels of
democracy and crime victimization (Lafree & Tseloni, 2006; Neumayer, 2003). The Civi-
lization Perspective (Elias, 1939/1982) suggests that a decline in crime victimization (espe-
cially personal crime victimization) occurs as countries become increasingly civil and
subject to the rule of law under republican forms of representative governance. In democ-
racies, formal institutions are established in which self-interest can be pursued through non-
violent processes in which open conflict is regulated and rights are protected. Moreover, a
greater appreciation for the dignity of each individual and thus greater support for human
rights emerges from this civilization process, which promotes the rise of democracy.
According to Elias, the advancement of Western civilization from the 16th century onward
entailed changes in personality structures that placed inhibitions on expressions of violence
and aggression. As children from elite families in Europe and the northern colonies of
America began to be sheltered within families from the rougher edges of life, they were
socialized to inhibit expressions of basic desires and passions. As adults, they were repulsed
by the open displays of aggression and violence they witnessed. Their ‘‘civilized sensibil-
ities’’ (and, not by coincidence, their fears of ‘‘mob rule’’) led elites (like Dr. Benjamin
Rush in North America) to push for the establishment of governmental structures aimed
at restraining behavior through the rule of law and promotion of civil discourse within dem-
ocratic institutions under representative, republican structures of governance (Colvin, 1997;
Masur, 1989; Meranze, 1996). These ‘‘civilized’’ elites also pushed for the ‘‘moral educa-
tion’’ of the masses aimed at inhibiting violence and aggression through self-regulation
(Takaki, 1990). In the process, democratic structures emerged and open displays of vio-
lence and aggression decreased. The...