Has democracy failed Russia?

• Author: Rutland, Peter

THE SUDDEN COLLAPSE of the Soviet Union was immediately taken as vindication of Western values and proof of the superiority of both market economics and a democratic system of government. America had won the Cold War, and "market democracy" (to use President Clinton's concise term) would spread from Belgrade to Bishkek. No one stopped to question the teleological assumption that events in Russia could be understood in terms of a transition from point "A" (a state-socialist political system with a command economy) to point "B" (a democratic polity with a market economy).

Few were inclined to ponder the special problems that the concepts "democracy" and "market" might encounter in the post-socialist landscape. On the contrary, building democracy and a market economy were assumed to be compatible and complementary processes which could be introduced to any country on the planet. This left Yeltsin playing the double role of George Washington and Adam Smith--either of which on its own would have strained even his considerable thespian skills to the limit.

This article challenges the Panglossian complacency of the "market democracy" paradigm, on three fronts. First, it will question the model of democracy which is being propagated by Russia's Western advisers and well-wishers. Second, it will consider democratization in the context of unresolved problems of state- and nation-building in Russia, challenges which most other countries in political transition do not have to face. Third, it will probe the linkages between flawed democratization and market reform.

The key point to bear in mind is that Russia is still on the downward path of disintegration rather than the upward march of transition. The abrupt collapse of the Soviet state unleashed turbulent centripetal processes which are still coursing through the political, economic, and social fabric of Russia. Yeltsin and the democratic movement managed to mobilize sufficient political force to destroy the old system, but have not been able to agree among themselves on the shape of the new order.

The democratic opening of 1988-90 created two new political actors: a broad but shallow democratic movement, geared to election campaigns and mass protests; and a ramshackle parliament with minimal legislative power, which was temporarily graced with legitimacy as the symbol of democracy. Alongside these two new players were the serried ranks of the old elite: the military, the bureaucrats, the managers, the secret police, the ex-communists. This transitory political regime has been dominated by presidentialism and regionalism. Presidentialism refers to the pivotal role played by Boris Yeltsin in mediating between the old and new political groups. It may be something of a misnomer, since the authority wielded by Yeltsin adheres more to his person than to the office he holds, and for the most part it is neither defined by law nor checked by institutional structures. Regionalism surfaced because the loss of control of the old bureaucracies led to a shift from functional to territorial representation of political interests. This is good for democracy in the long run, but makes the national leadership's task much more difficult in the short term.

The Working Model Applied

Most discussions of the spread of democracy to Russia share similar assumptions about the elements which constitute a democratic political system. The checklist includes:

1) free and fair elections;

2) separation of powers;

3) a fair and independent judicial system;

4) a free and inquisitive press;

5) the widespread sharing of democratic values in society at large;

6) respect for human rights: at least individual rights, and possibly collective rights (e.g., for ethnic minorities); and

7) the presence of civil society, i.e., a plurality of social organizations.

Each of the elements in the liberal democratic canon has been introduced in Russia, but in a curiously distorted form. To paraphrase Trotsky, it is democracy reflected in a samovar. Its faltering steps down the road to democracy have been accompanied by economic disintegration, rampant crime, the collapse of public morals, rising death rates, loss of international influence, and the continuation in power of much of the old communist-era elite. Rather than question the applicability and appropriateness of their own model of democracy, Western liberals typically blame these problems on Russia's political culture or the personal qualities of its leaders. We are told that Russia has failed democracy, and not that democracy has failed Russia.

In fact, the checklist approach is extraordinarily naive in reducing democracy to a set of values and institutions. What is absent is any consideration of politics: the struggle for resources and clash of ideas between different social and political groups. The assumption is that once democratic values and institutions are in place, parties will emerge to compete for the popular vote, and sound policies and good government will follow. Democracy is seen as a source of political legitimation rather than a forum for policy resolution. After all, the market democracy paradigm assumes that the new Russian government had no choice but to introduce market liberalization. When one thinks about it, it is a curious sort of democracy which begins by telling people that they have no alternatives.

Let us look at the seven items on the West's democratic list and consider how they relate to Russian realities.

1) Free and Fair Elections

Partially-free elections were held in the USSR in 1989 and 1990, and in June 1991 Boris Yeltsin was elected President of the Russian Republic. Gorbachev refused to submit himself for popular election, and Yeltsin came to be seen as the legitimate voice of the Russian people. This experience showed how dangerous it can be for authoritarian regimes to toy with elections, no matter how unfair the electoral process or how pusillanimous the powers of the legislature. Gorbachev's experiment set in train a dynamic of democratization which swiftly undermined the authority of the Communist party.

So far, so good for the liberal democratic model. However, after the failed coup of August 1991 Yeltsin proved strangely reluctant to pursue the electoral path. In Eastern Europe, free elections were held within months of the cracking of the socialist regime. Yeltsin found he could not agree with his democratic allies on the key issues of the day--market reform and the creation of a post-Soviet federation. Thus he chose to go it alone, and delayed calling new elections until December 1993. If elections had taken place in late 1991 the democrats would probably have won handsomely. After the price liberalization of January 1992, however, the economic collapse accelerated, and in the eyes of the public the democrats had to share some of the blame for that.

The crucial problem is that even by the end of 1994 no credible political parties worthy of the name have emerged in Russia. Political parties come from one of two sources: they either grow upwards from social movements or downwards from parliamentary factions. During the elections of 1989 and 1990 a loose coalition of voters' clubs emerged, which came together as the Democratic Russia movement. They showed they could win elections and bring thousands of followers into the streets. The sole issue on which they agreed, however, was the need to dislodge the Communist Party from power. Given the postponement of elections, there was no opportunity for the fledgling parties to develop through campaigning. Instead, their leaders had to engineer crises and confrontations around which to mobilize their followers, which added to the polarized climate in Russian politics.

The top-down route of party formation was also weak. The Interregional Deputies Group, which democratic deputies formed in the USSR Supreme Soviet in 1989, never coalesced into a...