Delivering Justice in Indigenous Sentencing Courts: What This Means for Judicial Officers, Elders, Community Representatives, and Indigenous Court Workers

Date01 October 2014
AuthorElena Marchetti
Published date01 October 2014
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/lapo.12028
Delivering Justice in Indigenous Sentencing
Courts: What This Means for Judicial Officers,
Elders, Community Representatives, and
Indigenous Court Workers
ELENA MARCHETTI
Indigenous sentencing courts are now an established form of innovative justice
practice in most Australian jurisdictions. Whether such processes, which involve
the participation of local community elders or representatives in sentencing an
offender, provide a “better” form of justice is still up for debate. Recidivism
analyses have yet to find that these courts are more likely to reduce reoffending
than their mainstream counterparts. Some scholars argue that this is not the sole
purpose of the courts and that other measures of “success” should be utilised when
evaluating their performance. This article uses interviews with judicial officers,
elders, community representatives, and Indigenous and non-Indigenous court
workers to explore what the courts are seeking to achieve and how that translates
into a different form of doing justice.
INTRODUCTION
According to Rawls “laws and institutions no matter how efficient and
well-arranged must be reformed or abolished if they are unjust” (Rawls 1971,
3), but what does this mean for a sentencing process involving colonised
Others whose cultural and legal norms were forcibly superseded by the laws,
culture, and legal system of the colonial state? In general, it is understood
that legal justice requires due process and that without due process there can
be no just outcome (Lai 2010). In a criminal justice context, due process
requires “the accused be given the right of participation . . . the hearing be
This work was partly funded by a Griffith University New Researcher Grant and partly by an
Australian Research Council Discovery Projects Grant (DP0985987). The author would like to
acknowledge and thank all of the interview participants who generously gave up their time and
contributed their knowledge in support of the research. I was invited to present an earlier draft
of this article at a one-day University of Western Sydney seminar: “Whose Justice? Contested
Approaches to Crime and Justice” in October 2013. I am grateful to the participants of the
seminar and to the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and feedback.
Address correspondence to Elena Marchetti, School of Law, University of Wollongong,
Building 67, Room 231, Wollongong, NSW 2522, Australia. Telephone: +61 2 4221 4632;
Fax: +61 2 4221 3188; E-mail: elenam@uow.edu.au.
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LAW & POLICY, Vol. 36, No. 4, October 2014 ISSN 0265–8240
© 2014 The Author
Law & Policy © 2014 The University of Denver/Colorado Seminary
doi: 10.1111/lapo.12028
open to the public . . . [and that there be] respect and concern for the
accused” in order to circumvent “a failure of justice” (ibid., 256). Addition-
ally, as with all justice processes, decisions need to be made without bias,
according to a set of rules, with consistency, with the opportunity for review,
and without discrimination against particular subgroups of the population
(Neff 2004). When making sentencing decisions, the penalties imposed need
to be in proportion to the offence and the sentence should reflect the sen-
tencing principles of a particular jurisdiction (Frase 1997). But these elements
need to also be aligned with “a participant’s satisfaction with procedure” for
there to be an impact on a person’s eventual compliance with laws and
outcomes as well as an “increased legitimization of authorities” (Neff 2004,
150). In other words, the need for due process is important because it not only
legitimises the verdict, it also has intrinsic value: the liberal trial is not merely a
method of determining guilt or a means of bringing criminals to justice; it is also
a process of doing justice to accused persons, a political obligation owed by the
state to the citizens it seeks to censure and punish. (Lai 2010, 251)
For Indigenous1Australians (and indigenous people around the world), it
could be argued that justice can never be achieved without the recognition of
Indigenous sovereignty (Watson 1997). However, until that happens and
until the hegemonic Eurocentric justice system properly acknowledges the
authority of Indigenous self-determination, we are forced to consider how
existing laws and processes can better meet the needs of indigenous offenders
(and other indigenous court participants) who continue to be overrepre-
sented in criminal justice systems across settler societies in Australia, North
America, and New Zealand (Cunneen 2014).
Similar to the experiences of indigenous (and other marginalised) people in
colonised countries around the world, it is well documented that Indigenous
Australians are often overcharged, much less likely to receive a summons as
opposed to being detained, more likely to be sentenced to a period of impris-
onment, and much less likely to receive bail (Australian Government
Productivity Commission 2011; Allard 2010; Adjin-Tettey 2007). Recent
Australian Bureau of Statistics data indicate that Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander people make up 3 percent of the total Australian population
(Australian Bureau of Statistics 2013a). Despite comprising a relatively small
proportion of the overall Australian population, they make up 27 percent of
the prison population, and their rate of imprisonment is fifteen times higher
than that of the non-Indigenous population (Australian Bureau of Statistics
2013b). As a result of laws and policies being implemented in ways that are
either intentionally racist, discriminatory, or that fail to consider the harmful
effects of a particular decision or process for Indigenous people coming into
contact with the criminal justice system—systemic or institutional racism has
been recognised as a factor that impacts the overrepresentation of Indigenous
people in custody (Cunneen 2006; Blagg et al. 2005). And while socioeco-
342 LAW & POLICY October 2014
© 2014 The Author
Law & Policy © 2014 The University of Denver/Colorado Seminary

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