Criminal procedure - Supreme Judicial Court delineates method for application of forfeiture to indigent criminal defendant - Commonwealth v. Means.

AuthorBall, Caitlin E.
PositionMassachusetts

Criminal Procedure--Supreme Judicial Court Delineates Method for Application of Forfeiture to Indigent Criminal Defendant--Commonwealth v. Means, 907 N.E.2d 646 (Mass. 2009)

The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees the fundamental right that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." (1) Nevertheless, indigent defendants may relinquish their court-appointed counsel by three methods: voluntary waiver, waiver by conduct, and forfeiture. (2) In Commonwealth v. Means, (3) the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) considered whether the trial court's application of the doctrine of forfeiture, a novel matter in Massachusetts, was constitutional and appropriate in comparison to well-founded guidelines set forth by other federal and state jurisdictions. (4) The SJC, taking into account its own precedent, further examined the impact of a defendant's mental incapacity on the applicability of the forfeiture doctrine. (5) In determining that employment of forfeiture was incorrect, the SJC held that the trial court unconstitutionally infringed upon a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights by denying the defendant a proper hearing prior to the exercise of the forfeiture doctrine. (6)

On March 15, 2002, a grand jury indicted Mark Means on a series of charges, including assault and battery on a correction officer and being a habitual criminal. (7) Due to his indigent status, the court appointed an attorney to assist Means with his defense. (8) In April 2004, Means filed the first in a series of motions petitioning the court to remove his appointed counsel and assign a different attorney, citing dissatisfaction with his attorney's job performance and communication efforts. (9) The court allowed trial counsel's subsequent motion to withdraw, appointing the attorney as standby counsel, but then ordered his reinstatement as trial counsel despite Means's submission of multiple pro se motions urging removal of counsel due to Means's anger management disorder. (10)

In March 2005, Means submitted an affidavit to the court stating that he had forwarded a blood-smeared letter to his court-appointed counsel threatening violence to counsel if he did not remove himself from Means's case. (11) At the August 2005 hearing on Means's March 2005 motion, the judge granted Means's motion and removed counsel, but declared Means had forfeited his right to proceed with any appointed attorney as a result of "egregious misconduct." (12) Means subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration, discussing his mental health issues and reiterating that he was incapable of representing himself at trial, which a single appeals court judge denied without a hearing. (13)

Means represented himself at the trial for his assault and battery charges, and the jury found him guilty. (14) Means immediately stood trial before the same jury on the habitual criminal charge, where he protested representing himself and once more requested that the court appoint him counsel. (15) Again, the judge denied his motion and the jury found him guilty. (16) Means appealed to the Massachusetts Appeals Court, which rejected his petition, and then to the SJC, questioning the application of forfeiture in light of his behavior and challenging the forfeiture doctrine itself as unconstitutionally depriving him of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. (17) The SJC granted Means's appeal and overturned his convictions, holding that a hearing is required for the defendant to offer an explanation of his behavior prior to removing counsel under the forfeiture doctrine. (18)

The Sixth Amendment provides all citizens the fundamental right to criminal defense counsel, regardless of their financial status, to help preserve the intrinsic human values of life and freedom. (19) Nevertheless, the right to counsel is not absolute, as defendants can surrender it by voluntary waiver, waiver by conduct, and forfeiture. (20) Forfeiture occurs when a defendant engages in deplorable misconduct such as excessive dilatory tactics, repeated dismissal of appointed counsel, or threatening or harming his or her attorney. (21) A judge will invoke forfeiture to safeguard the integrity of the judicial proceedings and ensure a fair resolution of the matter. (22)

The case of King v. Superior Court (23) presents a formulaic approach for applying forfeiture, which ensures adequate due process prior to removal of counsel. (24) Pursuant to King, in order to ensure the application of forfeiture is proper, a defendant must be notified of the pending forfeiture sanctions and be offered a hearing wherein he or she is represented by counsel and given the opportunity to call witnesses and present evidence regarding his or her purported misconduct and its bearing on the case. (25) The King court held that in evaluating a defendant's actions in tandem with his or her defense presented at the hearing, a judge should determine if the defendant's conduct was egregious in view of the entirety of the situation, and therefore whether a sanction of forfeiture is warranted and in the interest of justice. (26) A court should also take the mental health and capacity of the defendant into account when evaluating whether forfeiture is proper, as its application results in the defendant proceeding pro se in the matter. (27)

In Commonwealth v. Means, the SJC evaluated whether an indigent criminal defendant's misbehavior warranted forfeiture of his court-appointed trial counsel without any successor. (28) In considering this issue of first impression, the SJC looked to other state and federal jurisdictions for guidance on differentiating forfeiture from other waivers of counsel and establishing the requisite process for its application. (29) The SJC held that while forfeiture is a recognized and constitutional method of courtroom management, courts should only apply it as a last resort when the defendant has engaged in egregious conduct. (30) The SJC further emphasized that the court should never apply forfeiture absent a hearing where the defendant has a chance to provide an explanation of his or her actions, which the court should consider alongside the totality of the circumstances in deciding whether to apply forfeiture. (31) Although Means's actions may have been egregious enough to warrant the sanction of forfeiture, the SJC concluded that because the trial court did not provide Means a hearing to defend his behavior pursuant to his due process rights in connection with his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the application of the forfeiture doctrine was inappropriate. (32)

The SJC also acknowledged that forfeiture is unsuitable, even when it might otherwise be appropriate, if the court finds the defendant mentally incompetent. (33) The SJC recognized that in addition to the elements previously established by other jurisdictions, a judge should evaluate a defendant's mental health to determine if the defendant can voluntarily or involuntarily appear prose. (34) In articulating that the defendant's behavior determines the scope of any inquiry into the defendant's mental status, the SJC also noted that a court should continually visit the issue of a defendant's mental stability throughout the course of the matter, as mental functioning can change over time. (35) Although the SJC established a scheme for Massachusetts courts to use in determining whether the exercise of forfeiture is appropriate, which includes an evaluation of the defendant's mental status, the SJC did not delve further into the proffered procedure as it immediately found that forfeiture was inappropriate because the trial judge deprived Means of a hearing prior to its application and thus denied him due process in connection with his Sixth Amendment entitlements. (36)

In adopting the procedure established by the King court, the SJC wisely broached new ground in Massachusetts by establishing a mechanism judges must adopt when applying the forfeiture doctrine. (37) Although informal requirements permit the court some flexibility when invoking legal principles pursuant to what is...

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