Deliberative layering: Explaining diverse interest mobilization across the European Parliament's Policy Cycle

• Published date: 01 February 2021
• Author: David Coen,Wilhelm Lehmann,Alexander Katsaitis
• Date: 01 February 2021
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1002/pa.2139

ACADEMIC PAPER

Deliberative layering: Explaining diverse interest mobilization

across the European Parliament's Policy Cycle

David Coen

1

| Wilhelm Lehmann

2

| Alexander Katsaitis

3

1

Department of Political Science, University

College London, London, UK

2

Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced

Studies, European University Institute,

Florence, Italy

3

ARENA-Centre for European Studies,

University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway

Correspondence

Alexander Katsaitis, ARENA-Centre for

European Studies, University of Oslo,

Postboks 1143, Blindern 0318, Oslo, Norway.

Email: alexander.katsaitis@arena.uio.no

Abstract

Drawing from work on deliberation and information-access, this paper conceptually

frames why and when different types of interests mobilize across the parliamentary

policy cycle. We posit that each policy stage holds its own deliberative purpose and

logic, leading to a variation in the type and volume of information demanded. The

legitimacy of the expertise interest groups provide is affected by their organizational

characteristics. To ensure the smooth flow of the policy process, members of parlia-

ment encourage groups that legitimately hold relevant information to mobilize at

each policy stage, while lobbyists choose to mobilize when their expertise allows

them to better influence policy-makers' debates. We test our argument in the con-

text of the European Parliament, following a unique survey of the 8th legislature

(2014–2019). The responses lend support to our model. In a policy process that con-

tains various stages of deliberation, different organizations hold an information-

expertise key that gives them access at different stages. Significantly, less studied

groups, such as think tanks and consultancies, mobilize well ahead of others in the

cycle's initial phases; while lobbyists representing public constituencies dominate in

the final stages. The paper contributes to broader theoretical discussions on plural-

ism, bias, and deliberation in policy-making.

1|INTRODUCTION

To protect its democratic credentials against accusations of business

bias, the European Parliament encourages the mobilization of a

diverse interest population to inform its policy-making. As a result,

over the past 15 years, the lobbyists working with the institution have

shifted from primarily corporate to more general societal interests

(Coen & Katsaitis, 2019a; Lehmann, 2009). In this paper, we aim to

explain when and why different interest groups mobilize across the

EP's policy cycle.

Drawing from deliberative theory and information exchange

models, we argue that each policy stage has its own deliberative pur-

pose and logic, influenced by the number of policy-makers it involves

and by its degree of openness towards different constituencies

(Eriksen & Fossum, 2000). These factors lead to a concomitant varia-

tion in the type and volume of information demanded. On the supply

side, the legitimacy of the information interest groups provide is

affected by their organizational characteristics, notably the number of

their principals and their lobbying objectives (Zürn, Binder, & Ecker-

Erhardt, 2012). MEPs encourage groups that offer legitimate and rele-

vant information to engage at each policy stage, while lobbyists

mainly choose to mobilize when they expect that their expertise will

allow them better to influence policy-makers' debates.

We assess our model through a survey conducted with MEPs

during the 8th legislature, asking how often different groups contact

their office at different policy stages. The results reveal variation

across the cycle in the mobilization of different interest group catego-

ries. This paper contributes to discussions of political pluralism and

Received: 16 December 2019 Revised: 23 February 2020 Accepted: 9 March 2020

DOI: 10.1002/pa.2139

This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reprodu ction in any medium,

provided the original work is properly cited.

© 2020 The Authors. Journal of Public Affairs published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

J Public Affairs. 2021;21:e2139. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/pa 1of9

https://doi.org/10.1002/pa.2139