Defining national security as peace through strength: Ronald Reagan's visionary rhetoric of renewal in the 1980 presidential campaign.

• Author: Drury, Sara A. Mehltretter

In the 1980 election, Republican actor-turned-governor Ronald Reagan challenged incumbent Democrat Jimmy Carter for the presidency. It was a challenging time for the United States. In his now-infamous Crisis of Confidence (or "Malaise") speech, Carter (1980) addressed the nation and described his presidency as a time that produced a "crisis of confidence" in the United States, with a "growing doubt about the meaning of our own lives and in the loss of a unity of purpose for our Nation" (p. 1237). The long and controversial struggle in Vietnam was over, but U.S. global power seemed to be waning on multiple fronts. An oil shortage depressed the economy. In the fall of 1979, U.S. television screens broadcast supporters of a new, radical government in Iran holding fifty-two Americans hostage in the U.S. embassy. There indeed seemed reasons to doubt the strength and security of the nation. In contrast, the Republican candidate promised "a rebirth of the American tradition of leadership" in domestic and international affairs (Reagan, 1980a, para. 7). Reagan's advocacy relied not only on a call to renew what he referred to as the American spirit, but also on substantive changes in foreign policy and national security strategy.

In his 1980 foreign policy discourse, Reagan offered a visionary rhetoric of renewal, employing emotional appeals and narration alongside national security policy plans to return the United States to "peace through strength." To analyze these rhetorical strategies, this essay examines four significant foreign policy speeches during Reagan's 1980 presidential campaign: the nomination speech at the Republican National Convention, two speeches devoted to Reagan's plans for foreign policy-the Veteran of Foreign Wars Convention speech and A Strategy for Peace in the '80s-and Regan's speech the night before the election (Reagan, 1980a, 1980b, 1980c, 1980d). I argue that Reagan's campaign rhetoric represented visionary rhetoric--a. deep, substantive form of argument relying on emotion, narration, and appeals to change.

To begin, I draw from previous scholarship on presidential rhetoric, rhetorical visions, emotion, narrative, and crafting a methodological framework for understanding visionary rhetoric. I next consider previous accounts of Reagan as a rhetor. Then, I identify four major foreign policy speeches of Reagan's 1980 presidential campaign and analyze the ways Reagan constructed a visionary rhetoric of renewal for U.S. national security and foreign policy. Reagan's visionary rhetoric of renewal gained resonance as the campaign progressed, linking emotion and values with the potential for specific changes and actions in foreign policy. To conclude the essay, I reflect on visionary rhetoric as demonstrating the interplay between emotion, narration, and public policy discourse in U.S. political rhetoric, and argue that visionary rhetoric is a powerful tool for political candidates.

PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS AND VISIONARY RHETORIC

The president's ability to define political and social reality is one of his essential rhetorical powers. This power does not function in a direct, causational way, but rather through the nuanced influences within the rhetorical landscape (Hart, 2008). Presidents historically have been the "center of American political culture," serving as the symbol of our government, the dominant actor in policy debates, and the chief communicator (Edwards, 2008a, p. 832). Defining events and interpreting history are aspects of what Leroy Dorsey (2002) has called the president's "rhetorical leadership"--the "process of discovering, articulating, and sharing the available means of influence in order to motivate human agents in a particular situation" (p. 9).

Particularly in matters of foreign affairs, the president's power to define the situation and outline the options available is unmatched by any other political actor (Zarefsky, 2004; see also Edwards, 2008b; Hart, 2008; Heidt, 2013; Stuckey, 1991). Few citizens have first-hand experience with foreign affairs, so they look to the president for information about the state of the world and U.S. foreign policy interests. Because of his position as commander-in-chief, the president has not only the legal power to send U.S. troops to war, but also the rhetorical power to portray situations as threats or crises warranting diplomatic or military action (Bostdorff, 1994; Kiewe, 1991; Kuypers, 1997). Much of the president's influence over U.S. foreign policy rests in his ability to define our national security interests (Winkler, 2006). As commander-in-chief, the president has more access to intelligence information than other political actors; this was especially true during the Cold War era, when the executive branch gained more control over national security matters (Leffler, 1993). As the head of state, the president gives meaning to the concept of national security by defining the threats to the nation, identifying friends and foes, and articulating a vision of the nation's role in global affairs.

This is not to say that the president has sole or unchallenged authority over U.S. foreign policy. As J. Michael Hogan (1986) has argued, the president may be challenged by a "variety of individuals and groups," some of which may become "formidable opponents of the administration." These critics may undermine the president's agenda and policies (p. 10). Nevertheless, the president's power to define our national security interests remains considerable. When the president identifies a significant threat to national security, he is enacting the ability of the president to define political reality, to "shape the context in which events or proposals are viewed by the public" (Zarefsky, 2004, p. 611).

Although the candidates do not yet hold the office of president, presidential campaigns represent opportune moments for candidates to propose alternative political realities. As they engage in speeches and debates, candidates' campaign discourse can support, shift, dismiss, or re-define political issues facing the nation (Bailey, 2008; Ball, 2005; Ivie & Giner, 2009; Kiewe, 1999; Murphy, 2011; Spielvogel, 2005; Steudeman, 2013). Like the president, a presidential candidate has the opportunity to define- or re-define-what Edward Schiappa (2003) calls the "shared understanding among people about themselves, the objects of their world, and how they ought to use language" (p. 3). In short, a presidential campaign is an opportune moment for a candidate to employ visionary rhetoric.

As used here, the term visionary rhetoric draws from Ernest Bormann's theory of rhetorical visions, scholarship employing and developing that theory, and theoretical perspectives on argument, emotion, and narrative. Bormann (1972) defined a rhetorical vision as "the composite dramas which catch up large groups of people in a symbolic reality" (p. 398). The concept of rhetorical vision has been used as a part of fantasy theme rhetorical criticism and symbolic convergence theory, linking to group communication and identity formation (Bormann, 1977; Borman, 1982; Bormann, Cragan, & Shields, 1996; Broom & Avanzino, 2010; Endres, 1989; Endres, 1997; Rarick, Duncan, Lee, & Porter, 1977; Underation, 2012). The term rhetorical vision has also found its way into popular culture, as it is a common term in the "lexicon of journalists" (Bormann, Cragan, & Shields, 2003, p. 367). Beyond its relevance for group communication, scholars have also linked rhetorical visions to the significance of argumentation that relies on narrative, myth, values, and imagination (Bostdorff, 2003; Casey & Rowe, 1996; Gunn, 2003; Lewis, 1987). Rhetorical visions may derive some of their power from fragmentation, which enables the application of specific parts of the vision to appropriate situations. This sort of "tactical narration," as West and Carey (2006, p. 403) have argued, may be deployed across a variety of rhetorical agents and sites, "not so much fixing texts, relations, rituals, or practices, but instead: fantasies" (Gunn, as cited in West and Carey, 2006, p. 402).

Yet whereas rhetorical visions might "chain out" a fantasy theme or common set of understandings, visionary rhetoric is employed by a rhetor who advocates for change, such as a proposed public policy, institutional reform, calls to individual actions, and so on. Visionary rhetoric often relies on narrative to demonstrate the vision of change to the audience, and links that vision to strong emotions and values. Looking at social issues advocacy, Olson (2007) has demonstrated the power of a "concrete, vivid, and compelling vision of the improved world" used in contrast to the "negative consequences of refusing to change" (p. 94). The power of visions can also be applied to political campaigns: to be persuaded to accept and believe in a vision, a rhetor convinces his or her audience that the rhetorical vision can be enacted, shifting the vision from a competing definition to a perceived, potential public reality.

Visionary rhetoric, therefore, enables the rhetor to relate to a community with shared values and move that community towards action or change. Since the vision of the improved world is future-focused, visionary rhetoric is an example of a hybrid rhetorical form. Visionary rhetoric contains both epideictic and deliberative speech, with the rhetor rehearsing the values of a community and proposing policy action (Murphy, 2003). In Reagan's case, he deployed powerful visionary rhetoric in his national security vision of peace through strength. Reagan proposed the renewal of U.S national security and prestige, defining anew what it meant to be secure in the United States. His campaign rhetoric appealed to conservative U.S. values and emotion, but also articulated specific foreign policy changes.

STUDIES OF REAGAN AS THE GREAT COMMUNICATOR

Many rhetorical critics credited Reagan's reputation as the "Great Communicator" to his...