Defining the hourglass: when is a claim under the Florida Civil Rights Act time barred?

• Author: Sasser, Meenu T.

This article focuses on the statute of limitations for filing a civil action under the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, which amended the Human Rights Act of 1977.

In 1992, the Florida Legislature amended the Human Rights Act of 1977. Now called the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (FCRA), the amendments changed many of the procedural rules associated with filing a claim under the FCRA. This article will focus on the statute of limitations for filing a civil action under the FCRA.

Under the FCRA, a claimant must file a complaint with the Florida Commission on Human Relations ("commission") within one year of an employer's alleged violation.[1] Within 180 days of filing the complaint, the commission should determine if reasonable cause exists to believe that a covered discriminatory practice has occurred.[2] Once notified of the commission's determination of reasonable cause, the claimant must file his or her civil action within 365 days or request an administrative hearing within 35 days.[3] If the commission instead determines that there is no cause to believe the employer's conduct has violated the FCRA, the claimant may only file for an administrative hearing.[4] This too must be done within 35 days of being notified of the commission's determination.[5]

All is well if the commission is timely and makes an express finding as to cause. However, what happens if the commission fails to return a determination within 180 days? "In the event that the commission fails to determine whether there is reasonable cause ... within 180 days of the filing of the complaint, an aggrieved person may proceed ... as if the commission determined that there was reasonable cause."[6] Though clear on its face, the provision presents a court with the following dilemma: Does use of the phrase "may proceed" indicate legislative intent to preserve the FCRA's time restrictions on civil actions brought under the act?

The issue is brought into focus by another provision of the FCRA which states "a civil action brought under this section shall be commenced no later than one year after the date of determination of reasonable cause by the commission."[7]

Clearly, the claimant may proceed with his or her civil action when the commission is nonresponsive. However, if the claimant remains passive and simply waits for the commission's response, should the claim fall back into the general statute of limitations for statutory claims or be subject to the more restrictive time limits imposed by the FCRA? This very question is currently being presented to the Florida Supreme Court.[8] The First and Fourth district courts of appeal have both certified the question.

In Joshua v. City of Gainesville, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D550, 1999 WL 71523 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), the First District Court of Appeal, noting that pro se claimants could be misled by the permissive language of the FCRA, certified this issue for review by the Florida Supreme Court. However, the Joshua court stated that when taken as a whole, the FCRA's tone and procedural structure seem to favor a clear filing limit of one year.

Should the courts view a claimant who disregards his or her right to proceed, passively waiting for the commission's determination of reasonable cause, as having been misled or instead as the beneficiary of an ambiguous detour?

From Milano to Adams

Only a handful of decisions have addressed this question. However, these decisions have been unanimous in holding plaintiffs to the one- year limit.[9] Most noteworthy are the decisions in Milano v. Moldmaster, Inc., 703 So. 2d 1093 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); Joshua v. City of Gainesville, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D550,1999 WL 71523 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999); and Adams v. Wellington Regional Medical Center, Inc., 727 So. 2d 1139, 1140 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).

In Milano, the Fourth District Court of Appeal upheld the trial court's determination that the one-year limitation on filing a civil action began to run at the expiration of the 180-day period in which the commission was to make a determination of reasonable cause.[10] The court reasoned that a claimant should not enjoy an open-ended time extension that would essentially render the statutory limitation meaningless.[11]

The Joshua case also held, on the authority of Milano, that the plaintiff was subject to the one-year limit.[12] The court noted that "where possible, courts must give full effect to all statutory provisions and construe related statutory provisions in harmony with one another."[13] In that case, the successful appellee argued that use of "may" in subsections (4) and (8) denotes the legislature's intent to establish a procedural process.[14] Under both subsections, the statute provides a claimant with options from which to elect a course of action.

Finally, the Adams court, citing Milano, also rejected the plaintiffs argument in favor of the general four-year filing limit.[15] The court in Adams certified the same question put before the Florida Supreme Court in Joshua.[16]

Though the cases are unanimous in holding plaintiffs to the one-year filing deadline...