Defensive Medicine and Obstetric Practices: Evidence from the Military Health System

Date01 March 2020
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/jels.12241
AuthorMichael Frakes,Jonathan Gruber
Published date01 March 2020
Journal of Empirical Legal Studies
Volume 17, Issue 1, 4–37, March 2020
Defensive Medicine and Obstetric
Practices: Evidence from the Military
Health System
Michael Frakes*and Jonathan Gruber
We estimate the extent of defensive medicine by physicians during labor and delivery,
drawing on a novel and significant source of variation in liability pressure. In particular,
we embrace the no-liability counterfactual made possible by the structure of liability rules
in the Military Heath System. Active-duty patients seeking treatment from military facilities
cannot sue for harms resulting from negligent care, while protections are provided to
dependents treated at military facilities and to all patients—active-duty or not—who
receive care from civilian facilities. Drawing on this variation and addressing endogeneity
in the choice of treatment location by estimating mother fixed effects specifications and
by exploiting exogenous shocks to care location choices stemming from base-hospital clo-
sures, we find suggestive evidence that liability immunity increases cesarean utilization and
treatment intensity during childbirth, with no measurable negative effect on patient
outcomes.
I. Introduction
While the medical liability system is generally prem ised on satisfying the obje ctives of
compensation, corrective jus tice, and/or deterrence, much of the attention paid by
scholars and policymakers to th e medical malpractice system has fo cused on an
unintended, but potentially cri tical, side effect of this system: “defensive medicine.”
Defensive medicine can perhaps best be seen as deterrence gone awry (Mello & Brennan
2002), capturing situations in which fear of medical liabili ty causes physicians to practice
suboptimal care—that is, eith er providing too much care (“posi tive” defensive medicine)
or too little care (“negative” defen sive medicine). Both such response s are alarming
from a policy and welfare point of view. Ne gative defensive medicine impli cates
*Address correspondence to Michael Frakes, Duke University, 210 Science Dr., PO Box 90362, Durham, NC
27708; email: michael.frakes@law.duke.edu. Frakes is at Duke University and National Bureau of Economic
Research; Gruber is at Massachusetts Institute of Technology and National Bureau of Economic Research.
We are extremely grateful to Mike Dinneen and Daryl Crowe at the Military Health System and to Wendy Funk
and Keith Hofmann at Kennell Inc. for making the MHS data available to us. We thank Ronen Avraham for pro-
viding data on damage-cap reforms. We are also grateful to Jonathan Petkun and Chris Behrer for outstanding
research assistance. We acknowledge funding from NIA grant R01AG049898.
4
concerns over patient access to ca re, while positive defensive medic ine implicates
concerns over unnecessary heal th-care spending (to a potential ly substantial degree).
Whether liability causes positiv e or negative defensive medicine or n o defensive medi-
cine at all is likely to depend on a number of context ual factors. Arguably foremost
among those factors is the clinical set ting itself. In this article, we will r evisit the topic of
defensive medicine in a clinical sett ing that has been the most frequent ta rget of the
defensive medicine literatur e and that represents the most fr equent reason for hospitali-
zation in the United States: child birth.
Childbirth provides an especially powerful setting by which to explore the mechanics
of defensive medicine given that obstetrics/gynecology represents one of the higher-risk
specialties from a malpractice perspective. Jena et al. (2011) project that 74 percent of
obstetricians/gynecologists will face a malpractice claim by age 45 compared with 55 per-
cent for physicians practicing in internal medicine and its subspecialties. Though the topic
of defensive medicine in obstetric practices is well-trodden territory in the academic litera-
ture, there remains both theoretical and empirical ambiguity surrounding the question of
whether, to what extent, and in what direction physicians practice defensively during labor
and delivery. In this article, we approach this inquiry while bringing to bear a rich and
novel source of data and a powerful new estimation strategy. For these purposes, we build
on our recent efforts (Frakes & Gruber 2019) and turnour focus to the Military Health Sys-
tem (MHS).
The crux of our methodol ogical approach is th e Feres doctrine, a well-known
and highly controversi al rule that prohibits act ive-duty patients rec eiving medical treat-
ment from military facil ities from having any re course should they suff er harm from
negligent care—that is , they can sue neither the gov ernment nor the treating ph ysi-
cian in such circumstan ces. Importantly, howe ver, liability recou rse is available to
dependents and retirees treated at military facilities and to all patients—active-duty or
not—who receive care from civilian facilities. Variat ion in when Feres does and does
not apply affords us the oppor tunity to construct a pow erful methodological t ool
absent from traditional defensive medicine inve stigations: a treatmen t group of
patients who lack access to the medical liability system. That is, by comparing those
patients over which physicians are not subject to liability pressure to other patients
over which physicians ar e subject to such pressur e, we can identify the ful l impact of
liability forces on trea tment utilization and pat ient outcomes. The exis ting literature,
in contrast, has relied o n more limited forms of var iation—for example, ob serving dif-
ferential behavior in situations whereby patients do and do not have the ability to col-
lect pain and suffering da mages above some specified c ap. Not only may those stud ies
drawing on damages caps an d related tort reforms fai l to inform on the full exten t
of liability’s influence on behavior, but they also raise potential methodological con-
cerns to the extent that there r emains some ambiguity reg arding the extent to which
a physician’s percepti on of liability risk vari es in the presence of such limi ted reforms
(Carrier et al. 2010).
In more specific terms, to capture a liability-immunity treatment effect, we follow
Frakes and Gruber (2019)—which had embraced this approach on the full inpatient
sample—and estimate a difference-in-difference design in which we compare the care
Defensive Medicine and Obstetric Practices 5
received by active-duty versus non-active-duty mothers delivering on the base versus off
the base. To address endogeneity in the choice of on-base versus off-base care while esti-
mating this difference-in-difference design, we draw on exogenous shifts in access to
MHS bases during our sample period due to military hospital closings pursuant to recom-
mendations by the Base Realignment and Closure Commission. Moreover, to further
address endogeneity concerns, we expand on Frakes and Gruber (2019) and take advan-
tage of the fact that many patients in this childbirth subsample have repeated hospitaliza-
tions over the sample period of the same clinical nature. This fact allows us to include
mother fixed effects in many of our empirical specifications.
To execute this design, we rely on a unique set of data on births: the Military
Health System Data Repository (MDR). Covering 2003 to 2013, these data provide
incident-level claim records of inpatient stays for beneficiaries of the MHS, including
stays at both military and civilian hospitals and for active-duty beneficiaries and non-
active-duty beneficiaries. Using these records, we formulate a number of health-care
spending and utilization metrics, in addition to quality metrics.
In our previous work (Frakes & Gruber 2019), we found evidence suggesting that
immunity from liability is associated with a roughly 5 percent reduction in inpatient treat-
ment intensity. These previous findings are consistent with the conventional wisdom that
providers practice “positive” defensive medicine—that is, that liability pressures contrib-
ute to elevated spending. In the present article, however, consistent with the findings of
Currie and MacLeod (2008), we find evidence suggesting that immunity from liability is
associated with a modest increase in treatment intensity in the childbirth setting, including
a 4 percent increase (relative to the mean) in the rate of cesarean delivery. If anything,
these results are contrary to the lay perception that liability fears cause physicians to per-
form additional cesarean deliveries. Moreover, consistent with a defensive—that is,
suboptimal—interpretation of these treatment-intensity findings, we do not find any evi-
dence suggesting that immunity from liability is associated with a change in patient out-
comes. However, we stress that our estimates are imprecise in the case of some of the
health outcome metrics explored.
Our article proceeds as follows . Section II reviews the exist ing literature on
defensive medicine in obstetric pr actices, and describes the variatio n in medical liability
rules pertaining to the militar y population, which forms the b asis for our identification
strategy. Section III discusses ou r data, while Section IV sets forth our em pirical strat-
egy. Section V presents the res ults of our analysis. Finally, Sec tion VI concludes.
II. Background
II.A. Defensive Medicine Background and Literature Review
Analysts frequently attribute defensive medicine to uncertainties in the minds of physi-
cians as to what care standards are expected of them under the law (Frakes 2015;
Craswell & Calfee 1986). Consider a physician deciding whether to perform a particular
procedure in order treat a particular condition, but assume that the physician is uncer-
tain as to whether the courts will expect that she perform the procedure in question. In
6Frakes and Gruber

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT